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THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT

BY

F. MELIAN STAWELL

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"Shall I bring to the birth, and not cause to bring forth? saith the Lord."

UNDERLYING this book is the conviction that a sane nationalism, when it understands itself, points the way to internationalism as its completion. The principle that builds the single State cannot end with the single State. This has been felt, sometimes clearly, more often dimly, by all the best thinkers of Europe. The lesson has been hard; indeed, it has never been learnt, but it ought to be learnt and it could be learnt. Gradually the sense of its need has grown and in that growth lies hope. The survey which follows has been, for reasons of space, confined on the whole to Europe, but the same factors are and always have been at work in all nations.

CHAPTER I

ANCIENT THOUGHT: HELLENIC AND HEBRAIC

With the first beginnings in Europe of political thought we find the recognition, at least in theory, that individual man is formed for life in common, that he can only grow to his best in a unified society, and, the wider and more varied such a society can be, the richer his own development. In political thought, as elsewhere, the Greeks are our pioneers, and these conceptions are fundamental in all their thinking. To Plato, for example, the connection between the man and the community appears so intimate and so self-evident that he cannot even begin to answer the question,—Does it profit a man to be just?—without framing the picture of a perfectly just society. And this, not simply because in such a society the honest man would be rewarded and the thief punished, but because the philosopher cannot conceive

of man being satisfied with anything short of a City that did its best for all its members. Only in that setting, or working for that setting, can he advance, unhampered, towards the goal of his individual life, the contemplation of the Absolute Good. This conception dictates the framework of Plato's *Republic* as it dictated the lifelong conduct of Plato's master, Socrates. That Socrates should choose death rather than disobey the laws of his city, even when those laws were unjustly administered, is of a piece with the whole life of the man who believed that he owed everything worth having to his native land, that his best way of repaying the debt was by the search for truth, and that this search could only hope to be successful if co-operative. "The life without enquiry was no life for man," and the enquiry must be a common task. It is a mistake to think of the Socratic questioning as merely or essentially ironical. Underneath it lay the conviction that by joint examination and criticism truth was to be discovered, and that the common man as well as the elect, the mechanic as well as the poet, had his contribution to make and his share to do.

It is true that Socrates, in the troubled times through which he lived, withdrew as much as possible from definite political action,

and Plato puts into his mouth as the reason a condemnation that certainly does not lack sternness. "No man will ever be safe," he is made to declare before his judges in the noble defiance of the *Apology*, "who stands up boldly against you or against any other democracy and condemns the many crimes that are committed in the State. . . . The man who is to fight for justice, if he is to keep his life at all, must work in private, not in public." But no free-born Athenian, all the same, could withdraw entirely from public life unless he withdrew from his country, and what his country meant to Socrates can be told from the *Crito*. In that dialogue his words glow not only with personal love for Athens but also with the conviction that in a city so free there is a sacred contract between herself and her citizens. She allows them to leave her if they choose and to persuade her if they can, and he who elects to live with her taking the benefits of her laws binds himself to submit to her punishments, if he cannot "convince her where justice lies": he must "win her consent or obey her will, suffering quietly all that she bids him suffer." To break the laws by force was for Socrates to break the most solemn of pledges.

Here we have for the first time the definite idea of a "Social Contract," a conception that has had so deep an influence ever since and before which so great a future lies. What is essential in this, its valid and vital form, is the amount of freedom and initiative that it involves on both sides: the laws must be designed for the good of the subject and they must leave that subject room to criticize, to construct, and in the last resort to leave the community. In the work of Socrates' followers, Plato and Aristotle, this element of liberty retreats, it is true, into the background. But it is always insisted that government must be for the good of the governed, that any satisfactory society must be a unification of varied elements, and while both writers toy with the idea of monarchy, should there happen to be one man of superlative excellence available, both conceive in their ideal community, the community where "the citizens are as good as they can be," a company of equals learning alternately to obey and to rule. But this company is narrowly conceived, and here we come on the limitation that was the bane of Greek thought and still more of Greek practice. The Guardians in Plato's Republic, the full citizens in Aristotle's perfect *Polity*, are after all only a

fraction of the whole. And this narrowness does nullify the inspiration in their belief that, to quote Spinoza centuries later, "nothing could be more useful to man than Man."

"Useful," not in the mere sense of life-saving. "The State," wrote Aristotle in a pithy and immortal phrase, "may have come into existence for the sake of life, it exists for the sake of the good life." And we get some idea of how far Aristotle meant the phrase to reach if we read, as he intended, the *Politics* in connection with his *Ethics* and *Metaphysics*. "The good life" for him is the harmonious life which fits a man, while developing his other powers, to contemplate so far as in him lies that Absolute Perfection which is the spring of everything admirable on earth and in the heavens. Men, as he says, quaintly and profoundly, can contemplate that Good better in others than in themselves, and thus for him the friendship between good men is at the climax of human action and human knowledge. Now "the well-ordered State" is the training-ground and sphere of such men, and therefore "to complete the philosophy of human life an enquiry into the State is imperative" (*Nic. Ethic.* fin.).

With such words Aristotle attacks the

problem of all States. This belief that men as men need each other for their development is thus both at the base and at the summit of his thinking. Nothing is more characteristic of him than the saying "Man is by nature a political animal." But, when he comes to work out his system in detail, only the few are treated as possessing this nature at all. In a territory tiny itself, Aristotle suggests that those who are fit for the full rights of citizenship should not be too numerous to know each other personally.

This inner contradiction in Aristotle's thought, and in the thought of the classical Greeks generally, becomes acute on the question of slavery, the foundation even of their most advanced democracies. And there are signs that Aristotle himself was uncomfortable on the subject. At any rate he demurred to the practice of Greeks making slaves of Greeks. It is worth laying stress on these familiar points because they illustrate, at the beginning of Europe's history, what is plain throughout it, the fact that not till a community begins to unify itself can it think of unifying the world. Nationalism, though it has often resisted internationalism, is always a "moment" in the process towards the goal. But the Greeks are a long

way from this. Aristotle does not even envisage the question how the peace is to be kept between his tiny State and the many who must surround it. It is true that he has no love for war as such, that he says outright "we make war for the sake of peace," a famous saying, destined to stir the imagination of Europe and be expanded by St. Augustine for his *City of God*, by Dante for his *Monarchy*, and by Cervantes for his *Don Quixote*. But Aristotle, like these successors, looks on war as inevitable. Nor does he attack its evils: rather he glorifies death in battle for one's country as among the finest examples of human virtue. So with Plato: the organization of his "Fair City" involves the organization of the fighting-men, and peace has no part in his bright vision.

Further, it is lamentable to see how far below their theories, whatever the limitation of these, fell the practice of the Greeks. The central lesson from their political history is precisely that their leading States tore each other to pieces, when their prospects were at the best, by a series of wholly needless wars, bred from rival ambitions. Plato and Aristotle write after the most disastrous of these, the struggle between democratic Athens and oligarchic Sparta, the long Peloponnesian

War, a war lasting nearly a generation, twenty-seven years, according to the estimate of Thucydides, from 431 B.C. to the close of the century. And with both philosophers it is clear enough from their sharp criticism of democracy and their sympathetic references to Sparta that neither would have approved that war. It was not approved at the time by the best writers of Athens who had to live through it. We miss the vital point of Thucydides' great history, certainly the greatest in the world, if we do not realize that he felt both parties were to blame. He does not disguise the cruelty and treachery of the Spartans, and his exile of twenty years could not destroy his admiration for what was fine in his own city of Athens and magnificent in her Imperialism, her claim to be "the school of Hellas" in the lofty and simple life of art and thought. But he does not hesitate to show the tyrannical side of her rule from the first admission put into the mouth of her envoys that the Athenian Empire, at first a league against the Persians, has been steadily advancing towards a despotism. "We have been driven to this," he makes them say in words that foreshadow innumerable later manifestos, "for the sake of our own security, our honour and our interests. It was not

safe, surrounded as we were and are by hostile and suspicious forces, to surrender any of our power." To this he makes them add with a candour more Greek than modern, "we are not the first to act thus: it has always been the custom for the strong to rule the weak, and we consider we are fit to rule." "It has always been the custom," that appeal to the past in justification or excuse occurs again and again in the drama of his history. Sometimes it is said with a confident and cruel sneer, as when the Athenians at the height of their insolence sweep aside the claim of little Melos to stand neutral in the conflict. The Melians trust in the justice of their cause as it will be judged by heaven. The Athenians answer, "We do not fear the judgment of the gods—for we are doing nothing new. We know that men by the law of their nature will rule wherever they can. We did not make that law nor are we the first to follow it. We found it before our day and we shall hand it down after us, knowing well that you yourselves, if you were as strong as we are, would do the same."

There could scarcely be a clearer expression of the progress-barring doctrine, that what has always been, however bad, always must

be, and after all, simply because it always has been cannot much be blamed by other men. But the consequences blame it, although the Gods, as the German poet puts it, do not send in the bill every week-end. After the annihilation of Melos follows the disaster of Syracuse, and Nikias, the innocent incompetent general, just before he and his men are lost in the final doom, uses the old phrase, not as an excuse, but as a plea for pardon. "Surely we have been punished enough. Other men before us have attacked their neighbours: they have done what men will do and suffered what men can bear. At last we may begin to hope that the gods will now be merciful."

The gods had no mercy. The Peloponnesian War ended with the fall of Athens, and though she rose again there was never heart enough in the people to make the effort necessary for federation. How great an effort was needed may be felt from Thucydides' own account of the civil war in Corcyra, oligarchs against democrats, where there was "every form of murder and every extreme of cruelty," "where the father slew the son and the suppliants were torn from the temples." It is one of the strongest indictments against war ever written, and the

stronger for the understanding Thucydides had of the weakness as well as the wickedness of men. The prime cause of the fighting is the lust for power and gain. But once war is begun "men are tempted by dire necessity." "War is a hard master and most men grow like the lives they lead." So it goes on till there is nothing but suspicion everywhere. "There was no treaty binding enough to reconcile opponents: every one knew that nothing was secure and therefore he thought only of his own safety; he could not afford to trust another."

Yet this was the age that produced a Thucydides, and his was not the only voice of reason and pity. The play of "The Trojan Women" by Euripides was performed the year after Melos had been sacked when "the men were killed, the women and children sold into slavery," and no play gives a more moving picture of the conquered. It is they who are the heroic figures in the drama; all the glory is for Hecuba and Andromache and Cassandra, shamed and tortured, not for their Greek conquerors. And the brilliant comedy of the "Lysistrata" in and through its reckless indecency strikes a note that is almost as touching. Lysistrata, whose name means "the Peacemaker," and whose character is

as winning as her name, determines to band the Theban and Spartan women together with the Athenian in a vow that they will have nothing to do with men until the senseless war is ended. And when the others shrink from the sacrifice it is the Spartan who supports her. "The one true woman among you all!" cries Lysistrata. "Stand by me, and we shall save Greece yet, we two."

They did not save Greece, neither they nor their creator Aristophanes. His limitations are plain enough. Even the lovely choruses of peace between enemies with which the "Lysistrata" closes sing of Athens and Sparta united indeed, but united against another enemy, the Persian. And this is always the way through all the dreams and efforts of classic Hellas. When Isocrates half a century later once again implores them to unite, the union at which he aims is still to be pointed against "the foreigner." None the less, if the Athenians had listened to Euripides, Thucydides and Aristophanes and not to Alcibiades and Cleon, if they had taken the advice of Cimon against his stately stern opponent, Pericles, and refused all the attempts at crippling Sparta that could only "leave Greece lame in one leg," they might have opened an era in the history of their country that would

have set a priceless example for all the others that have followed. Because they had, in germ at least, the two ideas of arbitration between equals and confederacy on equal terms, ideas which the long and bitter experience of ages is at last teaching us are essential if nations are to be saved from the curse of war. One of the most admirable devices for civic life at Athens, and the Athenians were fertile in such, was the custom of submitting every quarrel between citizens that did not involve a serious crime to the good offices of an arbitrator, before it came into court at all. If both parties accepted the award, and they often did, the quarrel was at an end. And this excellent plan they were, on occasion, prepared to use between States. At the very opening of the Peloponnesian War the Spartans are felt to be at least formally in the wrong because they do not accept the offer of arbitration made by Pericles.

Not that the historian makes Pericles pacific, far from it, in his justification of war for the sake of Empire, though it is Empire as the basis for a lofty culture. Pericles is made to use words almost as tyrannical as those of Cleon, his successor, and, in a sense, his Nemesis. It is all the more remarkable that an offer of arbitration should have been

made and recorded, even if it were only offered to conciliate the public opinion of Greece. Plutarch even ascribes to Pericles a proposal, before the war broke out, for a Pan-Hellenic congress with delegates chosen from all the States. Thucydides, however, mentions nothing of the kind, while Plutarch is writing nearly four hundred years later and himself doubtful of Pericles' good faith. But that Plutarch should make the statement at all throws light on what was felt to be possible in antiquity, although it was never achieved. It is significant that one great grievance against the Athens of Pericles was that she turned the Delian confederacy, intended to be of equals, herself merely the leader, into a despotic Empire, "enslaving free cities contrary to treaty."

Cicero, looking back as Plutarch did through a haze of distance, spoke of the Amphictyonic Council as the common council of Greece. We know now that it was far from being that. Still, there is importance in the mere fact that twelve of the leading "tribes" did unite on an equal basis for a common purpose, even if that common purpose was limited to the care of Delphic territory and the observance of certain rules in battle. Delegates were chosen, two for each "tribe," and the ar-

rangements were such that as regards the voting "Athens, Sparta and Thebes had no more influence than the humblest Ionian, Dorian or Bœotian city." Moreover, the Amphictyons will always deserve a place in any review of Internationalism because theirs was the first Council in Europe, as far as we know, to attempt a definite limitation of cruelties in war. No Amphictyon, according to the ancient oath, could annihilate another's city nor cut off the water, "neither in time of peace nor in time of war." The same spirit is shown by the Platonic saying in the *Republic*, even though Plato limits the compassion of it to the Greeks, that men should never make war without remembering that one day the enemy will become a friend.

Sayings and agreements like these, even though they were never followed up, exhibit that Hellenic balance and humanity of judgment which point out a way of progress more practicable than the advice of extremists. No pure Greek appears ever to have advocated either non-resistance to oppression or the attempt to shorten war by making it as horrible as possible. To the Greek intellect, alert both in theory and practice, it would have seemed absurd to suppose that tyrants would become less tyrannical by being allowed

to have their own way, and sophistical to argue that because war was a resort to force it meant that the force must be unlimited. On the contrary, to find the right limit in war, as elsewhere, was to a thoughtful Greek the problem of problems.

That they never did find this limit was due, not to a lack of insight so much as to a lack of determination and endurance among the common people. And so we turn back to their writers for inspiration, when we are tempted to turn away from their history in despair.

It should be added, if only to avoid misunderstanding, that, for all their treachery and instability, the Greeks were the most humane people of antiquity, beyond Semites, Egyptians and Romans as they were beyond the Italians and Spaniards of the Renaissance.

To a born conqueror, an explorer, and organizer such as Alexander, Greece in her weakness and disunion might well have seemed half-derelict and the Near East entirely so. The powerful days of Babylonia, Assyria and Egypt were in the past; the power of Persia was plainly weakening. The thought that it might be possible to conquer them all must have been intoxicating to a man as restless and

ambitious as he was able. But many scholars have believed that he may also have felt a finer ambition and dreamed of welding the peoples together. It is far from unlikely. He certainly assumed Persian dress and manners and yet he claimed as jealously as his father Philip that a Macedonian was also a Hellene. The largeness of the idea would appeal to a man of his constructive audacity who delighted to open pathways between East and West and recognized merit wherever he came on it, founding new cities in lands that might have seemed worn out, patronizing and encouraging the despised Jews. Moreover, the Persian civilization had always attracted the Greeks even when they fought against it. The whole of Herodotus' history turns on the contrast between the two civilizations, the Greek and the Persian, the free and the despotic, and Herodotus is at pains to show the generous and royal side even of the despotism that he opposes. The figure of Darius in Æschylus' "Persians," play of triumph though it is, stands out as noble and impressive. Even the "Medizing" of traitors among the Greeks bears witness to the charm. And half-way between Æschylus and Alexander we have Xenophon, taking for his ideal prince the legendary figure of Cyrus the Great and em-

phasizing the humane and broad-minded spirit of one who was to rule over many peoples.

But, if it is true that Alexander did have such an aim, he took the wrong way to realize it. The characteristic Greek ideal was, that at least a substantial nucleus of the citizens must be free, and by this they meant that they must share both in administering and in making the laws. This was their right and not a favour. Philip and Alexander inaugurated the era of great despotisms, where the last word rests with the sovereign and those whom he has chosen. And the word is backed by force. The ordinary citizen has no more control over the military power than he has over the laws. The union that is possible under these conditions, in losing freedom, loses the elasticity which gives the spring to internationalism.

The old story of the Gordian knot tells how the prophecy ran that the world would be won by him who could untie it. Alexander cut it with his sword. But that, an internationalist will add, was to conquer the world, not to win it. Nor need we apologize for the allegory when we find that the Alexander of modern days, Napoleon himself, used it in his exile, looking back on his success and his mistakes

and giving a legacy of advice for his son. The Gordian knot of nations must not be cut again: it must be untied.

To the Jews of Daniel's time, somewhere about the Christian era, the Empire of Alexander was the third of the four chief Monarchies that had in turn oppressed the earth, following on the Babylonian and the Persian, and foreshadowing the Roman. Deliverance waits for the chosen people, and it will come through one who is like a Son of Man, not a brute beast trusting in the strength of his horns. It is not surprising that the Book of Daniel has so often fascinated men who have been goaded by arbitrary rule and the power of the sword. There is, it may be granted, a fanatical element in the book itself: the hope of the writer is limited to the holy people of the Jews, though a wider meaning could be given to his words. And this leads at once to the central complexity in Hebrew feeling, which through the influence of the Old Testament proved pregnant with consequences to Europe, the complexity caused by the conflict between broad and narrow views of Israel's destiny. From the time that they are securely established in Palestine, they are convinced that to them is entrusted by God a moral Law of universal validity. This at once marks

them out from other nations and gives them a duty in connection with other nations. Does that mean that they are to be the enemies of every nation which does not adopt the Law, or simply the teacher of every nation? The answer oscillates. At its lowest it was fierce to the point of savagery: at its best it soared up to the idea of a harmony wider than any Greek had imagined. Samuel may have hewn Agag into pieces before the Lord, but Isaiah foresees a time when the earth shall be full of the knowledge of God as the waters cover the sea. The words have the infinite hope that accompanies the austerity of the Hebrew. Greek literature is full of laughter, but it has nothing like this and it is hope of this quality which is needed for internationalism. The Hebrew puts his golden age in the future and has a trust to free men from the paralysis of the past. Whatever wickedness there is or has been, the Lord of Hosts will fight for the righteousness that is to be.

Thus the vision of the world at peace which would have seemed foolishness to the Greek is the strength of the Jew. It was religion that made the Jews a nation, it was religion that opened for them the vista of internationalism. At the same time their religion and their internationalism both remain two-edged.

Their thought, like the Greek, has an inner contradiction from which it seldom works free. We find it perhaps most markedly in Ezekiel. Nothing is more stirring in all their heroic literature than the resolution with which Ezekiel sets himself to build up the remnant of the chosen people in the strange land, by the waters of Babylon. He made no lamentation when the Lord took away from him the desire of his eyes with a stroke, and as he did when his wife died so he does when a messenger comes to him "saying the city is smitten." The final blow, the complete fall of Jerusalem "opens the mouth" of the prophet in that rising sequence of denunciation and promise which culminates in the vision of the valley where the breath of God comes into the dry bones and the two halves of the house of Israel, North and South, Ephraim and Judah, torn asunder by their senseless rivalry, are made one stick in the hand of the Lord. But the narrowness that follows this greatness is a bad augury for the future. Israel has sinned in neglecting the Law; they must keep it now with meticulous care and when they return to their own land "they shall spoil those that spoiled them and rob those that robbed them, saith the Lord God."

The Return was, as a matter of fact, accomplished by a stranger, Cyrus the Persian, and the sense of the service done, for whatever reason, by one nation to another, helps to lift Hebrew prophecy to its widest and noblest sweep. Here and there before the Second Isaiah there are glorious isolated passages that startle us by their breadth of outlook as in the verses ascribed to Isaiah of Jerusalem where the secular enemies of the country are seen as brothers, "when nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." "In that day shall Israel be the third with Egypt and with Assyria, a blessing in the midst of the earth, for that the Lord of Hosts hath blessed them, saying, Blessed be Egypt my people and Assyria the work of my hands and Israel mine inheritance."

But in the Second Isaiah the chosen servant of God is to be "a light to lighten the Gentiles" and he is to act gently as the light, not to break the bruised reed nor cause his voice to be heard in the street: "he shall bring forth judgment in truth. He shall not fail nor be discouraged till he have set judgment in the earth, and the isles shall wait for his law." And this Servant who is to send the light of God from East to West is, in

actual fact, the people who are "blind and deaf." The idealism of the prophet is realist enough to take full account of the present, only he hears a call from the future: "Bring forth the blind people that have eyes and the deaf that have ears." It is this temper that sees Cyrus the alien as the shepherd of the Almighty with his right hand held by God.

Yet even in Isaiah the old contempt recurs: the nations in the end are to bow down to Jerusalem and "lick the dust of her feet." "Strangers shall stand and feed your flocks and aliens shall be your plowmen and your vinedressers. But ye shall be named the priests of the Lord: ye shall eat the wealth of the nations and to their glory shall ye succeed." There is a curious likeness here between the Hebrew prophet and the Greek statesman, each claiming in virtue of his own nation's admirable qualities the right to rule the world. And precisely that claim postpones indefinitely the finer vision of both.

After Ezekiel we can trace plainly enough a sharpening of the conflict between the broader and the narrower elements in Judaism. For all their exclusiveness the Jews were sensitive to the charm of foreign culture. From Persia and the East they learned to conceive the world as a struggle between two

absolutely opposed and alien powers where those who fight against the holy cause are doomed to an eternity of torment, a lesson which was to furnish fuel for centuries of persecution and "religious" wars. Meanwhile, far from attaining without war the universal dominion of their hopes, they did not even regain their independence. To the Persian Monarchy succeeded the Macedonian. And under the successors of Alexander the conflict between zealot and latitudinarian, long smouldering, breaks out into flame. Even under the Persian we have on the one hand Ezra and Nehemiah denouncing as trespassers those who "have married strange women to increase the guilt of Israel." Nothing will appease "the fierce wrath of our God" but the putting away of the wives, "and some of the wives had borne children." The holy seed may not intermarry with Moabite or Ammonite or Egyptian or any of the peoples, "nor seek their peace or their prosperity for ever." Over against this we have the Book of Ruth where it is a wife "of the women of Moab" that refuses, in the tenderest words any woman uses in the Old Testament, to be parted from the people of her husband, a man born of Bethlehem-Judah. And the poet goes further: he makes the son of the Moabitish

damsel father of David's father. By the side of Ruth should be set the Book of Jonah where the grotesque is used, as in a fable, to heighten our sense of the ludicrous element in the obstinacy of a prophet who knows at the bottom of his heart that the Lord is "a gracious God and full of compassion" for all men, yet cannot bring himself to preach the truth to his nation's enemies until he is forced to it, and when they repent and are saved finds that "it displeased him exceedingly." Ezra and Nehemiah on the one hand, Ruth and Jonah on the other are like a foreshadowing of the struggle between Christ and the Pharisees, or between St. Paul and St. John, when the Roman had succeeded the successors of Alexander and the question of world-dominion had entered on a new phase.

CHAPTER II

THE ROMAN EMPIRE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE PAPACY

"When Augustus was Emperor He was born." The birth of Christ corresponds with the change from Roman Republic to Roman Empire, and the widest military despotism Europe has ever experienced was faced with a religion whose chosen weapon was Peace, and whose spirit, in the minds of some, the most devoted among its followers, carried pacifism to the extreme of non-resistance. The controversy as to the interpretation of Christ's words on this crucial point has been unending, from the earliest days of the Church till now, and it is likely to continue, if only for the reason that His words are ambiguous and that sayings, apparently with an equal claim to authenticity, can be quoted for and against. But one thing is clear: for the first time in Europe there emerged definitely and unmistakably the teaching that it was a

fundamental duty to use the methods of peace beyond all limits set of old time, and that all men, without exception, were brothers. How this teaching was baffled we shall soon see and how among its foes were those of its own household. But its emergence is of capital importance.

About the Roman Empire also, controversy has been and will be endless. All will agree that it impressed order and lessened liberty, but in what proportions? And how far should the Romans be praised for the good and excused for the bad? This, at least, the sober student of Internationalism will always bear in mind, that both elements must be ascribed to them. Internationalism in the strictest sense the Empire hardly envisaged: its leading idea was primarily that all nations should coalesce with Rome on varying terms of submission. But even before Rome made terms with Christianity she had applied, more steadily than any people before her, the conviction that Empire had a duty to its subjects. And this conviction she owed in large measure to those forerunners of Christianity in whom Semitic and Greek thought were blended, the Stoic philosophers.

That union was one of the most valuable results from Alexander's work. In the Stoic

the Semitic sense of One God, Lord and Creator, and the Greek sense that Reason is the same all the world over and the desire to actualize reason the spring of all existence, take, when brought together, a character momentous for political thought. When Zeno of Cyprus, about the time of Alexander, came to an Athens still keenly interested in politics and taught with the fervour of an apostle that the One God moves in all men irrespective of race, he broke down the irrational barrier that had fettered Athenian speculation.

The result at the time was small, but the conception survived, permeated the Hellenistic rule and, still more important for posterity, the Roman that took over the inheritance of the Greeks. It combined with the Roman ideal of a uniform, clearly-defined body of law, and we find the conceptions, never afterwards entirely lost, of "a natural law" and "a law of nations" over and above the peculiar rights and customs of any particular people. And as we compare the Roman Republic with the Roman Empire from its inception to its fall in the West, we can trace on the whole, along with the greater rigidity and the loss of liberty already mentioned, a greater sense of fairness to lands outside Italy. The admission of all free-born subjects

to the citizenship of Rome is an enduring title to renown. And there are sayings in Roman law, "None should be judge in his own cause," "What touches all should be approved by all," which, though meant for individuals, are applicable to nations. Again, for all the discipline imposed by Imperial army and Imperial bureaucracy, it may be doubted whether any great city was ever so mercilessly treated by any Emperor as the Republic had treated Carthage, and the student of literature may well ask if Virgil had not been touched by the newer spirit when he created the noble pitiful figure of the Carthaginian queen ruined by the founder of Rome. There is certainly reason to believe that the Messianic vision of universal peace had passed before him. Modern research has shown that "the chanter of the Pollio" was in touch with "Sibylline" songs that go back to Hebrew prophecy. But the vision only touches Virgil in passing: the last drops in the cup of his song are bitter, as Shelley reminds us in the closing lines of "Hellas," with the acrid wine of war.

Much is spoken of the Pax Romana, and it is true that peace was imposed over a wider area and for a longer time than before or since in Europe until the nineteenth century.

But from the end of the second century A.D. until the fall of Imperial Rome at the close of the fifth, that is to say for more than half her span, the Roman Empire in the West was incessantly at war, usually along her frontiers against the barbarians, but sometimes, and notably throughout the third century, because of rivalries inside her own borders. And to this should be added the recurrent and savage persecutions of the Christians up to the time of Constantine. The persecutions bring into relief the character of Roman Law as developed under the Empire. Since the writing of Maitland and Gierke we have come to realize how real is the difference between the spirit of a law that is made by officials and interpreted by them, and the law that is built up with the active co-operation of the ordinary citizen. The English Common Law belongs to the second type and herein it recalls the Greek. The Roman Empire gave full civil rights to all its citizens, it professed and felt a genuine reverence for law, but the plain man had no voice in law-making and could claim no respect for his own conscience. The cleavage that this could produce between governor and governed has no more telling illustration than in the case of Marcus Aurelius. A gentle-

natured Stoic, remembering on the throne that he is only a fragment of the whole, that his life lies in service to the whole, that the world is "the City of God" and himself a citizen of it, that human beings are, or should be, bound together by ties of reason and love, and that respect for another's judgment is involved in self-respect, Marcus Aurelius is among the persecutors. No allegiance can be tolerated that contradicts allegiance to the Empire. But the Christians claimed that the authority of the State was not supreme against the authority of conscience. The little slave-girl, Blandina, suffered torture for days at Lyons,—"No woman," said the onlookers, "ever suffered so much before,"—because she would not deny her faith. The legate of Marcus Aurelius refused to allow even a defence of the accused, when a Roman of standing, to his everlasting honour, claimed it. And in his private notebook we can feel the Emperor's attitude. There are occasions, he says, fortifying his own soul, when a man should be ready to give up his life, but he should do this quietly and after due consideration, "not in a spirit of sheer obstinacy, like the Christians." Despotism, even in a Marcus, sees only obstinacy in the resistance of a Blandina.

Yet not always. It is to the lasting credit of Roman statesmanship that they saw they must make terms with this new religion or it would make an end of their inner coherence. Constantine, six centuries after Alexander, becomes Christian and the daring dream of Paul the Apostle is fulfilled. Rome becomes the hearth of the new home Paul had foreseen when the second and final fall of Jerusalem was impending.

But if the Church conquered the Empire she herself was captured by her captive. She simply accepted the rigid imperial organization, enthroning herself beside it as spiritual adviser. More and more her own system came to be modelled on the Imperial pattern: a hierarchy that aimed at being world-wide with a Law that it was bound to follow, but a Law that could be interpreted anew by the officials and where, in the last resort, the supreme officials had the deciding voice. Thus Authority becomes as much a master-word for the Church as it ever had been for Imperial Rome, while liberty goes to the wall and with liberty the foundation of a living peace. Before Constantine the tone of the Fathers is not only pacific, it is often pacifist. A Christian may not take military service under the Emperors: he may pray for the

Empire, he may not fight for it. After the alliance the tone changes: it was not for nothing that Constantine won his decisive battle "in the sign of the Cross." The Christian may now fight in a just war: and the decision of its justice is left, even by St. Augustine who hates war, to the Emperor, unless indeed the injustice of it is flagrantly at variance with the commands of Christ. And though the Church while the Western Empire lasted never persecuted with the ferocity that had been shown intermittently even under the best of Emperors—there is nothing, for example, to equal the evil pre-eminence of the martyrdoms at Lyons—yet persecute she did, and as a matter of conscience. For this we have to thank the doctrine of hell, a doctrine the influence of which was only increased by the conflict with the opposing but kindred faith of Islam. Thus the Church which at the beginning had stood so valiantly for the rights of the individual conscience became, when it won power, in its turn an oppressor. The tragedy is full of warning for internationalists: all the attempts to unify Europe have failed, it has been truly said, because unity has been conceived as "the imposition of uniformity," not as "the tolerance of variety."

The Church did not save Europe from the deadness which falls on her from the third century to the ninth. For half a millennium there is a stagnation beyond any other we know of in Europe's history. There are exceptions, of course, but the barrenness is of a kind which can only be fully explained if we realize the deadening effect due to the death of freedom. Peace itself would be heavily purchased at such a price, and peace was not purchased. The Western Empire broke down in anarchy.

The Church did not break down. She held her place at Rome when everything reeled, and to this noble tenacity the Roman Communion owed its dominating position in the Middle Ages. She was there when Charlemagne revived the idea of a Universal Empire for the West at the opening of the ninth century, and her best leaders were ready to play their part. And in general, looking backward and forward from Constantine to Innocent III, we must admit that, if the Church was taken captive by the world and missed her finer possibilities, this does not mean that her worth was destroyed or without influence for a richer and truer harmony. She could and did often stand for conscience against the acts of arbitrary power. The

story of Leo, Bishop of Rome, in the fifth century, by sheer dignity and spiritual force, persuading Attila the Hun to spare the City, the story of Ambrose refusing Theodosius entry into the Church at Milan until he had done penance for the massacre at Thessalonica are cases in point. The first tale may be legendary, but it shows the feeling of the time: the second is matter of history, and it indicates also the less good side of the Church's power. The punishment inflicted by Theodosius on the Thessalonicans was arbitrary and fierce, but it was exacted against a community that had put themselves in the wrong by outrage against the Goths. It was the policy of Theodosius to weld, if he could, Goth and Roman together and that policy in itself should have enlisted the full sympathy of the Church. But the Goths were Arians and the opposition of the orthodox to the Arians was inflexible.

It is the first striking instance of conflict between Church and State, and that conflict, as we know, dominates the Middle Ages. Many of the details are outworn, but insistence on details should not obscure the issues of fundamental and permanent importance. They have lessons for our own time. The Church, and the spearhead of the Church, the

Papacy, could be, however imperfectly and confusedly, the champion of ideas which must be acted on if Europe and the world are to be saved. Not only could the clergy furnish an organ through which the grievances of the oppressed might find a voice, but the Church, by the very essence of her structure, was international and a witness to the underlying unity of Christendom. Again, she who served the Prince of Peace could realize that certain things must be done in concert if they are to be done efficiently, and must be done by persuasion, not by force. When the Church, through Gregory the Great, sent the second St. Augustine from Italy to pagan England and the enterprise was followed up by the dispatch of the Greek Theodore from Tarsus, she was flinging out lines of co-operation between peoples saner and surer than any conqueror's. Constantly we can trace this kind of inspiration in the defenders of the Church from the first St. Augustine downwards. If it could have its way and be kept pure it would transform the world. "The most cross-grained sceptic," wrote one of the soberest among historians, Seeley in his book *Natural Religion*, "the spirit most in love with negation, can scarcely deny the grandeur of the original conception of a

universal Church. . . . That there is something under the State which is not quite the State, a thing as yet unnamed,—shall we call it kingdom of God? shall we call it ecclesia? —and then that, as God is one and Man is one, this something must underlie not each nation only, but all mankind taken together —the vision of the whole race passing out of its state of clannish division, as the children of Israel themselves had done in the time of Moses and becoming fit to receive a universal constitution, this is great."

Further, the alliance with the Temporal Power, though it proved fertile in quarrels and in dangers, was good also because it was aiming at an indispensable element of progress. The State, as we know the State, uses force, and it is perfectly consistent to hold that while force is always a two-edged weapon, apter than most to do more harm than good, yet it is a weapon to be used in certain cases against those who know they are doing wrong. Force acts by threats, and threats can never do much good to the soul of the threatened, but they may prevent that soul from injuring others. Therefore, when the thing to be done is more important than the motive with which it is done, force may be, and should be used. When a ruffian is tor-

turing a child, it would no doubt be best of all to convert him, but it is better to stop him by force than not to stop him at all. This theory, however, may be and has been questioned from the days of the first Christian martyrs down to the Quakers, Tolstoyans and conscientious objectors of our own time. We shall have more to say of these later.

For the present it is important to emphasize, first, that this theory underlay the "union of Church and State" and, next, that the position in mediaeval times called for more than ordinary singleness of mind, boldness and prudence. The Church was to be, as it were, always a little ahead of the State, pointing out the more excellent way, making smooth the paths of peace, knowing when she must ask for the sword and knowing also when she had better not interfere at all. The complexity of the situation was the greater because the Church, as we have seen, had inherited the monarchical character of the Roman Empire with no provision for independent nations. And when the flood-tides of vigorous life and thought rose again in Europe, nationality, conscious or unconscious, rose with the flood. Add to all this the natural weakness of human nature when

tempted by great and irresponsible power, and we can scarcely wonder at the failure of the Church to carry Europe further on the road to unity. The Pope, once chosen, was irremovable except by death, and, while in theory any member, however lowly, of the Christian clergy could be chosen, in fact the Pope was almost always an Italian. The prestige of Rome ensured that. And this in itself was a provocation.

Not that the Church is more to be blamed than the rising nations. The milder and nobler counsels of the Popes were usually disregarded and the fiercer followed. The infamous Fourth Crusade was supported though its excesses were condemned by the same Pope, Innocent III, who commanded a truce of four years among all Christian peoples. Condemnation and truce were disregarded, like the weekly Truce of God that other leaders of the Church had later on tried to introduce. It is a grim comment on the mediaeval efforts at unity that the only great action which Christian Europe performed in common through all those years was the military venture of the Crusades. Pope and Emperor tore at each other in what was often a mere naked struggle for power, power not to succour, but to dominate. The disruptive

elements and the unifying are too well-known to need much illustration. Nowhere, perhaps, are both elements more noticeable than in the work of Innocent III, when the influence of the Papacy was at its height. When he summons the Lateran Council of 1215, he sets out as his objects the recovery of the Holy Land and the destruction of heresy, but the council, he adds, must also reform abuses, "compose differences, establish peace, check tyranny, and bring liberty everywhere." After this the council itself solemnly reaffirmed the excommunication of the barons in England who in that very year wrested the charter from John. One can trace a real desire, felt by Innocent himself, to do justice and reform legal procedure: he will not allow priests to bless the absurd and cruel trial by ordeal, he is ready to restrict the excesses even of the appeal to the Curia itself. "It was instituted," he writes, "to guard against the oppression of the weak, not to help the escape of criminals." Yet it is the Lateran Council that would compel secular princes to seek out and punish heretics: if they persist in neglecting this vital work the Pope has the right to release their subjects from their allegiance and assign their territory to the faithful. It is a policy that leads straight,

not only to horrors in heresy-hunting from which Innocent himself shrank, but to bitter opposition alike from growing nations and their rulers. Thus, long before the breach at the Reformation, the Church lost her chance of unifying Europe because she talked about liberty instead of working for it. The great chance seems gone at the end of the thirteenth century, when, with dramatic suddenness, after the triumph over the Empire in the destruction of the Hohenstaufen house, the Papacy falls before the unscrupulous opposition of Philippe le Bel, and the Babylonish Captivity at Avignon begins.

Another chance, perhaps, was given by the movement for Councils in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a movement that has an inner connection with our subject. But by this time the tradition of the Roman Communion was fixed as monarchical. It was hardly likely to look with favour on anything, for example, so radical as the scheme proposed by Nicholas of Cues, where the laity, including even the women, were to have a voice in important decisions. Nor is it to be supposed that the Church's competitor, the Empire, would have been any less despotic had it really become the unifying dominion that it claimed to be. The student has only

to recall the truculence of the German, Henry IV, in his quarrel with Hildebrand, or of Barbarossa when he fought the Lombard cities to feel little doubt of that.

CHAPTER III

MEDIAEVAL THOUGHT: DANTE, MARSIGLIO, DUBOIS, WYCLIF

But when we turn from the acts and efforts of high officials to the general culture of mediaeval times or to the writings of the great thinkers, others and more hopeful factors come into view. Recent research has emphasized the community of feeling that linked together across the nations the wandering scholars, lay or clerical, the Orders of monks and friars, the artists, even in certain cases the merchants. The broad movements of thought and imagination touch all Western Europe alike, sometimes almost at the same time. We watch the Romanesque and the Gothic appearing in the buildings of Italy, France, England, Germany, Spain, each country leaving the mark of its own individuality on the common style, and each learning from the others. We see heroic epic, as in the Chanson de Roland, the Nibelun-

genlied, the Volsung Saga, the story of the Cid give place to Romance and Lyric, and Romance and Lyric enchant Europe. Sometimes one country is in advance, sometimes another, but the kinship is so close during these centuries when the lands of Europe emerge together from the darkness of the Dark Ages that some modern authorities consider it closer than anything known until the nineteenth century.

The scholars, as we might expect, show this solidarity of thought most clearly and consciously. In their common language, the Latin of their intellectual ancestry, the problems of their time, and indeed of our time, begin to be discussed in the light of common conceptions, many of them derived quite clearly from the Greek. And here, in passing, mention should be made of one among the most dramatic contrasts in all the intercourse of nations. While Christian Europe was inciting itself in the Crusades to destroy the Mussulmans root and branch, it was Mussulman thought which was bringing back to Europe by way of Cordova the invaluable legacy of Aristotle. The old ideal of freedom, of the right and duty of every full citizen to share in the making of the State and its laws, revives under this stimulus. Coupled with

the idea of an all-embracing unity due to Christianity and Rome, it gave birth, as we may learn from the profound exposition of Gierke, to the idea we think so modern, "the idea of a State with Representative Institutions." And it was in travail of a wider idea still, an idea not yet brought to birth, the idea of a free union of humanity, a real commonwealth of mankind. This, as we have seen, lies at the bottom of what was noble in the struggle between Empire and Papacy, but when we read the great writers we find it in a purer form. The ideal is very variously conceived, sometimes freedom is uppermost, sometimes unity, but in the typical thinkers there is always the thought of unity in variety, and of a "social contract" in the living Greek sense, the interplay of an organism where all are "members one of another."

Dante's *De Monarchia*, written at the opening of the fourteenth century, begins with a world-wide sweep. He takes it as self-evident that there is a common goal for civilized mankind. "To imagine there is a goal for this nation and that nation and not for all nations taken together would be absurd." ("Esse autem finem hujus civilitatis et illius, et non esse unum omnium finem, arbitrari

stultum est"). Every living thing, in Dante's philosophy as in Aristotle's, had its proper work to do, "and this University of Mankind has a work of its own for which it was created in all its multitude, a work beyond the reach of any one man, or family, or village, or city, or kingdom." "Man was made to understand the world and to act on his understanding," but the work can only be achieved by all men taken together. In Dante's treatise there is, no doubt, much that is outworn and preposterous, but this passage alone should save it from oblivion. It is an augury of hope for all who believe in the power of Science to unite men. And peace, Dante says, in so many words, is necessary if "man is to devote himself in freedom and fullness to this work, a work which is almost divine."

But as we go on reading we discover that Dante's ideas about freedom and peace are somewhat poverty-stricken. He thinks of freedom mainly as the freedom of the Whole with mankind no longer distracted by division. And while we may admit, and gladly, that the highest freedom would not be possible without this, we should not overlook elements in Dante's doctrine which would lead to the Absolutist State. It is true that when he speaks of the whole civilized world being

under one authority, he explains this expressly not to mean "that every little town-council must depend on it directly." "Nations, kingdoms and cities have special characteristics of their own which require special laws." But, invaluable as these sayings are with their indications of a federal union rather than an unrestricted monarchy, we must note that the supreme head of the whole is conceived rather as apart from and above the kingdoms than as constituted by their choice. The "princes" are to "receive" from the Monarch that "general law" by which "the whole human race is to be governed and led to peace," even as Moses, while "he left smaller matters to be decided by the tribes of Israel," "reserved to himself those that were more important and closer to the common weal." There is no provision in Dante's outline even for the election of the Monarch, still less for the community sharing in the making of the important laws. Even in one of the most valuable sections of the First Book, where Dante points out the need of some constituted authority to decide a quarrel between two princes, he bases his argument, not on the evils and injustices of war, nor on the maxims laid down both by common sense and the Roman Code that "no man

should be judge in his own case," but on the fact that the princes are "equal." Therefore, he concludes, one of them can have no jurisdiction over the other, and there must be a Sovereign set above them to rule both. It does not seem to occur to him that there is an alternative: the "princes" could be tried by their peers and a "reign of law" begun by common consent.

This omission, and it is a vital one, may be owing partly to Dante's sense of human weakness: because of human perversity, the wills of men cannot be united, unless "there is one supreme lord whose will can be the ruler and guide of all others." This line of thought, it may be noted in passing, leads straight to the doctrine of a Divine Right in Kingship, a theory which Dante with his passion for unity and his desire for a makeweight to the Temporal Power of the Pope, does in fact all but formulate. But also, the reader feels, Dante is partly blinded by the prestige of Imperial Rome seen through a haze of racial pride and imperfect knowledge. And the suspicion is confirmed by his unquestioning conviction that the Italians are the salt of the earth and the pains he takes to prove that the Romans won their universal power by lawful means. His efforts lead him

to justify war as an extension of the judicial "ordeal by combat," as an appeal to the judgment of God which, provided it is made with a pure heart and where pacific means are unavailable, must inevitably lead to a just result. Dante is a striking instance of the recurrent hold this delusion can have on the human mind, in defiance of all experience. A man of his insight and genius is fettered by it where lesser men than he were already working themselves free. We have already noticed that Innocent III had discouraged trial by battle, and it is our English pride that Henry II had encouraged a legal procedure destined to supersede it, while the Roman lawgivers of Dante's own intense admiration would have laughed it to scorn. But what Dante sees and what many do not see even in modern days is that belief in a just decision by arbitrary war stands on the same footing as belief in ordeal by arbitrary combat.

The latter part of Dante's treatise, directed against the temporal power of the Papacy, does not concern us here. It is more fruitful to notice that in Dante's own day there were men permeated, far more fully than he, by the conception of the community as the creator and developer of law. Vigorous ex-

pression is given to this in the treatise *Defensor Pacis*, the joint production of two men, Dante's compatriot and contemporary, Marsiglio of Padua, and the Frenchman, Jean of Jandun. In spite of its pacific title the work has little, if anything, to do with the avoidance of war: in fact an army is taken as a necessary part of the State. The "peace" with which the authors are concerned is rather the stability of the constitution. Their anti-Papal bias is extreme for that age, the claim of the Papacy being denounced as "the great cause of division and restlessness among kingdoms and communities."

But other remedies that they propose interest a student of our subject more than their diagnosis, for the writers have a firm grip on the doctrine that no institutions can be stable without the active support of the citizens, and that this support is only fully given when the mass of the citizens have had full liberty to criticize and, if they choose, to reject the laws proposed. "If a single individual or a minority of the citizens carry a law over the heads of the others," "they are acting as despots." "And therefore the other citizens, or at any rate the majority of them, resent a law passed in this fashion even though it is a good one. . . . But when a law

has been put before them and passed with their consent—then the ordinary citizen is willing to obey it and carry it out, even if it be less good in itself, because he can feel that he has laid it down for himself." To the objection that "the mass of the citizens" would prove unwieldy, unreasonable and unreliable, the *Defensor Pacis* replies in a manner that sometimes recalls the best in Greek thought and sometimes anticipates modern democracy. To avoid the inconvenience of dealing with cumbrous masses, representatives may be chosen,—the word *repraesentar* meets us more than once in the *Defensor*,—to instruct the people "wise men and experts" should come forward as leaders, the union making for something better than either party could have obtained alone. "For although we may admit that the ignorant masses cannot by themselves think out a wise and beneficent policy, yet they can be excellent judges and critics of what is put before them by others." Last, and most important, Marsiglio and his coadjutor recognize that at bottom the stability of the State rests upon what we should nowadays call "the good will" in the mass of the people, and that, in point of fact, the masses of men do desire to live in a well-ordered community, and will accept laws if it

can be shown that they serve this end. Here, as so often, the writers go back to Aristotle. Further, although they do not attack the problem of war, it must be noted that two of their principles, if carried out, would have avoided many of the worst conflicts with which Europe has been plagued. They insist that no warrant can be found in the New Testament for compelling any one by force to obey the Divine Law. Christ left all things free, so far as this world went. The writers go to the root of the matter in recognizing that compulsory religion is no religion at all. Again, expanding their fundamental thesis, they assert not only that the consent of the citizens is needed for stable government: it is needed for any good government. No government, of whatever type, can be sound without it ("*Dicemus quod omnis principatus vel est voluntariis subditis vel involuntariis. Primum est genus bene temperatorum principatuum, secundus vere vitiatorum*").

It is true that the authors do not draw all the consequences that would flow from these principles, far from it. They even admit the right of purchase and the right of conquest, but they admit the latter only as the result of "a just war" and they add the words, "Moreover, every monarchy so established is

the more truly royal,"—(that is, less of a tyranny),—"the more it gains the consent of its subjects and follows the law of their interests." Passages like this show us how intimately connected, here as elsewhere, is the belief in reason with the belief in freedom and independence of thought, and both with the cause of peace.

It is worth while spending time on the *Defensor*, partly because the work is not easily accessible,—(the only current edition is in the large volumes of Goldast) [1]—but chiefly because it represents so much of the vigour and daring in mediaeval thought. If only, the student feels, this love of liberty and this trust in reason could have been united with Dante's religious fervour and magnificent dream of unity, the worst problems of Europe might have been well on the way to solution. And students are more and more coming to understand that Marsiglio and Dante are not isolated thinkers, however exceptional their ability. The ample quotations given by Gierke in his *Political Theories of the Middle Ages* show the English Occam, for example, holding firmly to the belief that all mankind could be united. "All human be-

[1] *Note.*—Since the above was written, a new edition has been published by the Cambridge University Press.

ings, however far apart from one another on this earth, could enter into relations so as to form one community, one sheepfold, one flock, one body, one city, one college, one people, one kingdom, were they not separated by ill-will." Occam argues, like Dante, for one "Emperor," but at the same time he is careful that the rights of the individual should be safeguarded. There are certain things in which the Emperor cannot interfere at all and certain things in which he can only interfere when it is plainly so much for "the common good" that private good must give way. "His power is limited because his subjects are free and he can only deal with their affairs for the common good."

But there is one great defect in all the theories and ideals we have been considering so far. They are all too much in the air: they do not take sufficient account of the actual divisions between the nationalities, still less do they attempt to frame any scheme which, fitting those facts, would give room for the ideal to grow. Neither the Emperor nor the Pope had anything like universal power, even in Western Europe, and by the opening of the fourteenth century neither was the least likely to get it.

It is in this connection that we must con-

sider the work of Pierre Dubois, Petrus De Bosco, a French lawyer of Coutances in Normandy and a counsellor, though not in the inner counsels, of Philippe le Bel during his struggle with the Papacy. Dubois sees with French clarity that the attempt to revive a Roman Empire, the dream of a personal sovereign ruling the whole of Europe in peace and quiet was a dream that could only lead to disaster. He wants unity in Western Europe, but "no sane man," he writes in his *Recovery of the Holy Land*," could really believe that at this period of the world's history one individual could rule the whole world as a temporal monarch, with all men obeying him as their superior. If a tendency in this direction did appear, there would be wars and revolutions without end. No man could put them down because of the huge populations involved, the distance and diversity of the countries, and the natural propensity of human beings to quarrel." At the same time Dubois believes that there is enough desire for concord to permit of a loose confederation where all differences between the sovereign powers of Catholic Europe should be submitted to arbitration and all the members should bind themselves to chastise any recalcitrant who refused to comply with the

award. The likeness of this proposal to the procedure advocated by modern internationalists makes it of singular interest apart from its intrinsic value. But when we come to look into the details of Dubois' plan we can see faults that would have prevented its success, if any attempt had even been made to put it into practice. At bottom he envisages the federation, if we may call it such, as dominated by France and as pointed, in a spirit of what we might call "aggressive imperialism," against Eastern and "barbarian" nations. This is not to say that Dubois is hypocritical: he is quite simply convinced, as simply as Dante then and most Englishmen to-day, that his own countrymen are of all people in the world the best fitted to rule others, because they are the most statesmanlike and the most trustworthy, "not liable to gusts of passion and, unlike other nations, always accessible to reason," to quote his considered opinion in the treatise *On the Way to Shorten Wars.*

Dubois' own plan, unfolded in *The Recovery of the Holy Land,* is statesmanlike enough, given his belief in the primacy of France and the mission of Catholic Europe to subdue the rest of the world. He sees per-

fectly well that it is no use simply exhorting the nations to live at peace with each other. That, since Christianity began, has been done "by the Holy Scriptures which abhor fighting and by the preachers who fulminate against it." And what use has it all been? Therefore, and since the nations, holding jealously to their sovereign rights, will not submit to one king, he proposes arbitration in a League backed by their united forces. A Common Council of Western Christendom should appoint a College of Arbitrators who, for any given quarrel, should in their turn appoint "three prelates and three lay judges for each party." If the award is accepted, well and good; if not, there is a final appeal to the Pope. Now Dubois, like his master, Philippe le Bel, objects, as a rule, to the Temporal Power of the Pope, but he is writing when the Babylonish Captivity at Avignon had begun and he confidently expects that the Pope will be under the thumb of France. Thus he can look forward to using the moral prestige of the Roman Pontiff to carry a decision supported by the enlightened policy and the strong arm of the French King.

It is in accordance with his whole outlook that he should add to his large scheme of

pacification special plans for increasing the power of the French Royal House at the expense of Germany, Italy, the Papal Patrimony, Spain and the Eastern Empire,—the latter, if necessary, by war,—and that these plans should not be divulged except to those likely to approve. The first and longest part of the *De Recuperatione* was sent and even dedicated to Edward I of England: the latter part was withheld. The sanctions proposed against recalcitrant members of the league were designed to further both the general scheme and the special plans. Once subdued by famine, all supplies being cut off by a drastic "economic boycott," the insubordinate leaders were to be shipped off with their entire families to perpetual exile in the East, there to spend their energies either in fighting the Turk or fraternizing with him or colonizing the Holy Land, or maybe all three together. For Dubois' fertile brain conceives a thoroughgoing system of colonization which will open permanent channels of trade between East and West and turn the Mediterranean into a European lake. Education is to be served at the same time, for colleges are to be opened where the Eastern tongues may be studied and medicine and surgery taught.

The entire scheme, good and bad taken

together, shows a remarkable and in some ways an ominous likeness to the designs of Napoleon. The most valuable element in it is the recognition that some kind of federal scheme directed against war and pivoting on arbitration was necessary if Europe was to be saved from herself. And the insistence on arbitration is the more significant because we know that it was in fact used about this time more freely than at any other period of mediaeval history. Dubois, at the opening of the fourteenth century, was appealing for the permanent acceptance of a method which he knew had been tried and which he believed to be useful. St. Louis, Philippe le Bel's grandfather, had been recognized as arbitrator again and again in Europe, sometimes even in matters of domestic politics. The belief in Louis' desire to do justice was well-founded, but the honest student of arbitration should add that his decisions were not always just, nor yet always accepted as just. In the great quarrel, for example, between Henry III of England and his barons, Louis' decision, the famous Mise of Amiens in 1264, went dead against the freedom that Simon de Montfort had been fighting so valiantly to win. Nor was it accepted by Simon. It is the more noteworthy that Dubois in his

scheme definitely provides for adequate representation on behalf of either side. Whatever else may be thought of his wide-stretching plans, there can be nothing but regret, as Lange points out, that this part of them was not developed further. But they could not have been developed satisfactorily if any leading Power persisted in cherishing schemes of aggrandizement and secret methods of realizing them such as Dubois keeps all the time at heart. He has, the reader feels, an intellectual passion for order and unity, but no real love of peace and no real sympathy with any country other than his own. While we honour the insight that could frame a scheme like his, we must admit that the motive force to run it was in large measure lacking.

There is far more of the temper needed in Wyclif's strong and ardent nature. His independent study of the New Testament had nursed in him a hatred of all fighting that springs from envy, pride or anger. There is an element in Dubois that would have led straight to wars for trade and Empire. Anything of the kind is anathema to Wyclif. In his attack "On The Seven Deadly Sins," he insists first that no private wars are allowable at all; and indeed by his time in England that had become an accepted fact. "By com-

mon lawe schulde no man make battel but if he have leave of prince of the people." This, however, is not nearly enough for the Reformer. He has small confidence in the decision of the prince being just. "Certes an earthly prince is commonly proud and wantis wit to teach when men schulden fight." Wyclif, therefore, goes on to add a two-fold condition, remarking, very truly, that "if men kepten well this, they schulden not fight now for no men." For no wars are "leefful" except those that should be "foghten with God's enmyes to venge God's injurie," and where "the deeds of fighting" can honestly be done "in charité," the warriors really "lovying God and their neighbours, yea, men that they fight with." Wyclif really means this, while he is quite shrewd enough to realize how men can deceive themselves in the matter: "at Domesday schal men wit who feghtis thus for charité; for hit semes no charité to ride ageyne thine enemye well armed with a scharpe spere upon a strong courser."

None the less he would permit wars in the last resort on these conditions, that is, where the heart is pure and intolerable wrong is being done. Thus he can approve "the state" of a knight and say expressly "myghty deffendyng of the lawe of rightwisenesse falles

to knyghtis, by a holy purpose for to serve God and mayntene his lawe. If there ben feeble men, as clerkes or commynnes, that standen with God's lawe and have mony enmyes, it longis to knightis to deffende hom fro these enmyes." Wyclif, one may guess, would have approved Joan of Arc's battle. His position appears consistent enough, though, like most vigorous preachers, he lashes out strongly first on one side and then on the other. The idea of a "preventive war" stirs him to something like fury. He puts the argument from "natural instinct" into the mouth of his opponents: "Sith a nedder"—(an adder)—"by hir kynde stynges a man that tredes on hir, why schulde we not feght ageynes oure enemyes? for elles they wolden destrye us and dampne their owne soules. . . . And so, sith oure enmyes wolden assayle us, but if we sayliden hom byfore, . . . we schulden first assayle hom, and thus we schal haf pees." This, to Wyclif, is an argument of the Devil: far better, he holds, to lose lordship and goods, even to die, than to fight for such reasons, where the fighter follows the instinct of a beast and not the law of Christ; "Jesus Christ, duke of oure battel, taght us lawe of pacience."

The weak element in Wyclif's teaching is

that he gives no indication how a man is to know, or his opponents are to know, that God, in Wyclif's own metaphor, has "whispered in his ear" and told him that the time has come to fight. Here the Frenchman Dubois has the advantage: Dubois does give a criterion: the enemy who may be fought is the one who has refused to accept or abide by arbitration. It may be said on Wyclif's behalf that in point of fact he thought the day of wars was over: "tyme is comen that Ysaie spekes of Crist, that men schal welle hor swerde into plowgh-schares, and the irne of hor speres into sythes or sikles." But this line of defence, it may be admitted, comes near saving Wyclif's repute for constructive statesmanship at the cost of his common sense.

Statesmanlike, however, his general attitude was and remained. The bulk of his working-life falls in the comparative lull during the Hundred Years War between England and France: but he must have been a young man at the time of Crécy and Poitiers, and it is the more significant that he has no regard for military "glory." "Lord, what honour falles to a knyght, for he killes mony men?" The renewed virulence of the struggle under Henry V would, we may be sure, have provoked an outbreak of protestation

from Wyclif, for his last treatise, the *Cruciata*, is a fierce polemic against Urban IV for proclaiming a Crusade against his rival Clement at Avignon and luring English adventurers to further enterprise against France. The whole trend of Wyclif's mind, reformer as he was, is to reform by reason and persuasion, not by force. "Men of the gospel," he says, "vanquish by patience," and the words recall the hope of his contemporary, the author of *Piers Plowman:*

> "Was neverë werre in this worldë
> Ne wikkednessë so kenë
> That ne love, an him liste,
> To laughyngë ne broughtë,
> And pees, thorw pacioncë,
> Allë perillës stoppëd."
> (Passus XVIII, fin.).

("There was never war in this world nor wickedness so fierce that Love, if he chose, could not turn it to laughter, and Peace, through Patience, make an end of all perils.")

Yet, as we observed, Wyclif does allow war in the last resort. Even in his polemic against the bogus "Crusade" he allows himself to quote, and without condemnation, "certain people" who say that the soldiers, instead of fighting for one Pope against an-

other, would be better advised to turn their swords on both. The two spirits in Wyclif were destined to prominence later, the spirit of wars for religious freedom and the spirit of non-resistance. The latter had long been dormant in orthodox Christendom: the clergy, it is true, were not to fight, but, broadly speaking, since Constantine there had been no question but that Christian laymen were bound, on occasion, to perform the duty. Only among the heretics, as far as we know, was the idea of thoroughgoing "pacifism" revived. One of the constant charges against the Albigensians in the thirteenth century had been that they rejected all military service as service to the devil. The Albigensian movement had been crushed before Wyclif's time, but the spirit of heresy could not be crushed for ever. If it was driven underground during the fourteenth century and the fifteenth, it was only to blaze out more fully at the opening of the sixteenth, when indeed it was allied, against its will, with the speculations, even more far-reaching, of the rationalists. And if it completed the break-up of Christian unity, we must admit how hollow that unity had been: if the wars of religion are among the worst in Europe, nevertheless the spirit both of Protestant-

ism and of Rationalism held possibilities of a deeper union and a surer peace. For both of them disclaimed mere authority and appealed to the reason and experience that every individual could share, if he chose. Certainly both Rationalism and Protestantism seldom understood what manner of spirit they were of, but at their best, as we shall see, they revolt, with a renewed loathing and distrust, from the senselessness and cruelty of trying to establish harmony by bloodshed. He who believes in reason, still more he who believes in the Light that lighteth every man who cometh into the world, appeals, if he understand himself, to these forces, rather than to physical force.

Meanwhile, from the time of Wyclif to the time of Luther, the nations of Europe were busily engaged in sowing the seeds of future strife. The Hundred Years War left England and France profoundly embittered against each other. In Germany the breakdown of the Empire left a chaos of tyrannical princelings with the Austrian Hapsburgs claiming an ill-defined and irritating overlordship instead of the splendid dream nursed by men like the singer Vogelweide in the thirteenth century and Nicholas of Cues in the fifteenth, the dream of a community with rich

and varied powers of local government linked together and culminating in one authority. Meanwhile in Italy the small city-states, through their jealousies and rivalries with each other and the Pope, were attracting and even inviting the interference of foreign plunderers from France and Spain; while in Spain itself the long and at last successful struggle against the Moors had trained up a nation of fanatical warriors, fully prepared for conquest in the name of the Church. Finally, the fall of Constantinople and the subjection of the surrounding countries beneath the Ottoman Turks closed one blood-stained chapter in the secular struggle between Europe and the Near East to open another in which we are reading still. Add to all this the diversity of races in Europe and the dreams of Empire nursed already by Germans, Italians, French, English and Spaniards, all of them confident in their own superiority and all contemptuous of any other nationality. Meanwhile not one nation had come as near even as we have come now to solving the problems of harmony inside her own borders. England had come the nearest and yet the Marian persecution, the Civil War and the wretched treatment of Ireland were still before her.

CHAPTER IV

RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION: RABELAIS, MACHIAVELLI, MORE, ERASMUS, LUTHER

THE leading publicists of the full Renaissance are telling witnesses both to the promise and the menace in all this, and for us the leading names are Rabelais in France, Machiavelli in Italy, Thomas More in England, Luther in Germany, and Erasmus everywhere. Rabelais beyond question is the most joyous, as Machiavelli is the most ominous. In Rabelais the spirit of Aristophanes lives again with all its humanity and more than all its indecency. Gross, gallant, exultant, with an exuberant belief in human nature as it rises rank from the earth, he trusts, like Aristophanes, that he can laugh it out of its cruelty. He has little care to compel it to do right: it will do right of itself if we give it a chance and do not make artificial vices out of harmless instincts and artificial glories out of inhuman depredations.

In the first and finest book of his rollicking work the most brilliant part, next to the magnificent scheme of an education inspired by freedom, is the serious mockery of war and imperialism. Gargantua's delightful father Grangousier (Mammoth-mouth), finds his kingdom attacked by Picrocholé (Testy-temper), over a quarrel between Testy-temper's bakers and his own vintagers who have taken by force five dozen of "hot cakes from Lerné, a celestial food for breakfast when eaten with ripe grapes." Mammoth-mouth offers ample reparation, and more than ample, both for the cakes and the losses in the quarrel. But Testy-temper scents an opportunity for expansion. The war arises, as Aristotle said wars usually do, from a little cause but not about a little cause. Testy-temper's counsellors, when they come before him with their plans, are all empire-builders, "the Duke of Small-trash, Earl Swashbuckler and Captain Dirt-tail."— " 'Sir,' they said, 'this day we make you the happiest, the most warlike and chivalrous prince that ever was since the death of Alexander.' 'Be covered, be covered,' said the King. 'Gramercy,' said they, 'we do but our duty. The manner is thus.' " With that they explain to him how, overcoming Mam-

moth-mouth, he could march down to Spain and "By copsody, Spain will yield, for they are but a race of loobies." Then, mastering the Straits of Gibraltar, he will control the coast of Northern Africa and, "going alongst on the left hand . . . rule all Gallia Narbonensis, Provence, the Allobrogians, Genoa, Florence, Lucca, and then God b' w' ye, Rome. (Our poor Monsieur the Pope dies now for fear.)" "By my faith," said Picrocholé, "I will not then kiss his pantoufle." The scheme spreads out till all Europe and the Near East are to be in the King's hands and the soldier who keeps his head, Echephron, is scolded as a man who cares nothing for the greatness and growth of his country. But when, unwillingly, Grangousier has taken up arms in his own defence and, making war "with as little effusion of blood as may be," is in a fair way to overcome the assailant, Rabelais' indignation takes a graver tone. "The time is not now as formerly," said Grangousier, "to conquer the kingdoms of our neighbour princes, and to build up our own greatness upon the loss of our nearest Christian brother. . . . It would have been more commendable in him to have contained himself within the bounds of his own territories, royally governing them, than

to insult and domineer in mine, pillaging and plundering everywhere like a most unmerciful enemy." The note of compassion is very characteristic. When the victory is won the prince Gargantua announces his desire to follow the example of his ancestors who chose rather "to erect trophies and monuments in the hearts of the vanquished by clemency than by architecture in the lands which they had conquered." He will not punish a whole people, but only " the incendiaries or fomenters of the war." And while he insists that "a too feeble and dissolute facility in pardoning evildoers giveth them occasion to commit wickedness afterwards more readily," the only punishment he does exact on the malefactors is that they should be set to work at his new printing-press. So it all ends in a song of laughter and literature, as Aristophanes would have had it end in his day.

This is what humorist and humanist hoped for. Machiavelli brings us back sharply to actual life, and his counsel has been followed rather than theirs. Of all writers he perhaps has done most harm to the cause of internationalism. Nor is it difficult to see why. He is extremely able, clear-sighted and penetrating and, for all his ruthlessness, high-minded. If we admit that an essential part

of statesmanship lies in constructing a system where men's lower interests coincide as much as may be with their higher, then we can hardly be surprised at the success of a writer who sets up a lower ambition as a positive duty. It is obvious that all men of action are naturally tempted to use their powers, or the powers of their class, in dictating to others: it is the hope of internationalism that this ambition may be subdued to the work of an ever-growing co-operation. But Machiavelli despairs of co-operation and if we compare his "Prince" with his "Discourses on Livy" we can see that the despair was bitter. What he admired fundamentally was a free and generous Republicanism, but he did not believe the Italians of his day were fit for it. If they were to be united at all,—and Machiavelli is passionate for a United Italy, free from the foreigner,—it must be by a Prince who will stick at nothing. He allows him force and fraud without limit, wherever either is needed for the sake of this shining goal. Here again we see how closely connected are the problems of nationalism and internationalism, and the enormous influence for good or bad of a long tradition. The cities of Italy had not learnt to co-operate, what they had learnt was to use force and fraud

against each other to an inordinate degree. And here Machiavelli himself is open to the charge he brings against the general run of mankind "who will never accept anything new until they have seen it proved by the event." The unity of Christendom had never been proved by the event, and even the dream of such a unity was so completely discarded by him that it seems never to have entered his mind.

He marks the close of an epoch and the rising of a nationalism which not only considers no other than itself, but believes it is justified in doing so. There is excuse for Machiavelli because of Italy's position, disunited and invaded, needing a Prince more than the Hebrews in bondage needed Moses or the Persians Cyrus, or the Athenians their saviour Theseus, "without a head, without order, beaten, spoiled, torn in pieces, overrun and abandoned to destruction in every shape." But if it is true, as Gierke states, that his typical doctrine came with a shock to an age that remembered a grander dream, it is quite as true that his principles were in practice accepted by the leaders of nations themselves secure and prosperous enough. Sometimes the acceptance has been conscious, more often unconscious, and the internationalist may

wonder which has done most harm. Conscious acceptance means the consecration of anarchy. On the other hand, it is idle to suppose that a statesman can disregard the safety and power of his people as he might be justified in disregarding his own, and ridiculous to imagine that the immediate interests of all nations are identical. The right path through the conflicting claims is certainly not easy to find and needs a clear head as well as a clean heart. In practice, the average statesman works in a fog that only seems convenient because the perils are overlooked, disregarding the interests of all other nations unless they chance to cross his own, and then astounded and aggrieved to discover that other nations take exactly the same view of their rights as he has done of his.

Machiavelli was writing at the same time as Sir Thomas More, and it is both fascinating and saddening to compare the precise coherent Italian realism with the ideals, often inspiring and as often inconsistent, shadowed forth in More's *Utopia*. "Many republics and kingdoms have been imagined," wrote Machiavelli, in "The Prince," "that were never seen or known to exist in reality. The manner in which we live and that in which we ought to live are things so wide asunder,

that he who quits the one to betake himself to the other is more likely to destroy than to save himself; since any one who would act up to a perfect standard of goodness in everything must be ruined among so many who are anything but good."

If Machiavelli ever read the *Utopia* he must have said to himself more than once, this man denies me and admits me in the same breath. When More is thinking of France and French dreams of expansion he gives full play to his scorn for aggressive nationalism as seen, say, in the counsellors who "serche the verye bottomes of their wittes to discusse by what crafte and meanes the kynge maye styl kepe Myllayne, and drawe to him againe fugitive Naples. And then howe to conquere the Venetians, and how to bringe under his jurisdiction all Italie, then howe to win the dominion of Flaunders, Brabant, and of all Burgundie: with divers other landes, whose kingdomes he hath longe ago in mind and purpose invaded." It might be Rabelais laughing at the counsellors of Picrocholé. But when More's English mind is stirred by English dreams of colonization and the possibilities of the New World already opening before the kingdoms of the Old, then the temper changes.

There is no war, it appears, more just than one for colonization, if you happen to be the best colonizing Power, are feeling the pressure of population at home and cannot acquire peaceably the undeveloped land that you need. The Utopians, we are told, limit their families; "but, if so be yat the multitude throughout the whole Ilande passe and excede the dewe number, then they chuese out of every citie certein citezens, and build up a towne under their owne lawes in the next land where the inhabitauntes have muche waste and unoccupied ground, receaving also of the same countrey people to them, if they wil joyne and dwel with them. . . . But if the inhabitauntes of that lande wyl not dwell with them to be ordered by their lawes, then they dryve them out of those boundes which they have limited and apointed out for themselves. And if they resiste and rebel, then they make warre agaynst them. For they counte this the moste juste cause of warre, when anye people holdethe a piece of grounde voyde and vacaunt to no good nor profitable use, kepyng other from the use and possession of it, whiche notwithstandyng by the lawe of nature ought thereof to be nouryshed and relieved." The writer does not seem to be aware that he is raising a huge question, indeed many such,

pregnant, as we know now, with seeds of wars, and that it will not do to settle them off-hand in favour of the nation which believes itself nearest to Utopia. Every active nation believes that of itself.

The same sort of unconscious inconsistency appears in More's opinions on the conduct of war. Naturally he is tender-hearted and chivalrous: he is obviously in earnest when he speaks of battle "as a thing very beastly," just as he loathes hunting for its needless infliction of pain. This natural generosity makes him insist that his Utopians, even when fighting, "hurt no man that is unarmed, onles he be an espiall," and "doo no lesse pytye the basse and common sorte of theire enemies people, then they doo theire owne: knowing yat they be driven and enforced to warre againste their willes by the furyous madnes of theire princes and heades." At the same time he advocates with equal earnestness a policy of "frightfulness" on occasion, and urges with arguments that might have come straight from Machiavelli the advisability of sowing dissension among opponents and bribing the enemy's subjects to betray their own country. "There is no maner of act nor dede that giftes and rewardes do not enforce men unto." Here is

reasoning that suits, not a maker of Utopias, but "the practical man" who thinks with Machiavelli that "men are a sorry breed." Finally More is anxious that war, wherever possible, should be waged, not by patriots, but by mercenaries, though well aware that "this custome of byinge and sellynge adversaryes among other people is dysallowed, as a cruel acte of a basse and a cowardyshe mynde." Among those who "dysallowed" it More might have included Machiavelli who, believing in unlimited force, has the courage of his convictions and calls on patriots to use it themselves and not hire others to do their filthy work. But More thinks it too foul and demoralizing for his Utopians and counts their lives too precious. He selects the scum of the earth for the task and if they are killed in the business the world is well rid of a rascally pack. The noble and lovely qualities of *Utopia* and of its writer are well-known. It is the more important to bring out here its defects from the standpoint of internationalism. They carry a much-needed warning. They all spring from a belief as blinding to a nation as to an individual, the belief that one's own people are "exceptional." There is a ring of sundering sea set round

More's *Utopia* with bad results as well as good.

"Who is there that does not think his own cause just?" That simple question put by More's friend, Erasmus, and put with his accustomed clearness and incisiveness cuts down to the taproot of war. Some students will find it cut deeper than his eloquent denunciation of war's bestiality or his witty mockeries of its stupidity. These provoke a reaction in the reader's mind: there is more in battle, he feels, than butchery. Erasmus is on firmer ground, and ground that may well prove more fruitful, when he questions its justice. He sweeps aside with the contempt of a humanist the doctrine, so common from St. Augustine downwards, that the command of the Prince can determine the question. With the insight of a scholar and a Christian he tracks this evasion to its source in Roman absolutism, an absolutism as unlike the spirit of Christianity as water is unlike fire. He points this out at the beginning of his famous "adage" "Dulce bellum inexpertis" ("War is fine to those who have never known it"). "We have borrowed much," he writes, "from the laws of the Cæsars, because of their claim to equity, and wishing to perfect our work we

twist the teaching of the Gospel to suit it. Roman law allows us to counter force with force and press our own claims to the utmost. . . . It glorifies war, provided it be just, and by definition it is just, provided the Prince declares it to be so, although the Prince may be a child or a fool."

To the argument that war is lawful because force is lawful in punishing a malefactor, Erasmus answers that there is at least one remarkable difference: "in the courts a man is condemned and suffers according to law, in battle each party treats the other as guilty." And in battle the punishment falls on the wrong people. "To the man who complains that it is unjust for the wrongdoer to escape punishment, I reply it is far more unjust for millions of innocent men and women to undergo intolerable suffering." Erasmus questions boldly "the right of conquest," usually accepted in his time, as indeed later, without question. "We treat government as though it were property. But man has not the same rights over free men as over cattle. What right you do possess is given by the consent of the people. And those who gave can, I presume, revoke the gift." The interests of the people are, in fact, not considered at all in these precious "fights for the Right."

"The struggle is not whether this city or that should be under a good Prince or a tyrant, but whether it should pay taxes to Philip or to Louis. Such is the glorious justice for the sake of which the world is drenched in blood."

Then with his easy wit, moving lightly even through tragedies, Erasmus points out that it might be worth while to ask whether, after all, war paid. "If you cannot have the mind of a statesman you might at least show the sense of a shopkeeper." Follows the suggestion "Why not arbitrate?" There are men enough of ability and honesty in the world and Parliaments and Councils have proved their uses. It is only a suggestion: Erasmus does not work out any kind of scheme in detail, but it is a suggestion to which every thinker who is in earnest about peace recurs more and more insistently.

It is only what we should expect that Erasmus mocks at the idea of a Crusade, the oddest of methods by which to win men over to a religion of love. He tears aside the ridiculous pretext and exposes the underlying aggressiveness. "If what we want is really to expand our Empire, if it is the wealth of Turkey we are after, why cover our mundane greed with the name of Christ?"

At the same time, it should be noted, Erasmus allows a war of defence against the Turks, if every effort has been made for peace and peace can in no way be kept. But even in that case he urges that war should be waged "with the least bloodshed possible." The persistent humanity is typical of Erasmus: one cannot imagine his ever arguing that it was the truest kindness to make war as horrible and hence as brief as possible. Also he had too much sense, one opines, not to realize that horrors only breed more horrors, "war linked to war," in his own phrase. It is also typical of him at once to look back with half-ironic wistfulness at the dream, now fast disappearing, of a Christendom united under one head, and to realize that this dream being impossible, it was better to take what he considered the second-best. "Most of us," he writes in his treatise on war with Turkey, "dread the name of World-Empire,"—(universalis Monarchiae vocabulum),—"a title at which others seem to be aiming. . . . There is no doubt that a unified Empire would be best if we could have a sovereign made in the image of God, but, men being what they are, there is more safety among kingdoms of moderate power united in a Christian league."

In this passage Erasmus touches, though,

after his manner in dealing with politics, he touches only lightly, on two ideas destined to a great future, a future for good or for evil according to the turn given to them, the idea of a Balance of Power, and the idea of a Holy Alliance or League of Nations.

The collapse, now nearly complete, of the old ideals nourished by Empire and Papacy called for new guiding ideas if Europe was to be saved from anarchy. The need can be illustrated by the case of Luther. Luther loved freedom, yet not so much as he hated disorder. Valiant in clearing the ground of abuses rather than great in construction and confronted by the breakdown of the Church's unity, a breakdown accelerated by himself, he had here little, if any, help to give the world. Yet he was a sincere Christian if ever there was one, and he saw that Christianity must appeal to the heart and the spirit, not to fear or the dread of death. But against men who refused the appeal and trampled on the innocent,—and his robust common sense believed there would always be such men,—he was prepared to use force, defending the Christianity of it by the words of Paul about the authority that "beareth not the sword in vain." The trouble was that, in the long-run, Luther had no authority to propose ex-

cept the civil authority actually in existence at his time. The contradictions resulting are startling and significant. Thus he first supported the Peasants in their just grievances and afterwards insisted that it was their duty to endure injustice rather than take their rights by force: "a child can understand that it is right for a Christian to submit to wrongs, not to draw the sword, not to defend himself, not to avenge himself, but to give his body and his goods to the spoiler, trusting in our Lord who will not fail us." Yet elsewhere he insists that the innocents who do not wish to be martyrs must certainly be protected by force. With his homely vigour he mocks at the pacifists of his day, simple-minded herdsmen, who would put lions and wolves and eagles in the same pen as lambs, flinging the gates open and saying, "Now be good, and live at peace together, there is pasture enough for you all" ("da weidet euch und seyet fromm und friedsam. Der Stall steht offen, Weide habt ihr genug").

Again, while he never ceased to pride himself on what he had done without the use of physical force, cutting down the authority of the Pope "without lifting a finger," and while he claimed for all his followers "the liberty of a Christian man," yet in the end he simply

substituted the secular power for the ecclesiastical. "The Papal order being abolished," he wrote to the Elector of Saxony, "it is your duty to regulate these things."

Similarly with war between nations. He slips back, as Lange points out, into the old unsatisfactory position of St. Augustine. Subjects must be guided by their Prince and the Prince has no guide except his conscience. Conscience, it is true, indicates a limit, for war is indiscriminate in its dreadfulness, and thus, even where punishment is called for by wrongdoing, the Prince should beware. "This should be his rule: if the injustice cannot be chastized without greater injustice, then he must let his own claim go, however well-justified it may be" ("Darum sey das sein Regel: Wo er Unrecht nicht strafen kann ohne grösser Unrecht, da lass er sein Recht fahren, es sei wie billig es wolle"). This is a fine saying and if faithfully kept would prevent numberless wars. And the real tenderness of Luther comes out in the sentence that follows. "What wrong have all those wives and children done that they should be made widows and orphans for the sake of your vengeance?" But then there are other sides in Luther's contradictory character that must be reckoned with. Some wars are just,

though none except those between Princes of equal standing. "Men must not resist superior authorities by force, only by bearing witness to the truth. If this converts them, well and good; if not, you have delivered your conscience and must suffer injustice for God's sake. But if your opponent is your equal or your inferior or under a foreign dominion, you must first offer him peace and justice, as Moses commanded the children of Israel, but if he refuses, you must do your utmost and counter force with force, as Moses shows so grandly in the twentieth of Deuteronomy." And Luther refers to a sufficiently fierce chapter. In such a war "subjects are bound to follow their lord and risk their goods and their lives. . . . And in such a war it is a Christian deed and a work of love to slaughter your enemy with a clear conscience and to rob and burn and do all the harm possible until the victory is won, except that one must guard against sin and not outrage wives and virgins." It reads almost like a parody, and the student of a greater German centuries later will recall the stinging verses written by Goethe (though withheld from publication during his lifetime) when the harshness of the Napoleonic wars had driven his countrymen to retaliate in kind:—

"The angels fought for us and the right,
But the angels were beaten in every fight,
Devil above and angel under,
And the devil walked off with the whole of the plunder.
Then all our good folk fell to prayer,
And the Lord looked into the whole affair.
Said God to the Son (and we know that He
Saw the matter plain from eternity),
'They'd better act as the devils act,
And scruple no longer, that's the fact,
Use every means till the war is won,
Then sing *Te Deum* when all is done.'
We didn't wait to be told it twice,
And lo! the devils were whacked in a trice.
So now we say complacently
'It pays to behave like a devil, you see.'"

But Luther's humanity is constantly breaking in and overcoming his ruthlessness. Even in the passage just quoted he draws the line at certain horrors and insists that peace must be given "to those who surrender and humble themselves." Moreover, for all his preaching of submission to sovereign authority, he feels there is a line to be drawn there also. "How? Do I mean that when a Prince is in the wrong his people must follow him? I answer No. It can never be right to act unjustly: we must obey God rather than man."

This is promising for the friends of freedom and peace, but the value of the conces-

sion is gravely impaired by the conviction, clear enough in his whole attitude, that the subjects are seldom, if ever, in a position to decide. "Suppose the subjects do not know whether the Prince is right or wrong? I answer, Just because they do not know and cannot possibly find out, they may follow without danger to their souls." The supreme defect in Luther's attitude is the one we have noticed so often before and must notice often again. There is no criterion other than the fighter's own judgment as to whether his cause is just or not. And, as Erasmus said, he will always think his own cause just. Luther glides over this all-important difficulty and contents himself with glorifying a just war. Indeed he does not seem even to envisage the possibility of an end to war. War "is in itself Godlike, and as natural and necessary to the world as eating and drinking." "What is war if not the punishment of injustice and wrong?"

CHAPTER V

HENRI IV, SULLY AND THE GRAND DESIGN

It was an ill day for Germany and for Europe when so grand and powerful a teacher as Luther could uphold so defective a doctrine, all but consecrating non-resistance to tyranny at home and any dynastic war against the enemy abroad. It is a French patriot and a practical statesman who marks out, nearly a century later, the path of escape from this devastating round. In the long and chequered history of Europe there are few examples of a lost opportunity more poignant than the neglected advice of Sully, the great minister of Henri IV. Here was a counsellor fitted both by temperament, tradition and experience to warn nations how they might achieve peace and unity.

Sully was an expert diplomatist and in this connection we should notice that it was during the century of his birth, the sixteenth, that the practice began of appointing accredited

ambassadors to the courts of leading sovereigns. Diplomacy has much to answer for, but it ought to be recognized that the ambassadorial system is only bad if a bad or an exclusive use is made of it. In itself it is a reasonable thing that there should be friendly representatives of other nations always in close touch with one's own, able to teach and to learn. And contemporary observers have borne witness that, if some wars have been fomented, others have been avoided by the tact and moderation of ambassadors. In estimating the increase or decline of arbitration from the thirteenth century to the nineteenth, a task that is difficult enough, this factor of diplomacy must be borne in mind, and that in both directions. What is characteristic of Sully in almost every department is a certain largeness of view. A convinced and faithful Huguenot himself, he had the insight to realize that Henri could never pacify France unless he accepted the Catholic Faith still dear to the majority of his subjects, "conformed in religion," as Sully puts it, "to the will of his peoples." For his own part Sully always insisted that the differences between Huguenot and Catholic were not enough to divide Christians and, as a man of the world, he saw that Henri had no special

convictions worth considering. The King, he tells us, met his advice at first with the answer, "Ha, no, I won't do that," but the words were uttered with so little conviction that from that time forward his counsellor "felt sure that he would adopt it as a last resource in his difficulties," as indeed proved to be the case. Thus, largely by timely concession, France was unified and given peace at home, but there remained the problem of Europe and the menace abroad. According to Sully's own account he had Henri behind him in his "great scheme," "le Grand Dessein," for the permanent pacification of Europe when the King was assassinated by Ravaillac.

Whether, in fact, Henri had anything to do with the scheme at all has been denied and may well be doubted. Even on Sully's own showing and in the final form of the Memoirs the King required considerable urging to convince him of the need for the generosity that was an indispensable feature in his minister's plans. "'What? what?' said the King, 'do you propose that I should spend sixty millions in conquering territory for other people without keeping anything for myself? I have no intention of that!'" There exists in manuscript an earlier version

of Sully's memoirs, never published, written apparently about 1617, and those who have studied it say that in this form all that appears of the "Grand Dessein" is a scheme to reduce the power of Austria. This certainly fits better with what we know of Henri Quatre's policy, but if we lose Henri's authority for the "Grand Dessein" it only enhances our sense of the significance in the value that Sully attached to his own scheme.

A comparison of the dates heightens this further still. The statesman was fifty years old when his master was killed, he was never in office again, and in 1618, one year after the first draft of the Memoirs was finished, the Thirty Years War broke out in Germany. So far as we can tell, Sully now began to recast them, and worked at this during the rest of his long life. He died in 1641, seven years before the Peace of Westphalia, which left France practically in possession of the whole of Alsace and with fresh seeds of hatred sown between Germany and herself. Richelieu, who was guiding France in Sully's place, was following out one half of Sully's plan, the half that aimed at lowering the power and the menace of the Austrian House, and leaving out the other, the half that aimed at substituting a real co-operation between all the

nations of Europe. It is singularly impressive to think of the experienced statesman that we know Sully to have been, watching from middle-age to old-age the fortunes of Europe as they changed but never changed for the better, and brooding in his retirement on a real change that might have been of untold good.

For it is of the first importance to realize that his plan was two-fold, and one side of it involved a change of heart. He certainly desired to destroy the huge domination of Austria, but this is not what gives the distinctive quality to his scheme nor what made it inspiring to subsequent thinkers and roused his own enthusiasm. In his lengthy Memoirs a Great Idea is always recurring. It has a prominent place at the close of the introduction: it is placed as a leading topic in his embassy to Elizabeth and again in his embassy to James I: it is treated over and over again in varying forms throughout the work and the whole closes with a letter supposed to be written by Sully to the King on the all-engrossing theme. It is a plan that would have allowed of a real partnership between all the nations of Western Europe, based on what we should now call the principle of nationalities, none too strong to threaten the

others and all agreeing to submit their differences to arbitration. Thus it takes its place in the tradition of French thought initiated by Pierre Dubois three centuries before, and the sequence has an interest of its own. France was ardently national, too national to accept the idea of a Universal Empire in which she should be, as it were, only a subject, and yet not so far removed from the Continent as to cherish the ideal of "splendid isolation" which attracted Sir Thomas More.

But what gives Sully's ideas their peculiar interest is that they are the ideas of a practical man who was not only absolutely in earnest, but well aware of the difficulties before him and with a lively sense for what was essential and what was unimportant. The very discursiveness of his handling and the smaller alterations in detail contribute to its impressiveness. More than once he refers to both of these defects, if indeed the changing is to be called a defect. Much of the plan is put in the form of long-winded letters supposed to be written to the King and the writer apologizes for the risk of wearying Henri by his disquisitions, but the topic, he adds, is worth it and a royal mind will understand this. Besides, the idea is really Henri's own and Sully is only working out the details

and reminding the King of his own finest conception. This, no doubt, is an artifice, but it is an unselfish artifice. Sully was quite content to let the renown of the scheme, if it were ever realized, go to Henri and not himself, provided that, by covering it with the prestige of Henri's name, he could help towards its quicker realization. The progressive changes in the scheme are really full of interest. Over and over again Sully says that his outline is merely tentative and that he will rejoice if it can be bettered by criticism and advice. As we read the reiterated statements and expositions, all of them differing a little in form or in detail of content, we get closer to the mind of the statesman and can watch him feeling his way further and further into the needs of the task before him, careless of redundancy or minor inconsistency if only he can add an argument that might help or suggest an alternative plan that might find easier acceptance.

In many ways we seem able to trace a development connected, as a statesman's should be, with the current events of his day. According to his own account the first time he spoke of the matter was to our own Elizabeth, "cette brave Elisabeth," as he calls her. Sully's own word, we have admitted, cannot

always be taken, he had to the full the memoir-writer's love of picturesque addition, not to speak of his reliance on literary stratagems in a good cause, but there seems no reason to doubt his accuracy here. He certainly went on the embassy to England and its purpose was to discuss the menace implied in the enormous power held by the arrogant and aggressive Hapsburgs. That menace was serious enough to France and England alike. The Armada alone would have been experience enough for England, and Sully makes no secret of his own view that the federation he desired in Europe would be impossible to obtain, "the mere idea of it ridiculous," so long as Christendom had to face the ascendancy of "this Austrian House," known to be ambitious "and already dominating such vast territories in the Indies, in Africa, in Spain and Portugal, and with such power over the seas and over Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Lusatia, Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, the Tyrol, Alsace, Franche-Comté, and the Seventeen Provinces of the Netherlands, enough to make her aim always at universal dominion in Europe."

Nor can we say that the fears of Sully were foolish when we think of the Netherlands and the meaning of their desperate struggle for

freedom from the Spanish-Austrian yoke. We know from our own English history that Elizabeth wished them well. At the same time we know also that she refused the sovereignty of their country when it was offered to her. But also it is wholly in accordance with her character and her policy that she should have given Sully to understand, as he tells us she did, that she would take it ill if the Netherlands were only transferred from Spain to France:—

" 'I will not hide from you that if the King my brother were to annex them or even become their feudal lord, it would be a matter of concern to me, and I have no doubt he would feel the same towards me in a similar case. . . .' " . . . "Pausing, and seeing that I was gazing at her intently, as though lost in thought and without a word in answer, she resumed, 'What? Monsieur de Rosny, have I not made myself clear, or do you disapprove what I have said, as your silence makes me suspect?' 'Madame,' I answered, 'on the contrary, what has kept me silent so long is my admiration for your ability, courage, foresight and judgment.' "

It may be only the skill of the memoir-writer, but the passage has verisimilitude, and it is natural at least to infer that the diplo-

matist was led in ways like this to realize that whatever happened France must not take the place of Spain and Austria in aggression, or the unity of Europe would be as far off as ever.

Whatever the cause, realize it he did, and more and more he puts in the forefront the proviso that the leader of France must abjure all conquests. Towards the close of his Memoirs, and watching, as he must have watched, the expansion of France under Richelieu, he gives a pretty clear warning to the young generation. It is put in the form of a warning to Henri. He implores the monarch to remember the natural resources and advantages of France and then consider "what might be the dreams of a prince less wise, less temperate and modest than yourself, one of your successors, for example, if he found his kingdom increased by territories taken from his neighbours that had once belonged to France and seemed admirably suited to her frontier, territories such as Savoy, Franche-Comté, Lorraine and the Netherlands (including Juliers and Cleves). Consider, I beg you, whether he would be satisfied with this, or whether such vast possessions would not feed his ambition and make him grasp at the idea of continually increas-

ing the power of France until she could claim to be the Empress of the West, the very same ambition as the House of Austria has always shown herself to cherish, building the same schemes on the same foundations; and yet this ambition, for themselves and for all others, will always prove vain, useless and doomed to disappointment, and, moreover, as harmful to the countries of those potentates who try to carry it out as to those who wish to be protected and guaranteed against it." Nor is Sully content with urging that the ambition is chimerical because the other Powers of Europe would never submit. He feels it morally wrong. The Spirit of God has given no sanction to "a Fifth Monarchy established by the force of arms." The monarchs of an aggressive Empire like Turkey deserve to be called "tyrants or beasts of prey rather than lawful kings and benefactors of humanity."

The true policy for a king of France, "whoever he may be," is "to acquire friends, allies and confederates united to him by common interests," and never by nursing grandiose schemes of expansion "to rouse undying hatred, the powerful armed opposition of some and the envy and jealousy of all," "dangers he can never shun while he shows himself in favour of annexation." France,

therefore, was to take the lead in refusing all increase of territory by conquest and in consenting to submit even those pretensions that she thought were just to the decision of the majority among the confederate European powers.

Sully knew well that his proposals "would be thought fantastic dreams, impossible of realization," but he was confident that the moral effect of such action on the part of France would be tremendous. There might be an end once and for all to the incessant quarrels over frontiers. "If it were known," he wrote, "that our great King, one with so many legitimate claims and so many weak neighbours at whose expense he might expand, had openly declared that he would never enlarge his present dominions, but, on the contrary, accept the frontiers that the majority of his associates thought right and fair," there would not be a ruler in Europe who would not "feel bound to do the same and submit his own claims to the same tribunal." In a supposed letter to the King, Sully specifies definitely some of the claims France was to surrender. She was "to submit to arbitration, fully and frankly, all her legitimate pretensions to Navarre, Sicily, Naples, and all the dominions in Flanders and Artois,

offering to evacuate these countries of her own accord."

Similarly, if Alsace and Lorraine and the Tyrol were taken from Austria as Sully desired, they were by no manner of means to go to France, but to the independent Republic of Switzerland. If Henri would act thus, "I am convinced there would not be a single one of your associates who would not be ashamed not to imitate your generosity." The generosity that Sully urged was certainly startling enough. A modern parallel would be for England to offer Gibraltar and the Suez Canal to the League of Nations. But because it was startling, it does not follow that it would not have been far the most promising course for France. And Sully had his full share of worldly wisdom. Each half of his scheme would have been futile without the other. He saw very plainly that the two causes of war were ambition and alarm, and his first object was so to equalize the powers of the European nations that "even the greatest could not hope to dominate and none of the others need have cause to fear." Moreover, he realized that "the House of Austria" was holding down nations that would never settle happily under her rule. He urges Henri to free the whole of the Sev-

enteen Provinces, "provided that you do not take one inch of their territory for yourself." The Dutch, he adds, are so passionate for liberty that they will do more than enough without any urging, and Henri must know that Bohemia and Hungary and the subordinate provinces will be ready to shake off the Austrian yoke as soon as ever they see the least chance of doing so successfully.

Sully is among the first statesmen to insist on the principle of nationality. In one of his many attempts to plan out a new and better political map for Europe he insists, as a necessary condition for the success of his plan, that "in every attempt at new combinations . . . care must be taken to respect the natural dispositions and peculiar characteristics of peoples and races and thus guard against the folly of trying to unite in any one State . . . men whose differences of temperament or diversity of language, law and tradition are so great as to be incompatible."

How well he gauged the national differences that were likely to be permanent in Europe can be learned from studying the detailed grouping he proposed. In the Society of Nations that he longed to introduce, —what he called the "Universal Christian Commonwealth of Europe" ("cette tant desirable république universelle très-chrétienne

de l'Europe"),—he would have liked, so he indicates, to include Russia, but he did not think it would be possible at the time, "pour encore." She was too Asiatic, too uncivilized, too inchoate, too remote, and too much occupied with her own affairs. He advised waiting until her rulers, "from a sense of their own advantage, should make overtures of their own accord, and show plainly that they wanted to join the confederation." As regards Western Europe, he varies the details from time to time, but the general lines are always the same and the wisest form of it is the latest. There are to be fifteen powers in all: six Hereditary Monarchies, France, Spain (reduced to the Peninsula, the Balearic Islands, the Azores and her possessions in the New World), Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and a new Italian kingdom composed of Savoy, Piedmont and Lombardy together (a striking anticipation of the first achievements won by Cavour). Then five "Monarchies" that might be called elective. First, the Papacy with Naples added to the Papal States, for Huguenot though he was, Sully believed, as indeed proved to be the case, that the struggles of the Pope for temporal power would never cease, and he held that it would be better to assuage them by concession. Next, the Empire, which should be made

genuinely elective, and which would have comprised what we now call Germany. Then Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary, each a separate kingdom. About the composition of Hungary he hesitates, and here most he may be criticized, for it would have reflected many of the drawbacks of the Austrian Empire just before the Great War. True, it would have been free from the problem of Poland and what we now call Czecho-Slovakia, but it would have tried to unite with Hungarians proper Roumanians, Yugo-Slavs and Austrians. Yet it is hard to blame any one for failing to plan compact unities in that complicated corner of the world; more especially at this period with Turkey hammering at the gates. Finally, there were to be four Republics, the Swiss (increased by Alsace and Lorraine and the Tyrol), the Netherlands, the Republic of Venice (increased by Sicily), and a new Republic of all the Northern States in Italy that did not go with Savoy or Venice. As one looks at the plan and thinks of Europe, one cannot but see what years of bloodshed and misery might have been avoided if Sully's arrangement had been adopted. Yet this is not to deny that his plans were dangerous, and indeed he often admitted as much. Every big change in

Europe was dangerous then, just as it is now, though the most dangerous thing of all was to change nothing and allow matters to run on in the old bad ruts.

The two chief objections to Sully's ideas have doubtless already occurred to the pacific-minded reader. One, that his arguments might easily be twisted to support the doctrine of the Balance of Power in its most selfish form. The other, that war would have been necessary to bring about the changes he desired. In answer to the first, it should frankly be admitted that such a twist was not only possible, but that it occurred. From the time of Sully onwards the need to preserve the Balance of Power has been made the excuse for expanding one's forces and one's own dominions at the expense of one's neighbours, for playing off every nation against every other, for fostering secret alliances that aim solely at checkmating some particular "foreigner," for everything, almost, that goes to feed the suspicion and antagonism which it was Sully's desire to reduce within manageable limits. But it is not fair to blame him for this. If one dynasty is holding down, as the House of Austria was doing then, other races in a position where their happy and healthy development was impossible, it might

be imperative to insist on limiting its powers. But there is all the difference in the world between a limitation undertaken in a great-hearted spirit, with the leading nation prepared to surrender advantages of its own, and a selfish struggle after a so-called "balance" that aims always at tipping the scale in its own favour. It is like the difference between the race in armaments and alliances that has been the curse of the last half-century and a genuine agreement on such all-round reductions and guarantees as would free every nation from any immediate menace. Yet the selfish policy might claim as strongly as the generous, and has in fact usually claimed, that it was only aiming at an equalization of forces and the maintenance of peace.

The chief answer to the second objection can be found in Sully's own pages. It is true that in the earlier part he advocates war as a necessary means for bringing Austria to reason. But his view changes. Whether it was because he saw Spain and Austria gradually weakening during the Thirty Years War and under Richelieu's skilful exploitation of the situation for the benefit of France, or because he felt something like horror at the ravages of Turenne, or whatever the reason, at any rate it is noticeable that he speaks less

and less of using force and more and more of trusting to persuasion. He is no pacifist and always keeps a moderate use of force in reserve. But the emphasis alters, and markedly. He speaks in the first volume of "countering force with force and craft with craft," and of proceeding by "open war," though even here he hopes to limit war to the liberation of the Low Countries and calls peace "the best and greatest treasure in all the world." But in the second volume he thinks it possible to convince the Hapsburgs that even though the needs of the Christian Commonwealth would require "some apparent diminution of their pretensions and dominions," yet, as a matter of fact, they would find that "they gained in wealth, power, safety, dignity and influence" ("qu'ils accroistront de richesses, puissance, seureté, royautez et vasselages"). Later in the volume he actually suggests, as the first article of his confederation, "that there should be no military aggression, nor declaration of war, nor any kind of hostilities employed for the establishment of the new dominions proposed, nor for the diminution or expansion of those already in existence." Elsewhere, it is true, he does still envisage force if persuasion failed. But he believed it possible to unite the

other nations of Western Europe in a common entreaty to Spain and he did not think she could resist the united pressure, but would make a virtue of necessity. Nor was the belief as wildly optimistic as it might appear, for he was prepared to allow the Spaniards "any conquests they might make in Asia, Africa and America, and agree that they alone should have the right to send out fleets and armies for the purpose." At the same time, one of the fundamental articles for his Commonwealth is that there should be "entire freedom of trade between all the countries of the members both by land and sea." The problems of the New World and its occupation by the Old were only just then beginning to appear, and if the first of these provisos seems too summary and one-sided ever to have been workable, there can be little doubt about the wisdom of the second as a safeguard against war and the jealousy that leads to it.

Other points are of interest in Sully's general attitude towards war. He realized its wastefulness, the importance of a check on its cruelties, and the attraction it would always possess for certain types of men. When urging France to take the lead in a disinterested surrender of all claims and con-

quests, he warned her kings what a policy of aggression would mean to their own country not only in odium, but in hard cash—"While drawing on themselves the jealousy, envy and hatred of all other nations, they would find themselves obliged to meet expenses that would ruin their people by the taxation involved." As regards the cruelty of war, Sully takes his place among those who insist that it can be and should be limited. He seldom preaches against the horrors of war in general,—he is always rather the statesman than the preacher,—but as he develops his scheme we find him urging as a prime condition for its success that the French monarch must never "lay himself open to the charge of having been cruel or treacherous either to friends or enemies," and while he must not let his own armies "be reduced to misery and starvation through his folly and his negligence," he must not allow "violence, rapine, pillage, burnings, or any other barbarities." In short, Sully wants "a pacific army" ("une milice toute pacifique"). "The soldiers must pay for everything," and the people in the countries through which they pass "be guaranteed from plunder and from oppression." He admits that such a thing has never yet

been known, and he has at least one passage on the evil of past wars that might content the most thoroughgoing pacifist. "I assert that in all the wars of France, whether civil or foreign, whether France has been aggressive or on the defensive, no result has been gained from all the toils and sufferings or from all the victories and conquests, when matters have at last been concluded and peace made, except ruin, misery, disaster, death, impoverishment, and embarrassment of every kind for both parties, but especially for the unfortunate peoples, who must always suffer most from the madness of their princes."

The extract shows that Sully did not shut his eyes to actual evil when urging possible good. Indeed, what is so attractive in him is precisely this combination of clear observation with clear idealism. It is peculiarly French and particularly useful. He faced the likelihood that there would always be what he calls "ill-conditioned characters, spirits of strife and contention, who cannot live without fighting." But he thought a use could be found for them in defending Christendom against Turkey or against the recalcitrant members of the confederation. Certainly, the perpetual opposition against "the infidel" which Sully seems to accept as inevitable is a defect from our present stand-

point. But we must remember that things were different in his day when so much of Eastern Europe was held in slavery by the Turks, a slavery which the subsequent centuries never in fact removed except through revolt. Sully's policy, allowing for the conditions of his time, has much more in common with the "bag-and-baggage" policy of Gladstone than with the old Crusading spirit from which it is, however, descended.

Moreover, in spite of his plain perception of "human depravity," as he does not shrink from calling it, and his shrewd thrusts at the weaknesses of particular peoples (there are passages which can touch an Englishman on the raw, while Voltaire might have signed his description of "those kings, who like the God in whose image they claim to be created, believe that their Will should be the Law of laws and the one test of Right"),—in spite of all this, Sully never makes the Past the measure of the Future. He has not even that pedantry of "precedent" which has fettered so many thinkers, both in his time and before and after it. He looks ahead rather than behind. He hardly ever appeals either to antiquity or to the Old Testament. When he does it is effective. Thus, he recalls the Amphictyonic Council of Greece as something to encourage the modern world, though not a

thing to be slavishly copied. "In its precise form it may appear ill-adapted to the present age, with the differences in scale between the countries and the diversity of character, but none the less we should take it for a model, adding to or diminishing its powers as may seem best to the majority of the members." Or, finally, he will compare Henri, "Henry le Grand" as he likes to call him, with the David who planned a temple that he could not build and whose son achieved the work. "Almighty God chose two kings after his own heart, David and Henry the Great, and let their lives, their virtues, their defects, their influence and their fortunes resemble one another in almost every respect. And at the close of their days He put into the heart of each a noble, religious, glorious and magnificent scheme, gave them the grace and the means to make the preparations necessary, collect the treasures and the materials for bringing it to perfection: and yet for reasons known to Himself alone, it was not His will that it should be accomplished by their hands."

Solomon the Wise fulfilled the high dream of his father. Will not "Louis le Juste" prove a second Solomon?

CHAPTER VI

GROTIUS AND PENN

The answer of history to Sully's hopes may seem the grimmest irony. Three hundred years of incessant war or preparation for war in Europe, nearly all of which could have been avoided if Sully's advice had been taken, and for which, in all too many cases, foundations were laid by "Louis le Juste" and his other advisers. Yet, underground, the ideas of Sully were fructifying.

We have no reason, it is true, to suggest that the Dutchman Grotius was acquainted with Sully's actual writings. Indeed the first volumes of the Memoirs were not published till 1628, and Grotius' big work "On the Laws of Peace and War," *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, appeared in 1625. But Grotius was a refugee in France from 1619, he received a pension from Louis XIII and he had been honoured by Henri IV "who," as Lange reminds us in his admirable *Histoire de l'Inter-*

nationalisme, "presented him to his court when he was only sixteen as 'the wonder of Holland.'" Grotius must have been in touch with what was being thought and said in French circles on international affairs. Now the idea of some such League as that advocated by Sully was certainly "in the air" about this time. It has been suggested that Grotius was directly inspired by the book of another Frenchman, the *Nouveau Cynée* of Emeric Crucé, which, published in 1623, went so far as to urge the inclusion of "infidels" in the League, though prepared to make war on "savages" as "brute beasts." In any case, it is important to notice that Grotius, whose fame as the founder of International Law is assured, was on the side of a plan that lesser men have called "Utopian." He does not say much about it, but what he says is weighty. When urging arbitration he appeals first, after his fashion, to the precedent quoted by Thucydides. "Thucydides tells us," he writes, "that it is a crime to attack the man who is prepared to arbitrate." He goes on to add: "Christian Kings and Christian States are specially called upon to adopt this method of avoiding war. For this reason, as for others, it would be useful, and we may say necessary, that conferences should be es-

tablished between the Christian Powers to settle disputes by the voice of those nations who are not themselves affected by the controversy in question." And further, "methods should be found for compelling the parties to accept peace on reasonable terms."

No details are given, nor does Grotius attempt to outline, like Sully, any grouping of the Powers according to the principle of nationalities. He is far more of a legalist than a statesman, but, from the wide political schemes afloat, he selects here the point essential for his prime purpose, the restriction of war and its horrors. He tells us himself that this was his motive, to contravene the theory that war was the negation of law, to insist that laws were not, or should not be, silent in the clash of arms. He was horrified by the excesses in the Thirty Years War, at its height when he began his book, and it was the knowledge of them that gave him the final impulse. "Convinced as I was that there does exist a common law between nations, a law that is valid both in the preparations for war and during war itself, I found many and cogent reasons for writing on the topic. Throughout Christendom I watched a licence of which savages would be ashamed. Men rushed to arms on the most frivolous pretexts,

and once war was declared there was no respect for the laws of God or man, nothing but a riot of fury as though authorization had been given for every sort of crime."

The careful reader of these quotations may discern, what is abundantly clear from the pages of the book itself, the fact that Grotius never distinguishes precisely between what is or has been the custom and what ought to be the custom, and yet that this distinction is always in his mind and indeed was the great reason for his work. He desired civilized governments to accept, plainly and definitely, as strict a standard as possible of what was permissible in war. And instinctively he felt they would be enormously influenced by what had been allowed or disallowed in the Past. He is quite right here: to this day the example of Jeanne d'Arc is one of the most effective replies to those who say that when a nation is fighting for its life its military leaders will permit any cruelty. But there can be no denying that Grotius is something of a pedant in his legalism. He is so concerned to find out what has been "law" in the sense of the prevailing custom, that he sometimes seems to lose sight of "law" in the sense of an ideal not beyond the reach of man. Hence the rage with which

Rousseau attacked him, as we shall see later. But we do not treat Grotius fairly if we are as hard on him as Rousseau. He is always trying to get men forward just so far as he feels they will go at the given time, and it is likely that his very caution, his care never to propose any humane practice that had not already been shown compatible with success on the battlefield, was one of the factors that contributed to his immediate and lasting success. Governments and soldiers were not afraid to follow him. He has a valid claim to be what he is always called, the Founder of modern International Law. There are three elements, it may be said, needed if international law is to deserve its name: common consent to a definite body of permanent rules between nations, a genuine effort to make those rules as just and as humane as possible, and a system of penalties applied in common if the "laws" are broken. For all three elements Grotius did something and for the first two a great deal. It is true, as we have seen, that he only touched lightly on the third. He never attempted to elaborate the system of impartial "conferences" that he spoke of as "almost essential," nor do more than hint how belligerents should be "compelled to accept peace on reasonable terms."

For this a new political system like Sully's was in its turn essential and Grotius was too wary to develop the innovations needed, although his insight told him that they were needed.

It would be churlish to blame him for the omission when he accomplished so much, but it is important to notice it in any review of his work. The student of internationalism begins to feel at this period how necessary it is for the spirit of fair-play to find a political body and legal organs if it is to be effective in the world of action. The success of Grotius on the legal side is an indication of this. His persistent demand for a critical codification of what was permissible in war did influence the conscience of Europe more than all the sermons that had been preached before him. There has been no such full codification as yet, and international law is still too much a matter of vague conventions, but, broadly speaking and allowing for horrible exceptions, there has been less cruelty as a consequence of his writing, at any rate until our own day when the inventiveness of science has outstripped for the time the organization of mercy, making engines of destruction too tempting in their power not to be adopted, too indiscriminate in their operation not to

slaughter the defenceless. The improvement due to Grotius and his followers has a real parallel, though one that is not complete, with the reform in the attitude to punishment that was to follow later. Savage tortures had been inflicted under the belief that if punishment were a deterrent, then the more horrifying it were made the better. So with war; if war is an appeal to force, it was argued, and is argued still, then the more unrestrained the force the better. We have noticed this argument already in a man so gentle-hearted as Sir Thomas More. In each case there is the same fallacy. Because a certain amount of deterrent, or a certain amount of force, is necessary, it does not follow that an unlimited amount is good. On the contrary, war and punishment may be necessary evils to be minimized as far as possible. This is a coherent and reasonable view, distinct from terrorism on the one hand and pacifist anarchy (in the philosophic sense) on the other. This was the view of Grotius, and it remains his chief merit that he worked out in detail how the principle could be applied, and had been applied, under the actual military conditions of Europe. He does not put the principle into so many words, but it underlies his whole attitude. It is, after all, the

common-sense view, though it can be defended by a philosophy, and Grotius was essentially a man of common sense.

It was common sense also that made him press the need, apart from humanity, for common agreement on such disputed questions as those which cluster round "the freedom of the seas." This famous phrase has meant many things at many times. In the age of Grotius it was above all important to decide whether any one power could claim a jurisdiction over any part of the high seas as complete as it could claim on land. This particular question has now, as every one knows, been decided in the negative, though every one does not realize what a remarkable instance it affords of ownership in common between all nations. But there are outstanding questions still unsettled and still full of difficulty. The high seas are now free in time of peace, but in war? Naval powers like our own, when they hold what we call loosely "the command of the sea," are always anxious to interfere with neutral trade when by so doing they can put effective pressure upon the enemy: while neutrals, very naturally, when they feel the quarrel is none of their own, urge their right to carry on their usual commerce as in time of peace. Compromise

after compromise has been attempted but none have yet been really satisfactory. Everything points to the conclusion that they cannot be satisfactory until all States agree to join a League and to make no war without the authorization of the League after full debate and an offer of arbitration proposed and refused. Then it might fairly be said that the belligerent offering arbitration was now acting in the interests of world-order and had a right to the co-operation of neutrals. A citizen may justly resent a policeman dropping into his house on the policeman's private affairs, but the matter changes when he is in pursuit of a murderer. This argument, one may feel pretty sure, would have commended itself to Grotius and his common sense. If we must criticize him, the criticism would be that too often he allows his caution to hamper that sense. An instance can be found in a passage quoted by Lange bearing on the superstition that "the judgment of God" is shown by success in war. We have seen the hold that this idea had upon Dante, but thinkers were now beginning to question it. This is how Grotius expresses himself: "if we examine what happens in most cases, it will be possible to maintain that God does so manifest his judgment

across the chances of war that victory, not infrequently, does fall to those who are in the right." Caution could scarcely go further in the effort to preserve, without defying facts, the little grain of truth hidden behind the belief that "victory crowns the just." But a bolder common sense would have insisted on asking whether the judgment of God might not be manifested less infrequently through the reason of men than across the chances of their violence.

As for the ultimate basis of law and its philosophic causes, Grotius has little to say, being indeed little of a philosopher. Certainly he recognized that no law could be built up within the State unless individuals respected something more than their immediate private advantage, and he held that the same principle should be extended to the relations between States. But he did not go deeper, and sometimes he speaks as though the only test within the State was the ultimate utility to the individual considered as a private person, and the only test between States the ultimate utility to each nation. Here indeed he did good service in pointing out how often, much more often than a narrow outlook realizes, the ultimate interests of individuals as such and of nations as such do coincide

with the interests of the larger wholes in which they must be and should be included. But in the end no good is done by obscuring the fact that sometimes the interests do conflict, and it might be called curious if it were not so common that a man like Grotius, who approves of war, does not see what is implied in a patriot giving his life for his country or a nation sacrificing prosperity to save its soul. The fact is religion and philosophy were needed to complete Grotius' common sense, much as statesmanship was needed to complete his legal acumen.

Of all creeds bearing on war the most noteworthy for Europe is Quakerism and it was a Quaker, William Penn, who revived Sully's scheme, deliberately and with personal experience behind him. The fundamental principle of Quakerism, as everybody knows, is simply the Christian belief that in every man there is an Inner Light which shows him that he is made for something more than his private happiness, that he must take account always and in everything of his friends' needs, and that all men are, or could become, his friends. Connected with this belief is the profound distrust of force. Force appeals, not to the inner light of reason and love, but to the dread of suffering or the fear of death.

Therefore it must always do harm, even though it may sometimes do more good than harm. The Quaker position on this point is not entirely clear: some "Friends" have gone much further than others in abjuring force, but they are all united in opposing war as it has ever been waged in history. The emergence of Quakerism marks the revival of that free spirit of comradeship and inquiry that welcomes the most revolutionary of Christ's sayings, a spirit that had not been so strongly felt in Europe since the days of the Lollards. Penn's application of his principles to the Red Indians when he was governor of Pennsylvania is well-known and the success that attended it, a success the more remarkable because the natives had already been embittered by unfair treatment. But, as Joseph Besse, Penn's early biographer, writes, "his friendly and pacific manner of treating the Indians begat in them an extraordinary love and regard to him and his people, so that they have maintained a perfect amity with the English of Pennsylvania since."

Far less notice has been taken of Penn's appeal that the European nations should put something of the same principles into practice. His short *Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of an European Diet, Parliament or Estates*

was begun in 1688 and published in 1690, at the crisis, therefore, of our own "Glorious Revolution," more than fifty years after the first publication of Sully's *Grand Dessein*, more than twenty years after the Peace of Westphalia, and at a time when Western Europe was once more filling with flame. England joined the war against Louis XIV in 1689 while the book was still being written. The essay, Penn's biographer tells us, "was so adapted to the unsettled condition of the times and so well received that it was reprinted the same year." But no government paid attention to its counsels. More than two hundred years of the "bloody tragedies" over which he laments were to pass before men could be brought even to consider his remedy, that "the sovereign princes of Europe . . . would, for the same reason that engaged men first into society, viz., love of peace and order, agree to meet by their stated deputies in a general Diet, Estates, or Parliament, and there establish rules of justice for sovereign princes to observe one to another; before which sovereign assembly should be brought all differences depending between one sovereign and another that cannot be made up by private embassies before the sessions begin; and that if any of the sovereignties that constitute these imperial states

shall refuse to submit their claim or pretensions to them, or to abide and perform the judgment thereof, and seek their remedy by arms, or delay their compliance beyond the time prefixed in their resolutions, all the other sovereignties, united as one strength, shall compel the submission and performance of the sentence, with damages to the suffering party, and charges to the sovereignties that obliged their submission."

Now that the League of Nations is in being, this proposal, for all the differences in diction, has a curiously modern ring. But there is still much that the moderns can learn from Penn. He has many quiet thrusts at fallacies that still hamper our way. He sees that the best solution for a clash of "sovereignties" is to be found in some form of confederation where the private affairs of each country are not touched, while armed conflicts between them are avoided through frank and reasonable discussion, "reason upon free debate." Thus "the sovereign princes" do not "become not sovereign": "they remain as sovereign at home as ever they were. Neither their power over their people, nor the usual revenue they pay them, is diminished." Nor is their sovereignty lessened abroad, for "none of them have now

any sovereignty over one another: And if this be called a lessening of their power, it must be only because the great fish can no longer eat up the little ones." The possible retort that the decision of the Assembly might not always be just would not have disturbed Penn: he knew, and by experience, that the decision of law-courts within the State are not always just, but he saw, like his fellow-Quakers, that none the less no State could exist in any sort of harmony without law. And further, he insisted, like Erasmus, that it was of the essence of law for no man "to be judge in his own cause." The methods taken to preserve justice between individuals had never been tried between nations, and it was high time that they should be. The whole weight of Penn's argument turns on this, and his knowledge of human nature is there to buttress it. Reasonable government is needed to ensure justice in society, and succeeds where disastrous failure follows the simple plan "that they should take who have the power, and they should keep who can." And this failure shows what is the real "voice of heaven and judgment of God" concerning war.

Much in the same way, Penn's sober wit points out how war breeds war even when

the war-makers think they are aiming at peace. "Though *Pax quaeritur bello* be a usual saying, Peace is the end of war, and as such it was taken up by O. C."—(Oliver Cromwell)—"for his motto; yet the use generally made of that expression shows us that, properly and truly speaking, men seek their wills by war rather than peace, and that as they will violate it to obtain them, so they will hardly be brought to think of peace unless their appetites be some way gratified." A man who writes like this is no rose-water idealist with his head in the clouds. Penn believes, it is true, in the good possibilities of human nature, but it is human nature disciplined and trained. This is the true office of government and the right "balance of power," "that one may not injure another, nor himself, by intemperance." Penn has always his eye on facts, and his eagerness for some sort of federal solution was supported by the striking success of the Dutch Republic. He refers his readers expressly to Sir William Temple's account of the United Provinces as "instance and answer upon practice to all the objections that can be advanced against the practicability of my proposal." And with a winning modesty he recognizes his debt to Sully while pleading that England

should carry out the plan:—"I confess I have the passion to wish heartily that the honour of proposing and effecting so great and good a design might be owing to England, of all the countries in Europe, as something of the nature of our expedient was, in design and preparation, to the wisdom, justice, and valour of Henry the Fourth of France, whose superior qualities raising his character above those of his ancestors or contemporaries deservedly gave him the style of Henry the Great."

England did not respond, neither by her government, nor, for many years, by any of her leading men. The arguments for it—and there was only argument, no action being taken anywhere—were carried on in that France where it was first conceived. But before dealing with this more must be said about the Quaker attitude to war in general and Penn's position in particular. Penn does not really face the question what ought to be done if a recalcitrant nation refused to submit to the decision of the Assembly. He gets round this difficulty by the simple method of supposing it would not occur, "no sovereignty in Europe having the power and therefore cannot show the will to dispute the conclusion." This is all very well on

paper and when matters go smoothly, but the crying need then, as now, was for some practical public scheme which would restrain the aggressor when things went wrong, as well as some way of deciding other than by the single voice of the aggrieved who the aggressor really was. The great merit of Sully's scheme was that it provided for both: the aggressor was marked out by the refusal to submit to arbitration, and if he continued recalcitrant, force was to be used, not merely brandished as a threat. Thus the procedure between nations would be brought closely into line with the law between individuals under a decent Government. As regards the duty to arbitrate, Penn's position is, as we have seen, perfectly clear, but it is impossible to say what he would have answered if the question had been pressed whether or no he approved the use of force in the last resort. He speaks of submission to government within the nation as a duty and of diplomacy between nations as an approved method of peace-making, but every government known to us has felt itself at liberty in the last resort to employ force at home and every diplomatist knows the value of armies. Here is the fundamental difficulty of the Quaker position, at least for those Quakers who press

the command "Resist not evil" as far as it will go. If they countenance the use of force by a government, even though they would not employ it themselves, if they take the benefit of living in an ordered community which relies upon force as a necessary, though dangerous instrument, they are open to the gibe that, like a new and more exasperating sect of Pharisees, they make ready to enter the Kingdom of Heaven through the sins of other men. At the same time, it is all-important to insist that the Quaker protest is, and has always been, primarily against war of the type that we know now, where each party claims to be justified and takes, as we say, the law into his own hands, killing with little or no scruple the innocent along with the guilty. War of this type differs profoundly from the limited use of force within the nation, hedged about as that is by strict law and rightly considering vicarious punishment as a monstrous miscarriage of justice. The Quaker protest that such war is unchristian is, has been, and will be invaluable, both for freedom and for mercy.

CHAPTER VII

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: ROUSSEAU

Let us now return to France and the possible inheritors of Sully's unfulfilled renown. The first claimant is the little-known Abbé de St. Pierre, and the next the famous Rousseau. The Abbé is a not unattractive figure, but his writings are almost unreadable. He was sturdy enough always to refuse the title of "le Grand" to Louis XIV, and the reader's heart warms to him finding he was expelled from the Academy for the refusal. Rousseau not only rescued the gist of the good man's argument's for the "Plan to ensure Peace" from the morass of verbosity into which their writer had plunged them, he also provided them with a philosophy. Rousseau is unfairly neglected in this country: as Vaughan, his latest and best interpreter, observes, he has been "little studied and less understood." The current opinion is still that he was an extreme individualist, believing that society

must inevitably put man into unjustifiable fetters. But this is a travesty so complete one might almost say that nothing could be further from the truth. It would be far safer to venture the paradox that Rousseau's central position is really the Quaker position, though without its theological implications and its abjuration of force. For in both views there is only one permanent foundation on which to build the State and that is the force which the Society of Friends calls the Inner Light and Rousseau "the General Will," the power in man to pass beyond his petty personality and consider, not the mere interest of this man or of that, but the interest of all men taken together. This power is latent in every one and should be made active, but it can only be made so by exercise and discipline. For this reason, Rousseau, like the Quakers, was seriously interested in education, and in an education the supreme aim of which was to fit men for life in a community. In Rousseau's opinion it is a prime function of the State, as important as the respect for Law. "It is not enough to say to a citizen *Be good;* we must teach him to be good. And even the force of example, which is here our best teacher, is not the only instrument we should use. Love of country is the

most powerful; I have already pointed out that every man is virtuous when his own will conforms to the general will: and it is to the wills of those we love that our own wills conform the most readily."

The "general will" (*la volonté générale*) is much more than the will of all men (*la volonté de tous*), for it is that will working in an intelligent harmony. Its decisions, therefore, must not be confounded with the decisions of the majority, though decision by the majority may be an essential practical device for bringing it into operation. Essential, because the "general will," though it aims at the general comfort, is more than general comfort: it is a conscious principle, only coming to its own when the citizens take an active interest in their fellow-citizens. It must be awake and alert in their minds, and for that they must use their minds. It cannot breathe among slaves. And also, it must warm their hearts, for Rousseau is well aware that the emotions are no less important, both as forces and as values, than the reasoning powers. Rousseau is the last man to deny that their obscure growth has played a great part in bringing us to our present position, and may be destined to play a greater part in the future. Man has travelled

from the primitive "state of nature" to a half-organized condition, he hardly knows how, but it is in him to travel much further.

Rousseau has often been blamed for being "unhistorical," and there is truth in the blame. There is much that he ignored, but all the same he had an imaginative grasp on certain vital factors in the history of political change overlooked by his contemporaries and not fully appreciated now. Indeed it is partly this that makes him difficult, for he is always conscious of man's nature as a thing capable of growth in different directions, an organism which, if it understood itself, would grow better, but which often does not understand itself and, for the time, grows worse. Thus he will use the word "natural," as many writers have done, in at least two distinct senses, to mark either the early savage state before reflection has begun, or the final consummation when the ideal would be reached. If the reader will remember this, he will find Rousseau both more intelligible and more inspiring, and with the distinction before him he can easily gather from the context which sense is being used. Rousseau himself attacked the phrase "natural rights" because of its ambiguities. The bully could justify his aggressions by pleading that it

was natural for him to take all he could: indeed, any condition whatever could be justified as having come about in the course of nature and so we should be left with a pure indifferentism. Rousseau's objections here are as well-founded as his cutting criticism against the facile optimism of his day. If the gospel of Leibnitz and Pope was to be accepted and we were really to believe that "Whatever is, is right," then we must call it equally good "that there should be Lapps and Esquimaux who get on without our marvellous police, Hottentots who laugh at it, and a Genevese who approves it." No test of what in any society ought to be can be gathered merely from what has been or from what is. All thinkers admit as much: few make it the pivot of their thinking. But Rousseau always remembers, as Vaughan reminds us when discussing his treatment of what is fair in war, "that it is not the Right which has to be established from the facts, but the facts which have to be judged by the Right. Few men have grasped this fundamental truth so firmly as Rousseau. And that is why, in this as in other matters, his work forms so memorable a landmark in the history of mankind." The deference of Grotius to tradi-

tion and the past infuriates Rousseau. "Even if a thousand cruel nations have massacred their prisoners, even if a thousand professors, writing in the pay of tyrants, have made excuses for their crimes, what has truth to do with the mistakes of men, or their savagery with justice? Do not let us ask what men have done; let us consider what they ought to do. Let us hear no more of these base and venal authorities whose writings only serve to make men slavish, ferocious and miserable."

Poor Grotius! It is very unfair to him. The advance in humanity during the eighteenth century that Rousseau himself observed was largely due to Grotius' work. Had it not been for him, Rousseau could not have written as he did about former cruelties, "Thank God, in Europe we see nothing like them now. Men would be horrified at a King who massacred his prisoners. We are indignant even if they are treated badly." But none the less Rousseau's work on war and internationalism is far more profound than anything in Grotius. To value it properly we must keep in mind his theory of the State and its basis. Self-interest alone will never build a nation: and patriotism alone will

never bring peace to mankind. But the same power that unites a people might, in the end, make a union of peoples.

For this, however, prolonged and deliberate efforts are needed. "It is absurd to suppose that the present system of violence can be altered without conscious art." Wisdom must come to the help of the natural man. In fact, the present system, just because it is partly organized and not organized enough, is the worst that could be conceived. In the primitive "state of nature" man had neither the organization nor the control over resources sufficient to produce the systematic devastation that modern armies bring into being. Just as there are abuses and oppressions in the modern world unknown to primitive communities, so there is a chronic "state of war" between modern nations, flaming out periodically into horrors unknown to savage tribes. The average primitive man is not the monster of inhumanity that a writer like Hobbes would have us believe. Rousseau recognizes the ability of Hobbes, "one of the finest geniuses," he calls him, "that ever existed." But he realizes that Hobbes' fear of anarchy and his eagerness to justify despotism led him into a sheer travesty of primitive life. That life is not a war of all

against all, where every man's hand is against his fellow. If true, there would be little hope for the world, but again, if true, we could not explain how the modern State, faulty though it is, had become possible at all. "If hostility of this kind, reciprocal and mutually destructive, were really an essential part of our constitution, it would make its power felt even now and burst through every chain imposed on us by society. Hatred of mankind would be, admittedly, the master-passion of men. A father would mourn over the birth of his own children, a brother rejoice at the death of a brother, and every man, if he found another asleep, would desire to kill him at once." As a matter of fact "the natural law," the good law which is written in the heart, tells him "that he has no right to take any one's life except in self-defence, and makes him shudder at the thought of killing in cold blood, even when he is driven to it."

The growth of scientific invention in war has only sharpened the deadly paradox to which Rousseau called the attention of a careless world. We have suppressed personal war between individuals, we have organized ourselves into national unities, admittedly for the sake of peace and protection, but the

"concord" has been left fatally incomplete. Without union between the nations, he writes in his remarkable fragment on *The State of War*, our harmony is a delusion ("une concorde artificielle"), "in which men have come together only to massacre each other, and the worst horrors of war spring from the efforts to avoid it." The organization of one nation leads inevitably to the organization of others, "and the collisions of these huge bodies, left to their own forces, are by so much the more terrible as their masses are greater than the mass of any individuals." Hence the wretched contrast between the plans of publicists and the results. "I read books on Right and Morality: I listen to learned men and lawyers. Under the influence of their eloquence I pity the sufferings of savages in the state of nature, I bless the wisdom of our institutions and I comfort myself for being a man by the knowledge that I am a citizen. . . . I close the book, I leave the lecture-room: . . . I look up and out. I see the horizon aflame, the country-side deserted, the cities given over to pillage . . . I come near: I look on a scene of murder, human beings slaughtered in their thousands, dying men trampled down by their horses, death and agony everywhere. This then is the fruit

of your organization for peace. Oh, you philosophers! Read us your books on the battlefield."

It is not, we must repeat, that Rousseau ever despises the building-up of a nation. On the contrary, there never was an internationalist who was a more fervent nationalist. Patriotism is a mainspring of his whole political philosophy. He has nothing but contempt for the loose cosmopolitanism which could not recognize that the first step towards the ultimate order must be made within the nation. In the first draft of "The Social Contract" he puts this in so many words. "We conceive the Society of the Whole after the model of our own societies. The building-up of little commonwealths sets us dreaming of the great, and we do not really become Men until we have learnt to be Citizens. Which shows what we ought to think of those self-styled cosmopolitans who, while they profess to base their love of country on their love of mankind, make their love of all the world an excuse for loving nobody at all." In the treatise on *The Economy of the State* Rousseau goes so far as to write, "It looks as though our sympathy for men weakens and evaporates when it tries to spread itself over all the earth, and that we cannot be so

much moved by the disasters that fall on China and Japan as by the calamities of Europeans. In some sense we must restrict and concentrate our interest and our compassion if they are to be made effective. It is a good thing for humanity that human feeling, fostered among fellow-citizens, should take to itself, within the nation, new powers through constant intercourse and common interest."

But we should utterly misunderstand Rousseau if we read such a passage alone. The making of a nation is only the first step, and until the second is taken we may be in a worse position than if we had never taken any step at all. Just as it is worse for the individual man to be exploited under a tyrannical and ruthless despotism than to be left in savage isolation, so it would have been better for nations to know nothing of each other at all than to be swept, as they now are, by the will of the rulers to whom they are bound into devastating wars which they can neither avoid nor control. The fact is we are living at once "under the social order" and in the primitive "state of nature," and thus "suffering from the defects of both without the security possible to either." "The perfection of the social order depends,

it is true, on the union of force and Law. But for this it is essential that Law should direct force: whereas now, with our prejudices about the absolute independence of sovereign princes, naked force, posing before the citizen as Law and before the foreigner as 'the interest of the State,' robs the one of the will and the other of the power to resist it, with the result that everywhere in the world the name of justice serves as a screen for violence."

To all who understand Rousseau's central thought the remedy he desired will now be obvious. The separate national unities are at present in the same position as the individuals would be if there were no recognized Law in the State based upon the General Will: and the nations, to escape their anarchy, must now learn to submit to such a Will between themselves, forming organs for its expression and training themselves to recognize it. Rousseau does not ignore the difficulty. He knew this was hard enough within the nation: "to obey the General Will it is essential to know it, and above all to distinguish between it and the mere personal will, beginning with oneself, a distinction always difficult to make and which, in the last resort, needs heroism to give it light. Fur-

ther, since in order to exercise his will a man must be free, there is another difficulty which is quite as great, and that is to secure the liberty of the subject at the same time as the authority of the Government."

The fundamental problems could scarcely be stated more clearly, and Rousseau, like every one else, might well feel them to be insurmountable if he had not this faith in the Law-making power latent in man's own nature, a power which sometimes, and not without reason, he calls divine. He might have added, as many modern thinkers would add, that we should be content to admit that the perfect State has never yet been made, while insisting that in a healthy society it is always "a-making." So with any union of States. Because we cannot reach the ultimate goal at once (nor perhaps ever), there is no reason why we should not advance when every advance, however slight, lessens the horrors of our present condition. Rousseau's teaching also makes it clear how eager he would have been to safeguard the rights of the individual State. We have seen how strong was his sense of patriotism: he counts no death finer than a volunteer's in defence of a nation's freedom. Just as he considers no State could be called truly a State so long

as it left a single citizen unfairly treated,—and therefore, we may add, all States we know can only be considered after all, to borrow a German phrase, as no better than "make-shift States,"—so he would insist that no League of Nations could begin to fulfil its functions if it slighted any one of the members who composed it. Only thus can we hope to build "the great city of the world," "in which States and Peoples are but individuals."

Rousseau's sense both of the difficulty and the vital importance of awakening the General Will in its fullness, made him, as we saw, attach the greatest importance to the natural links of affection between men of the same race and the same traditions. That is the root-cause of the trouble that one race has in governing another. Undeniably it is hard for one race to love another and impossible perhaps ever to love it as one's own. Therefore, always, a foreign government, even if well-intentioned, as our own in India, finds itself, to its own distress, incessantly undoing with one hand what it does with the other just because it is trying to evoke a general will, not only without the help of personal love, but often with the hindrance of personal dislike. At the best, it can never alone

complete its own work. And to any one who realizes with Rousseau the greatness of the General Will and the difficulty of evoking it, there is something so sublime in the achieved existence of any nation that the mere thought of any other destroying it seems quite as hateful as murder. For these and kindred reasons we could have been sure beforehand that, when Rousseau came to consider how it would be possible to rescue Europe from her international anarchy, he would turn to the idea of some loose federative union, closer than an alliance, less close than a Federal State. Now this idea, as we have seen, lay to his hand in the proposals of Sully recently revived by the Abbé de St. Pierre, and his passion for the republicanism of antiquity made him too, like Sully himself, look back with affection to the Amphictyonic Councils of ancient Greece, although he added that, "as a matter of fact," federation "had only been fully understood by the moderns."

The need, Rousseau knew, was pressing and nothing but a deliberate and concerted effort could avert catastrophe. He had a clear vision of the inevitable conflicts between vigorous States, organized as they are now, with no common law to judge between them: he speaks as a writer would to-day of their

tendency to expand indefinitely and their desire to feel themselves stronger than any possible opponents. What was there to restrain them? International law was feeble in the absence of any coercive power. In the fragment on *The State of War* he is uncompromising in his contempt for its influence: "As to what is commonly styled international law"—(*le droit des gens*)—"it is certain that in the absence of all sanctions its dictates are mere phantoms with even less power than the natural law." (The natural law, in this passage, means the vague kindliness in human beings before it has been evoked and disciplined by wise servants of the State.) "The natural law speaks at any rate to the individual heart. But international law, having no guarantee beyond the interest of those who accept it, finds that its decisions are only respected so long as self-interest confirms them. Thus, in the half-and-half condition in which we find ourselves, having done too much or not enough, we have done nothing at all and our situation is as bad as it can be."

Rousseau's re-handling of the Abbé de St. Pierre's enormous treatise on the Plan for a Perpetual Peace commences, after a sigh for the ideal, on the same note, but with peculiar

emphasis on the unreason of men. "If the social order were in fact, as we are told, the work of reason rather than of men's passions, should we have waited so long before understanding that we have done too much or not enough for our own happiness? That all of us, because we are living at once under the reign of law as regards our fellow-citizens and like savages as regards the rest of the world, have prevented private feuds only to fan the flames of public wars which are a thousand times more terrible? In short, that our union with some men has made us the enemies of all mankind?" On this diagnosis of the disease there follows the indication of the only cure possible. "If any way of escape is to be found from such a paradoxical and perilous condition, it can only be through some kind of federal government that could unite the nations much as individuals are united now, the one set like the other submitting to the impartial authority of Law." This is supported,—and this part of the essay is due entirely to Rousseau,—by a short and brilliant survey of Europe's actual condition with the chief historical causes that had led up to it. Rousseau was one of the first to recognize, not only that there were actual federal unions already existing such as the

Swiss, the Dutch and the German, but that "over and above these political unities, there may be others, less obvious but not less real, forming quietly through community of interest or likeness of policy or uniformity of tradition. . . . The European Powers already form a kind of system unified by a common religion, by a common international law, by a similarity of culture, by literature, by trade and by a balance of power which results inevitably from all this . . . and which would be far less easy to overthrow than many people imagine."

Nor does Rousseau, for all his indignation at the persistent folly of men, omit to recognize that in this respect there has been progress. "This society of nations has not always existed in Europe. . . . The Greeks, intellectual and conceited, divided humanity into two classes: one, their own race, was born to rule, and the other, which included all the rest of the world, was fit for nothing but slavery." It was Rome that first broke down this prejudice effectively, not only through subjugating the people who believed themselves "sovereign by natural right," but through forming a world-wide empire which took the daring step, "either insensate or wise beyond words, of granting to the van-

quished the same rights as the victors and changing all the subjects of Rome into her citizens." The uniformity of Roman Law added "a second chain of justice and reason" to the links of equal citizenship. And "a third link, stronger than either," was forged by Christianity. The influences of Papacy and Empire have remained, even when the Empire has been reduced to a phantom. And these two powers form the greatest single factors that, joined to the geographical position of Europe and the common inheritance of arts and letters, have made her peoples more like a genuine society of nations than any to be found elsewhere in all the world. "Yet, on the other hand, when we look at the incessant quarrels, the thefts, the aggressions, the rebellions, the wars, the murders that devastated this noble land, this home of wise men, this temple of science and art, if we think of our fine talk and our foul deeds, our humanity in principle and our barbarity in practice, a religion of love and an intolerance of hate, then the brotherhood of Europe seems nothing but a cynical name for the unending animosity of her nations."

If Rousseau had stopped here, he would have added little to the jeremiads of the

past. But this is how he goes on: "None the less, in all this, events only follow their natural course. Every society without laws or leaders, every union the making and the maintenance of which are left to chance, is bound to be submerged by quarrels at the first breath of change. The historic union between the races of Europe has made the fabric of their interests and their rights extraordinarily complex: they touch one another at so many points that the least alteration cannot but mean a collision: their conflicts are as disastrous as their relations are close and their endless quarrels have almost all the cruelty of civil wars." "We must admit therefore," he continues, "that Europe is in a chronic state of war and any particular treaty between this nation or that means rather a truce than a peace," but this is because "either the treaties have no guarantors other than the contracting parties or because the claims of any side are never really settled, and such rights or the pretensions to such rights between Powers who recognize no superior must inevitably lead to fresh wars as soon as changing circumstances have given new strength to the claimants." Matters are made worse by the uncertainties and contradictions of such

public law as does exist in Europe, a law as yet "neither established by common consent, nor founded on coherent principles," and by the plentiful lack of harmony within every nation between the form of government and the actual condition of the country. The relative forces of the nations themselves are indeed so evenly balanced in Europe that there is no chance of a universal monarchy again; "Yet if the present system cannot be overthrown it is only the more liable to storms. Between all the Powers of Europe there goes on a continual ferment which cannot undermine them completely, but serves to keep them in a perpetual state of unrest: their efforts are always useless and always recurring, like the waves of the sea that agitate the surface without altering the level, so that the people suffer for ever and the sovereigns reap no benefit."

Now this unstable equilibrium of itself indicates the real method of cure. "Our survey leads us to three inevitable conclusions. We must admit, first, that between all the nations of Europe, omitting Turkey, there are common links, imperfect indeed but closer and stronger than the loose ties existing between mankind in general; next, that the imperfections of this society make

the condition of those who compose it worse than if there were no connection at all; but, finally, that the same links which make the connection disastrous would avail to make it perfect. Thus all its members could win their happiness from what now makes their wretchedness, and change the war that dominates them into everlasting peace."

I have summarized Rousseau's argument here at some length, partly because it is so extremely able, at once wide and precise, and partly because so much that he says has a direct bearing upon modern problems. The condition of Europe has not, fundamentally, altered too much for that.

After this general argument, Rousseau, following St. Pierre, propounds the federal solution, in essentials the same as that proposed by Sully, and now at last, in the League of Nations, attempted in reality. There are differences, of course, but not such as need detain us long. The League was to be less wide than the modern League, for it only included the European family, but wider than Sully's, for it embraced Russia, and that as a matter of course, a proof, by the way, of the strides that Russia had made under Peter the Great. It was to be stricter than the modern League, for it allowed no secession,

and no kind of war except what was definitely approved by the League itself, which was "to force rulers, so to speak, to be just and pacific," a phrase anticipating much modern talk about "enforcing peace." It was less military in one sense than Sully's scheme, for it accepted the dominance of Turkey in Europe as an accomplished fact, but more so in another, for it envisaged the interference of the League in the internal affairs of the members. The League was to guarantee the sovereigns "alike against the ambition of irresponsible and iniquitous Pretenders and the revolts of rebellious subjects."

This, the weakest point in the whole plan, was precisely the one taken up by the "Holy Alliance" after Waterloo. It is very curious to find it advocated by Rousseau, so often, and not without cause, considered the harbinger of Revolution. But it must be remembered, first, that he insisted "the princes could only be guaranteed from rebellion if the subjects were guaranteed from tyranny," and next, as we shall see at the close, that he had a real hatred of bloodshed, while at the same time he loathed misgovernment and moreover saw, as we have already noticed, that the misgovernment in most European States would, if not remedied, inevitably breed war.

It is natural, therefore, that he should have welcomed the possible influence of the League as a chance of bringing the public opinion of Europe to bear upon such danger-points. Even at the present day, when every publicist has learnt that there are some internal affairs which must be left entirely alone, we are far from abjuring all pressure about them all. The League of Nations makes rules, for example, and every one admits that it ought to make them, about the slave traffic, the traffic in women and children and the opium traffic. But it does this by consent and would not even envisage the use of force unless the contracting parties broke, deliberately, their own solemn engagements. Here, as always, it is the federal principle that points the way to the solution. And Rousseau has a firm grasp on this principle: "There is all the difference in the world," he writes, "between depending on another's will and complying with the decision of a body of which one forms a component part and where each member can take the lead in turn. Liberty is lost in the hands of a master: it is confirmed in the hands of associates."

But in presenting this scheme to the world he made no secret of the fact that he did not expect it to be realized, at any rate, not in

his own time. His lambent irony plays round the incredible folly of princes, "who, like other men, are only led by their passions, and never reason except to justify the idiotic things they are determined to do." He will not think of appealing to their higher motives, as the simple-minded Abbé had done; he counts that hopeless from the start. But, as a forlorn hope, he is prepared to prove how well it would serve their interests. Aggressive war in Europe can never pay: "the victor is only left with the sorry consolation that he has not lost so much as the vanquished." And here Rousseau points out what even now is constantly overlooked, the fact that wars, in our present chaos, are actually fostered by fear. Peace, under our circumstances, though really the supreme interest of all concerned, cannot be trusted to take care of itself if only for the reason that "the lack of security makes every country, knowing that it cannot count on avoiding war in the long-run, try at any rate to get it declared at the moment most favourable for itself and so forestall a neighbour who would be sure to forestall it in turn. Thus, in fact, many wars, even where the offensive is taken, are rather to be counted as unjust methods of safeguarding one's own

rights than as attacks on the rights of others." Security, in short, can only come through co-operation, and co-operation is impossible without a plan of the kind proposed, a plan perfectly feasible and where the drawbacks are negligible in proportion to the gain. "This is not to say that princes will accept the proposal,—but simply that they would accept it if they consulted their real interests. For it must be noted that throughout we have never assumed that men are what they ought to be, good, generous, disinterested, putting the public welfare first from pure love of humanity: no, we have taken them as they are, unjust, grasping, always preferring their own interest to everything else. The only thing we give them credit for is enough intelligence to see what will benefit themselves and enough enterprise to secure their own happiness. If, in spite of this, the plan is never executed, it will not be because it is chimerical: it will be because men are utterly unreasonable. And a sane man among lunatics is nothing but a fool."

The words close Rousseau's re-writing of St. Pierre's work. In the "Criticism," added on his own account, he makes still clearer, if possible, his admiration for the scheme and his profound distrust for the dynasties whose

consent was needed for its inception. This consent they would most certainly refuse. "Then the Abbé's work, the impatient reader may retort, is nothing but a useless dream. Not at all: it is a solid, sensible book, and it is most important that it should be preserved." The reason why it would lead to nothing was simply because the monarchical governments of the day were set upon expansion. "Kings and their ministers care for two things and two things only: to extend their power abroad and to make it more absolute at home."

Europe has done much since Rousseau's day, and largely through Rousseau's teaching, to limit absolute government at home: has it done much, if anything, to limit the passion for domination abroad? In this respect democracies are now as much on their trial as monarchies were in Rousseau's day. And while it is true, fortunately, that the prosperity of one country does not ultimately lessen the prosperity of another, it may easily lessen, as Rousseau saw, its power to dominate, for that power depends on superiority, not on excellence. So long as one nation or its leader is possessed by the desire to be "top-dog," so long will there be "dog-fights" between them. Rous-

seau despaired of princes: he kept a hope, even if a faint one, in peoples. It was characteristic of him that he took Machiavelli's "Prince" to have been meant as a satire. Machiavelli for him was "a good citizen and an honest man" who knew how to pillory the behaviour of potentates. But there are democratic leaders to-day who justify Machiavellianism openly and others who practise it unavowedly. For the rest, Rousseau shows more than customary acuteness in his forecast of how the plan would be received. "The royal ministers who deign to notice it, having no reasonable or respectable argument against it, will do, as they have always done, turn it into ridicule." Which is precisely what Frederick the Great proceeded to do.

On the other hand, Rousseau would never admit that the plan was chimerical, and in judging of Sully's original proposals it is interesting to note that Rousseau thought there had actually been, in the state of Europe at the opening of the seventeenth century, a chance of realizing a League of the kind without a great war. For Sully's scheme was linked with the reduction of the Hapsburg power and that reduction was then so obviously to the "immediate self-interest

of all the other nations concerned" and so feasible in itself that the splendid scheme would have had a driving force behind it "greater than it was ever likely to get from any love of the common good." As things had shaped themselves in Europe by Rousseau's time, he saw no likelihood of ever attaining it except after the convulsion of a European war: it would clash with too many "vested interests." And that war he dreaded. He ends on a double chord, a note of longing for the scheme, a note of doubt as to whether it would be worth the price.

That price, intentionally or not, we Europeans have now in fact paid, and paid in full, some may venture to hope. It remains to see whether we can secure the goods. And here it must be repeated that if we do, it can only be through the training of that "General Will," that spirit of "fair-play" between nations, which Rousseau in this treatise ostentatiously refused to invoke, but the belief in which was the obvious motive for his writing the work at all. The real hope of democracy lies in the fact that it does force the average citizen to consider within the nation the interests of other people besides himself. This ought to train him, and sometimes it does, for internationalism.

CHAPTER VIII

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: BURKE

But also, it must always be remembered national unity may, and usually does, develop antagonisms towards other nations for the simple reason that each wants the lion's share in a stock of limited goods. There is only a certain amount of fertile land on the globe, for example, and every nation needs at least some of it. If it were only "some" that it needed, this might not matter. But the desire to acquire more may be bound up with a nation's vigour. There is little use in saying, as Rousseau, for example, does, that a nation is just as well off without much territory. This, it may be noted in passing, is itself disputable. There is much to be said on both sides. Other things being equal, a nation finds it an economic advantage to have a greater supply of fertile land than its neighbours. It can, if it chooses, press this advantage to the full in its trade-bar-

gaining. We make a great mistake, of course, if we look on trade as nothing but competition, a kind of veiled and gentler war. Trade has always, and inevitably, an element of mutual gain: otherwise it would not go on. And it was a great landmark for internationalism when this began to be more fully recognized, as was the case when Adam Smith opened the era of Political Economy in the eighteenth century. But while exchange must always do something for the good of both parties, none the less it can do, possibly it always does, more good to one than to the other: and he is likely to get, as we say, the best of the bargain who has the best natural resources at his command. On the other hand, the greatest source of wealth springs from the varied inventiveness and industry of man. That industry is always the greater when men are working freely for their own people and under what they believe to be fair conditions; and that inventiveness is the richer when the different gifts of mankind are all employed. No one would expect the world to be the wealthier in the end if it was all ruled by one Power dictating to tributaries. Experiments in that direction have proved too unsatisfactory. Judged, therefore, from the narrowly economic point, the

question of increased territory remains, in the vast majority of cases, a question to be settled in each nation by balancing advantage and disadvantage: the gain to its own individual resources on the one hand, the gain to the sum total of the world's wealth on the other, and therefore, in the long-run, to a possibly greater share of the wealth through exchange than could have been got by keeping the new natural sources in its own hands.

This is complex enough, but it by no means exhausts the complexity of the problem. A nation that is energetic, prolific, capable of developing itself and its peculiar ideals, is almost certain to demand more space for the work, quite apart from considerations of economic gain. Especially is this so if it has any gift for colonization or for governing backward races. It may be true enough that its individual members would be equally rich if they stayed at home and allowed others to develop undeveloped lands while they took the new products in exchange. But this obscures the all-important fact that by so doing they would lose the interest of the new work. As one looks down history from the days of the Greeks and Romans to the most recent pioneering, one feels it impossible adequately to explain the thrust

towards growth in nations and empires by the mere desire for wealth or even by the mere desire for military power. A modern poet has put this defence in the mouth of a Roman conqueror before a British patriot. Boadicea asks Suetonius why Rome, with all her palaces, should come to disturb Britain. He answers:

"Rome is not marble towers and palaces,
Rome is a thought born in the mind of man
That has conceived an order to endure
Beyond himself: . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . a thought
That moves for ever outward, outward, outward,—
Cannot be satisfied, till the whole world's
Lethargy and hostility are transformed
Into that order."

It is idle to suppose that this spirit, the spirit of a Julius Cæsar subduing Gaul, could ever be appeased by money. Money is rather its tool than its goal. It can only be conquered by a larger idea, the idea not of a growing nation, but of a growing world in sympathy not only with any one people but with all peoples. Many valiant enemies of aggressive Imperialism weaken the force of their attack by not seeing where the strength of their opponents lies. Similar considerations apply

to the desire for military security. It is there, of course, and accounts for much in the passion of nations to expand. But it is not the only factor. Many countries, our own included, have undertaken the control of territories, not because they thought it would make them safer, but because they thought it would give them more influence in the shaping of the world. The two things are far from being the same, and the ramifications from the interplay of the three, the economic, the military and what we might call the nationalistic, are endless and ever-changing.

Nor would they be avoided by cutting out nationalism, even supposing we could achieve this. Experience has shown that the individual adventurer, not responsible to any particular government, is the worst of exploiters. And there are rich lands in the world, nominally in the possession of savage or backward races, certain to be so exploited if the national governments stand aside. For, unfortunately, it is the fact that the tropics are fitted for products, from rice to rubber, that can only be grown there and that the rest of the world will not consent to do without. And, still more unfortunately, the human races that thrive in the

tropics are the black, the brown and the yellow, not the white. Now the white men are firmly convinced of their own superiority, and whatever may be the ultimate truth on the matter there can be little doubt that they are the more efficient: nor yet that intermarriage between themselves and the darker breeds fails to produce a good stock. Thus, over and over again, one race is put in the power of another with which it cannot amalgamate, yet which demands its loyalty.

These are commonplaces, but they are repeated to recall the difficulties and intricacies of the problem. How are all these interests, so important and so conflicting, to be reconciled in any way approaching fairness? If ever there was need for impartial judgment and all-round examination, there is need here. To attempt a solution at haphazard on the principle of allowing rival jealousies and greeds to work themselves out, a sort of catch-as-catch can with the devil to take the hindmost is to invite trouble from that gentleman. He has not been slow in availing himself of the invitation. The distribution of the world's natural resources, limited as they are and must be, the relation of backward races to those abreast of modern science, offer problems that are world-wide

and they need the forum of the world for their settlement. The wonder is that with our parochial methods we have managed even as well as we have done.

But the way, if there has been an advance, has been marked by pitfalls. English writers of all opinions on politics are accustomed to applaud Edmund Burke. And with much reason. His integrity and ability, above all the generosity of his temper towards the young colonies and the ancient communities whom England was now trying to govern, make him a figure not to be forgotten. He stood, with all the force of his fiery character, for a large-hearted treatment of America and a decent sense of our responsibilities towards India. He failed for the time in his efforts for conciliation with "the American Colonies," but many of his phrases have now become houschold words. There is hardly a speaker on the British Empire who does not quote something about the bonds "light as air and strong as iron" that bind the Dominions to the Mother Country. But there are still too few among us who realize how great a change it was that Burke tried in his day to introduce. We like to emphasize the finer side of English policy, and draw a kindly veil over our own mistakes and mis-

doings. And yet, after all, the greatest hope for England and for the world is that, bad as things may be now, we have in many ways learnt from our mistakes and repented of our misdoings. It is often said complacently among us, and still more often thought, that the English race has a peculiar genius for colonization. Perhaps it has, but it has undoubtedly done some things peculiarly at variance with that genius.

To read carefully Burke's two great speeches on American Taxation and on Conciliation with America is to realize the good and bad together. The principles of freedom and fairness which he tries to impress on the Parliament of his day are excellent, but it does not do to forget what is involved in the fact that they needed impressing. Moreover, it is significant that Burke does not venture to enunciate boldly and as a fundamental principle the principle for which the Americans were contending, to wit, that there should be "no taxation without representation." Often, it is true, he comes very near it, as when in the speech on Taxation he quotes the example of the Chester Act in England as something which "recognizes the equity of not suffering any considerable district, in which the British

subjects may act as a body, to be taxed without their own voice in the grant." But he is careful to add that this was recognized "without affecting the abstract equity of the authority of Parliament." Burke, it is well-known and apparent all through his writings, distrusted "abstract principles" in political discussion. More than once he glories in this. "I am not here going into the distinction of rights, not attempting to mark their boundaries. I do not enter into these metaphysical distinctions; I hate the very sound of them." . . . "I am resolved this day to have nothing at all to do with the question of the right of taxation. . . . The question with me is, not whether you have a right to render your people miserable; but whether it is not your interest to make them happy."

Now there are undeniable advantages in ruling out abstract questions. It saves a great deal of thinking, it saves a great deal of controversy, it may conciliate otherwise irreconcilable opponents, nor should it be mocked as though this were all: it also avoids the genuine danger of overlooking the fact that "circumstances alter cases." Partly because of the poverty in language, all abstract principles must be stated in

general terms, and yet when it comes to practice the principle must be applied to particulars and the particulars vary. The true art of statesmanship lies in so varying the application that it suits the particulars and yet does not give up the inner spirit of the principle. The danger of not stating the principle precisely lies in the fact that when it does not suit the statesman, for narrower motives, to apply it at all, it will be the easier to disregard. Much both of the advantage and the disadvantage can be seen in Burke's writings. He did not want to say outright "no taxation without representation," because he saw no method, America being as far-off as she was then, of allowing American representatives to sit in the British Parliament, and further, he foresaw that it might be useful for certain contingencies, when quick action was necessary, to reserve full power to the Imperial Parliament. "She is never to intrude into the place of the others, whilst they are equal to the common ends of their institution." But for exceptional needs, and among them he mentions expressly the needs of war, he would allow exceptional power. "But then this ought to be no ordinary power; nor ever used in the first instance." Burke's point of view is easy

enough to understand; but it easily leads to dangers of its own. It has the great merit of keeping things elastic, but also, what is an additional merit in Burke's eyes, of always reserving power in the last resort to the Assembly that he considers sovereign, so that it might impose taxation in an emergency as it considered best. But this, precisely, is what the fathers of the United States would have repudiated. A modern parallel might be found in a nation which, while professing whole-hearted devotion to the principle of arbitration, would never pledge itself to arbitrate; on this vital point it would insist on being itself the arbiter. We come here on the defective and reactionary side of Burke's thinking, a side that was shown in his fatal blindness to the greatness and necessity of the French Revolution and in his defence of rotten boroughs against reform.

Yet the world might be well-satisfied if Foreign Ministers were as large-minded towards one another as Burke was towards the Americans. In his enthusiasm for their freedom and their friendship he even comes within an ace of repudiating, in advance, anything that could be said in the name of patriotism to justify the lack of representa-

tion at home. An opponent had said, he tells us, "that the Americans are our children, and how can they revolt against their parent? . . . that if they are not free in their present state, England is not free; because Manchester, and other considerable places, are not represented. So then, because some towns in England are not represented, America is to have no representative at all." And Burke continues roundly: "They *are* our children; but when children ask for bread, we are not to give a stone. Is it because the natural resistance of things, and the various mutations of time, hinder our government, or any scheme of government, from being any more than a sort of approximation to the right,—is it therefore that the Colonies are to recede from it infinitely? When this child of ours wishes to assimilate to its parent, and to reflect with a true filial resemblance the beauteous countenance of British liberty, are we to turn to them the shameful parts of our Constitution? are we to give them our weakness for their strength? our opprobrium for their glory? and the slough of slavery, which we are not able to work off, to serve them for their freedom?"

Yet when there was a chance actually of working off that same "slough of slavery"

at home, Burke, as we know, drew back. The truth seems to be that Burke was a thoroughgoing "paternalist," thorough in every sense. He did not want to see the children too independent, but he did want the authority always to be exercised in sympathy with them and in honest regard for their interests. He felt that government ought to be a mother, not a stepmother. And this was in accord with his whole conception of political society as a partnership in every high enterprise, not merely a relation between those who give orders and those who receive them, still less a connection between men who threaten and men who succumb. Indeed, in this respect he is very near to Rousseau, though without the other's clarity and merciless logic. He sees that the real links which bind men together are the sense of justice and mutual affection: and that without one or both of these all political frameworks are mere scaffoldings which will never make a building. But he is not, as Rousseau was, the initiator of a new order, just because he did not set out so clear the fundamental thing at which Government should aim, the participation of the governed in the work. Yet many of his finest sayings lead to this and that is why he has been so

useful to a people like ourselves who prefer to be led on step by step without asking too curiously what is to be the final goal.

Burke's speeches on America failed of success at the time, but they have combined with the successful revolt of the American Colonies to change the whole attitude of England towards colonization. Three stages may be marked: first, the attitude against which Burke fought, that the Colonials were children who ought to obey, not children who ought to be considered, children, moreover, who were growing to be men. At this stage it was usually held that, as a matter of course, their trade should be subordinated to that of the Mother Country. That was the aim and object of the Navigation Acts, and other ordinances restricting American manufacture. There were protests, it is true, notably from Adam Smith: "To prohibit a great people from making all that they can of every part of their own produce, or from employing their stock and industry in the way they judge most advantageous to themselves, is a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of mankind." And Burke himself, though he does not condemn the "commercial restraint" outright, yet speaks of it as a burden which, if combined with

taxation from the home country, would be intolerable. "I think it," he said, "if uncompensated, to be a condition of as rigorous servitude as men can be subject to."

The next stage was the stage marked by Lord Durham's report on Canada and the consequent grant of complete self-government, including the right, not only to be free from all restraints in their own commerce, but to put what duties they liked on imports from home. This one fact alone might show how much England had learned from the conflict with America. It would have astounded Burke, but it is the logical conclusion of his own argument. But at this stage the general feeling towards the Colonies was not only that they should be allowed to break the connection with the Mother Country if they wished; it was generally expected that they would so wish. And those who desired to maintain it felt obliged to give as reasons some consideration of commercial advantage or military strength. But in the last thirty years a different spirit has been appearing. It began with the advocacy of what used to be called "Imperial Federation" and of which the catchword now, and a splendid catchword too, is "the British Commonwealth of Na-

tions." The note of this attitude is the recognition, not so much of commercial or military advantage, but of the greatness in a real unity maintained among diverse, widespread and virile populations, and the value for such unity that lies in belonging voluntarily to the same political system. Nowadays there is nothing that unites men more closely than this: there are other loyalties, it is true, the loyalties of Labour in particular, but the importance of this one may be measured by the difference of feeling in England towards America and towards Canada. We say, and we hope it is true, that there is the greatest goodwill in England towards the United States, but no one could deny that it would be greater still if our military and naval forces were pooled. And as nations now are, this cannot be. Not impossibly, in centuries to come, it will be recognized that the biggest service England did the world was in paving the way for world-federation by showing that it was possible for "sovereignties" to unite in common action and common defence.

With men of the same race it may be said, this is none too difficult, and that is true of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. But in India and South Africa the Empire has to face the problem of the coloured races.

Here again Burke inaugurated a new epoch. In his long fulminating speeches at the trial of Warren Hastings, he insisted, as Professor Laski points out, that "England must be in India for India's benefit, or not at all." It is this that gives them their greatness. Their fairness as an attack on Warren Hastings himself has often been challenged and may, perhaps, be doubted. But that is not the point. What cannot be doubted is that Burke made a new departure when he opened up abuses that were being ignored, and further, that, though the details may be exaggerated, especially with regard to Hastings himself, yet the indictment, all deductions made, is a terrible one against the evils of Company rule in India. Several consequences follow from these facts, and only two of them are soothing to our national sense of honour. We are glad that Burke stood up, and was, in the main, successful. Hastings was acquitted, but the system was changed. There were men to be found like Burke and his supporters, stirred to shame and indignation at the possibility of truth in the charge which he declares was admitted by "one of the honestest and ablest servants of the Company," the charge that "the civil service of the Company resembled the mili-

tary service of the Mahrattas,—little pay, but unbounded licence to plunder."

Burke's rhetoric, often, it must be admitted, swollen and self-conscious, is dignified by his fundamental honesty of purpose. He believed that English rule could do a great deal for India, "whose native regular government was then broken up," that it could really bring "order, peace, science and security to the natives of that vexed and harassed country." But for this was necessary "a severe inspection of ourselves, a purification of our own offences, a lustration of the exorbitances of our own power." It is something, it is much, that the representative of a nation could say this frankly, instead of always, like Athens at the opening of the Peloponnesian War, crying up its own virtues, as though it were free from the failings common to the rest of the world. But if England claims that she learnt a lesson from Warren Hastings' trial, she ought not to suppose either that she learnt it completely, nor yet that everything which went before it should therefore be forgotten, still less that no other nation could ever learn in the same way.

On the contrary, one of the plainest inferences from the whole matter is the possibility

of a nation's conscience being awakened by publicity. When Burke urged the judges to remember that they had come to "try the most serious of all causes," "the cause of Asia in the presence of Europe," he struck a note the echoes of which have a value far beyond his own time. And in this connection it is worth pointing out how grave an indictment against Europe is involved in the usual defence of Warren Hastings. Hastings, it is said, must not be judged too harshly. The French were threatening our influence in India, and it was of paramount importance that this should not be allowed. Mistakes must be allowed to a man in such emergencies. There may be real force in this defence, but what does it imply for Europe? European anarchy was such as to make it inevitable for other countries to be treated as counters in the game of grab. And much the same would have to be said later of Canning's well-known phrase that he would "call in the New World to redress the balance of the Old."

CHAPTER IX

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: FREDERICK THE GREAT, KANT AND GOETHE

The eighteenth century, with which we are still concerned, and the seventeenth before it, have been counted by thoughtful students as the two centuries most anarchical in European history. It is difficult to award the prize in that gloomy competition, but there is a good deal to be said for this judgment. The landmarks in the history of our subject, as we have had abundant reason to observe, are certainly not milestones marking a regular advance. Many of them are danger-signals and there are plenty of such during this period.

The rise of Prussia and the advent of Russia into the European world, though both events brought great good, were attended with ominous signs. Frederick the Great's career is typical. His organization of Prussia itself for industry and for justice, once

he had got the power he wanted for his country, was altogether admirable. His early friendship with Voltaire was full of promise for intellectual co-operation in Europe. But the friendship broke down in recrimination and the power of Prussia was won in large part by sheer plundering. The temptation, it may be admitted, was strong. Prussia had scanty natural resources, no coal, little pasture for sheep, and her frontiers were awkward. But "to improve Prussia's figure" ("corriger la figure de la Prusse") by padding her with substantial slices cut from her neighbours was not hopeful for Europe's future. The taking of Silesia, the first partition of Poland between Frederick, Catherine of Russia and the reluctant Maria Theresa, were bad omens and have led to as bad results. But this much must be said for Frederick: like Pericles, like Bismarck, like Cavour, if he did unjustifiable things for the benfit of his own country, at any rate he knew, as they did, when, for the same reason, to stop. The worst of it is that other men, in their own countries and elsewhere, follow the bad precedent set by leaders of this type without the wisdom of their limitations. Nor can any wisdom of the prudential kind do much to appease the

resentment of the nations that are wronged. Thucydides let us see this long ago: the imperialistic policy of Pericles led straight to the Peloponnesian War, although, if the Athenians had kept to the prudence of his counsels, if he had not been followed by a Cleon and an Alcibiades, Athens might never have paid the price herself. Looked at in a broader survey the tragedy of Greece and the tragedies that have marked the relations between Prussia and Europe might all have been avoided by a timely policy of co-operation. If France had not been set on maintaining her own ascendancy, if Poland's neighbours (as Sully would have wished and Rousseau after him) had helped Poland to set her own house in order instead of hindering her whenever they could for reasons of their own until she was too weak to resist them, we might not now be faced in that quarter of the world with prejudices and problems that seem almost insurmountable. And the path to this maze has been disastrous. Frederick's own description of the state of his country after the Seven Years' War was over is eloquent of what, in the end, his hard-won victory had cost. "'To form an idea of the general subversion,' says the King, in regard to 1763, 'and how great

were the desolation and discouragement, you must represent to yourself Countries entirely ravaged, the very traces of the old habitations hardly discoverable. Towns, some ruined from top to bottom, others half-destroyed by fire; . . . no field in seed; no grain for the food of the inhabitants. . . . Noble and Peasant had been pillaged, ransomed, foraged, eaten-out by so many different Armies; nothing now left them but life and miserable rags. There was no credit by trading people, even for the daily necessaries of life' " (Carlyle's *Frederick*, vol. IX).

Yet through all the wars of these two centuries there were, as we saw, isolated thinkers dreaming of or working for unity. Burke followed on Rousseau and Rousseau on Grotius and Grotius on Sully. Further, there were factors in the general movements of thought and events that ought not to be overlooked. The expansion of Europe itself, even with all the drawbacks we have indicated, was bringing the world together with results to be more noticeable for good in the century that followed. Above all, science had already begun to show, for those who had eyes to see, what men might do when they joined forces for discovery instead of hurling them at each other for destruction.

Galileo the Italian, Copernicus the Pole, Tycho Brahé the Dane, Kepler the German, they all needed each other for the completion of their work. The same is true in physics and mathematics of Descartes the Frenchman, Newton the Englishman, Leibnitz the German, and Huyghens the Dutchman. And the era of co-operation in medicine, so abundantly fruitful in our own days, had been opened, it might be said, by Harvey the Englishman, Vesalius the Belgian, and Servetus the Spaniard. The interplay of mind with mind in science shows how the nations should behave to each other. When Calvin had Servetus burnt at Geneva, he sinned against humanity in more ways than one. The co-operation that Calvin would have limited to "the elect" in his "Christian Institutes" finds one of its clearest examples in science. In science every one is on an equality with every one else, no one is under compulsion, and the work of one man, provided it is rational, so far from hindering another's, helps it, provided the other's work is rational too. These are really the valid principles that lie at the root of the republican watchwords, *Liberté*, *Egalité*, *Fraternité*. No one inspired by that generous formula ever supposed "Equality" to mean that all

men have equal abilities, any more than that all men are of equal stature. What it does mean is that all men should have an equal chance, and privilege be reserved for proved merit and for nothing else. Nor does liberty mean no leadership: it means, as it means in science, no arbitrary decisions that cannot be justified by an appeal to reason. And brotherhood means, not that all men should love each other equally, but that all men should be encouraged to make the best of themselves, in the belief that the fundamental principles of right conduct are the same all the world over and cannot, when they are clarified, conflict. So with science: the life of thought, it is the basic belief of science, is the same all the world over, and welcomes, or should welcome, the co-operation of every reasonable being.

In the face of such considerations national barriers, however important, sink into a subordinate place. And men who feel the greatness of knowledge are peculiarly fitted to realize this. F. W. Hirst in his *Arbiter in Council* quotes a fine passage from Turgot full of this feeling. The optimism of it, bred from the early enthusiasm when it seemed possible to reform France without bloodshed, is pathetic in view of all that followed, but

the sense of the link between knowledge and internationalism is perfectly sound. "The nations are drawing together: soon all that the soil produces, all that industry has created in the different countries of the world, will be available for the whole human race. Eventually all peoples will recognize the same principles, will use the same knowledge, and will unite to promote the general progress and the common good." A similar awakening to the essential solidarity of mankind when men act as reasonable beings, a similar sense of the latent richness in human life and the value of the different contributions that could be made by different nations can be observed in Germany from the middle of the eighteenth century. Lessing had a magnificent theme in "The Education of the Human Race," the gradual training of humanity through the long progress of the centuries. Indeed, it was now that belief in progress first began to take a firm hold of the European mind, and, curiously and interestingly, along with the belief went an altogether new sense of the worth in the early stages of civilization, even in what had been scouted as mere savagery. Herder and Grimm in Germany, like Percy and Walter Scott in England, taught educated people

the value of folk-songs and ballads and primitive tales. It is the beginning of the modern science that we are well-advised to call Anthropology, the study of Man as Man. The connection between this new interest in old things and the confident hope for the coming unity of the world is not accidental: it rests on the conviction, always present though not always recognized, that all phases of man's nature belong together and could throw light on each other. The era of German philosophy opened in the second half of the eighteenth century, and through all its diversities it is permeated with a sense of the unity in man's mind. Kant's whole system turns on this as a cardinal point: there are deliverances of reason which every thinking man, every man who experiences anything at all, is bound to accept. And, whatever else may be shaken in Kant's system, this point stands firm. Kant was not only a master-thinker, he was a man of exceptional strength and sincerity of character through and through, and it is not surprising that, with this fundamental belief, he should have looked on the disunion of Europe with deep concern and with the conviction that it could, if Europeans chose, be remedied.

His convictions were given to the world in two short treatises. The first was written when he was over sixty and published in 1784. It has the somewhat heavy title,—and the heaviness is characteristic,—*A Cosmopolitan's Suggestion for Universal History.* But its leading idea, that the burdens of war will drive men to peace, teaching them by bitter experience what they could have learnt without price, had they only been reasonable, is simple enough, and the whole essay in some ways more inspiring than the second, *Towards Eternal Peace,* because it gives clearer expression to the man's own belief. It refers directly to Rousseau, and Rousseau's views have plainly influenced Kant, but the contrast is almost as instructive as the likeness. Kant, whose leading principle in ethics was the command, "Treat every man as an end in himself, never as a mere means," was sure to sympathize with Rousseau's doctrine of the General Will and Rousseau's insistence on the need for deliberate and collective effort. But he has none of Rousseau's occasional idealizing of the savage or his exaltation of the native goodness in uncorrupted man. In fact, he leans rather to the view of Hobbes, that the savage state was a war of all against all. And at the same

time he has, what Rousseau had not, a deep-rooted faith in progress as somehow bound up in the nature of things over and above Man's conscious effort, though capable of being hastened or retarded by that effort.

It is of singular interest to note the insight with which Kant combines these different ideas. Nature has given man reason and that means she wants to awaken his deliberate free-will, a thing quite other than the "freedom of the brute." "Man is not to be led by mere instinct, instructed and provided for by a knowledge born with him and ready-made: no, he is, as it were, to make everything for himself and out of himself." But man is a blundering creature and a bad creature: along with the power to reason and to co-operate goes an irrational antagonism towards other men, the sheer brute instinct to grasp and domineer: human society is "an uncompanionable companionship." Yet out of this rivalry comes good: at its worst it prevents man from sinking into a mere sheep. And further, the very wretchedness and poverty of the condition drives him to citizenship: "selfishness itself is forced to discipline itself." Man gets a glimmering at last of the truth that only Justice would give him the setting in which his powers could

develop. But, to allow this truth full scope, the justice must be world-wide: and here again it is only through the recurrent misery of wars that men are likely to learn. But if they do not learn it, all is lost.

"*The problem of a satisfactory constitution for any nation is bound up with the problem of law between nations, and the one cannot be solved without the other.*" Kant writes this sentence in capitals, and he goes on to ask, "What is the use of working at a lawful constitution, the establishment of a true commonwealth, for some men only? The same antagonism which forced men to this now becomes the cause why each commonwealth, as a nation among other nations, stands towards its neighbours in an attitude of irresponsible 'freedom' and therefore must expect from them all the evils that once weighed on individuals and drove them into the bonds of law-abiding citizenship." But these evils themselves, so Kant believes, will force men beyond their pitiful little halting-places between anarchy and organization. "Nature will drive them with the scourge of war, with the extravagant and ever-growing burden of armaments, the weight of which must be felt in the end by every State even when at peace: she will compel them to make

attempts, halting at first and incomplete, and then, after much desolation, destruction and revolution, to do what reason could have taught them at once without so many bitter experiences, namely, to give up their lawless life of savages and enter into a League of Nations (*Völkerbund*)—an organization where every State, even the smallest, can expect security and peace, not from its own power or its own decision as to what is right in its own cause, but from this great Society of Nations, this Amphictyonic League where the powers of all are united in one and the decision is given by the general will acting according to law. However absurd and sentimental such an idea may seem, however much it may be now laughed out of court as it was when advocated by St. Pierre and Rousseau,—none the less it will be the inevitable result of the misery which men bring on themselves and which will force nations to take this step, however much they may dislike it, the step that 'the natural man' took so unwillingly, force them to surrender their lawless freedom, the freedom of the brute, to find rest and security in a lawful constitution."

The words read like a prophecy, not yet completely fulfilled, and the more comforting

because of Kant's full recognition of the irrational element in mankind. There is little of the sentimentalist about Kant. The recognition that there may be a stimulus to progress in the very disasters of war was, for an internationalist at that date, new and valuable. There is, undoubtedly, truth in it, although, like most discoveries in thought, it has shown itself dangerous. Allied to crude doctrines of evolution, "struggle for existence," "survival of the fittest," and the like, crudely applied to human society, it was used abundantly in the nineteenth century to justify a policy of leaving the present international anarchy to look after itself, trusting that out of the Witch's Cauldron, by some inscrutable, unconscious alchemy, the elixir of life might be brewed. But, as with Sully, the mistaken inferences drawn from Kant's ideas are not the author's fault. He is insistent always that the further organization of mankind could only be achieved by a conscious and tremendous effort, and that till this was made our "civilization" was nothing but "a glittering wretchedness." Here again he recalls Rousseau and deliberately. "Until this last step is taken, and the union between nations accomplished . . . mankind has to

endure the worst of evils under the delusive appearance of outward prosperity, and Rousseau was not so far wrong when he preferred the savage state to the civilized, so long, at least, as man refuses to climb the last ascent of the hill before him."

But Kant knew also that, for this, "a long and intensive education" was needed, "an education of the spirit for all citizens in every country." He nursed a hope of ultimate success and believed he could discern signs of a gradual progress in the history of Europe towards better government, signs also that Europe was destined to lead the world, but he speaks of this as "an article of faith," not as a thing that could be proved. If that hope was confident, it also carried with it a much-needed warning to statesmen. Nations and governments would be judged in the end, he says, by what they had done to help or hinder the cause of internationalism. It is not only as an escape from horror, moreover, that Kant pleads for the cosmopolitan outlook: it is because of his belief in the latent powers of men which need peace imperatively for their development. That, too, was a note comparatively new in the writings on the subject in his day, and it is a note of increasing value.

The second treatise is more concerned with practical details and perhaps for that reason of less permanent importance. But it contains four or five points well worth notice. It is couched in a form that looks, as F. W. Hirst has suggested, like a grim mockery of the disingenuous treaties so common then and since. The "preliminary" Articles of an Everlasting Peace, if it is not to be the peace of the grave, must ensure, in the first place, that no secret reservation is made carrying with it germs of future wars. To-day every one offers lip-service to this principle, but the other Articles are more contentious, and therefore may repay more study. For example, the third, providing that standing armies must be given up. And here Kant's argument is of enduring interest. It is against the dignity of a man, he urges, to be thus treated as a mere tool in the hand of the State. If he makes war he should make it as a volunteer, convinced that it is necessary for the defence of himself or his country. Kant does not consider the question of conscription, a thing not yet customary in Europe. But the argument makes dead against, if not all conscription whatsoever, at any rate all that does not allow fully for the conscientious objector. Again, by

the fourth Article, no foreign loans are to be allowed. Stated in this unqualified form, the proviso is, frankly, absurd. But it points to considerations that are of great importance in the present day. If loans for war and for munitions were only granted on condition that the belligerent was already justified before an International Court, an enormous advance would have been made. Admittedly money strengthens the sinews of war, and to weaken the sinews could not fail to check the monster. There would be an end, at the same time, to the modern spectacle, alike degrading and indefensible, of the same neutrals financing both combatants and selling engines of destruction impartially to both.

Another proviso of Kant's ensures that "no State shall interfere by force in the affairs of another State." Kant makes an exception, by the way, for the cases where there is civil war open and declared, an exception which takes from the Article much of its effect. But something more should be said here in connection with the words "interfere by force." The doctrine of non-interference is pushed very far to-day, often so far as to imply that no foreigner should be allowed to conduct political propaganda

in another country wherever this was unpleasing to the Governments concerned. This is a very different matter, and recalls the religious intolerance we believed Europe had outgrown and all the other vain attempts to set up national barriers against the tides of thought. All the great movements of thought in Europe have been international, even before the days of printing and cheap transit. The change from Paganism to Christianity, the darkness of the Dark Ages, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the growth of science, the Industrial Revolution, the rise of Democracy, the formation of a Labour Party, the emancipation of women, the advocacy of Socialism and Communism, they have touched every country in turn, sometimes almost simultaneously. There is an unescapable unity in Europe: the only question is whether that unity shall be a real union or the locked embrace of a fratricidal conflict.

The "constitutive" Articles of the Treaty deal more directly with the League of Nations that was then only a dream, and Kant's first requirement for such a League is that every member of it should have a republican form of government. By "republican" he means what we should now call "constitutional";

that is to say, it must be truly representative of all the citizens, and war must not be declared without their consent. Secondly, it is to be recognized that only on the basis of such a League can there be a satisfactory system of international law. Without some form of international and impartial authority to interpret and administer it, aggressors only invoke "international law" to cover their own attacks, although the mere existence of anything that could even be called by such a name bears witness to the underlying sense of right always latent in man. The third "constitutive" Article proves that Kant was alive to the problem of the coloured races, but it must be considered rather as an evasion of that problem than a solution. No country, he insists, has a right to claim more than hospitality for its nationals from any other country, and he implies that any attempt by the "commercial governments" of Europe to control Eastern or barbaric lands was bound to end in a "litany of horrors." But the question, as we have already indicated, is too complex to be solved so easily as that. Native misgovernment may often reach a point at which it is far better to interfere. And without some civilized government it is hardly conceivable

that certain savage races could ever advance at all. Instead, they would become the victims of irresponsible traders. None the less, Kant's warning has been abundantly justified. The "litany" did not end with the denunciation of Warren Hastings. Since Burke's time and Kant's, there have been things done by Europe in Africa, in India, in China, for which Europe has not, even yet, repented as she ought. Negro slavery, reprisals at the time of the Mutiny, the forcing of opium on the Chinese, extortions for rubber and for cocoa, the atrocities committed by white men after the Boxer rebellion, these are things which even to palliate or to veil should be felt as a disgrace. The best safeguard against repetition lies in publicity. And on the value of publicity Kant was among the first to insist. "All actions," so he wrote in the final Appendix to his treatise, "are unjust if they depend on principles which cannot be published." More and more in recent years has this come to be recognized by all advocates of a sane internationalism, and herein lies the significance of the demand for "an open diplomacy."

Kant's belief in men's possibilities, his facing of their actual wickedness, and his

recognition that the good and the bad were tied together by curious knots are all reflected in the work and the thought of his compatriot, younger and even greater than himself, Goethe. Goethe was not only a man who took all knowledge for his province: he took all nations into his sympathy. He believed that a civilized people could reach a standpoint at which it saw that the disasters of another were as much to be deplored as the disasters to itself. And he felt as he believed. He "could not hate the French" even when they trampled on his country or when he "thanked God" that Germany was rid of them; he kept his admiration for Napoleon's powers even when he came to admit the harm in the Napoleonic aggression, or when he warned his countrymen against ever copying the Napoleonic example. He was blamed for his large-heartedness in his lifetime: it was dubbed unpatriotic: but since the Great War they who know his writings best will recognize that in their finer spirit lies the cure for all our fevers. Those writings are little known among us in England to-day, and that is our loss. Even the greatest of them, "Faust," is only familiar in the fragment of the First Part. Yet the epic sweep of the Second Part, and

the close of Faust's career bear directly on our problem. All history, the poet tells us, even the search for Beauty, has been lived under the recurrent shadow of war because man "who will not govern himself" will not give up the lust to govern his neighbour by force. Yet the work of government is a task essential for man. Faust discovers at last that only in the framework of a society aiming at the development of free citizens can his own restlessness draw near peace and his own powers find a scope that will even begin to satisfy him.

Yet precisely here is he dogged by his old besetting sin, the aim at possession instead of union, which had brought disaster to Gretchen. And here, it is thought with much reason, Goethe took hints from the last years of Frederick the Great. In Faust's work for expansion and organization, excellent work in itself, he allows himself to be exasperated by the sturdy independence of an old peasant couple who want to keep their own little plot of land when he wants to move them. Furious, he turns to Mephistopheles. "But isn't it your destiny," the Devil asks, "to be a colonizing power? I'll shift them for you." Faust hands the job over to him, and then is filled with horror

at the result, conflict, devastation, and the death of the innocent. This is not what he meant. It is the excuse of countless aggressors, but Faust is in earnest. He breaks with Mephistopheles at the eleventh hour, abjuring the compound of trickery and tyranny which makes the charlatanism of conquest and which Goethe includes in "Magic." But Faust does not give up the effort at organization. And it is all-important that he does not. The same powers of self-assertion and self-expression, such is Goethe's belief, that drive man to plunder and tyranny, have it in them, if he chooses and persists in the choice, to drive him towards beauty and freedom and world-wide comradeship. But will he persist, so long as he lives? Will the nations of the earth ever understand that this is true? To that question, so the poet seems to say, the answer of Destiny is dark. But he lets the soul of his Faust be ransomed, once he has begun to act upon its truth.

CHAPTER X

NAPOLEON AND THE HOLY ALLIANCE

The mutual admiration of Goethe and Napoleon is familiar to students of both. All ability attracted Goethe, but especially the ability to organize, and whatever else Napoleon had or had not, he certainly possessed this power in a superlative degree. The trouble was that with him, as with Faust, it was doubled by the desire to domineer. Hence, for a man of his military genius, and with Europe crying aloud for reorganization, the contradictions and complexities of Napoleon's career. He had little feeling, it must be granted, if indeed he had any, for the real greatness of liberty: he admired Rousseau, but he had no eyes for the inner meaning of Rousseau's "General Will." What he did have was a sense, astonishingly correct when not obscured by his own egotism, of the conditions, political, legal, social, under which men would at

least consent to live and work, and a power, almost unique in history since the days of the Cæsars whom he recalls, of roughing-out the indispensable framework and getting it set up.

He called himself the child of the Revolution, and in a sense he was always that, though he always resembled one side of the family much more than the other. The impulse towards a new order in which there would be a chance for all men to exert their powers—*la carriére ouverte aux talents*—that, undeniably, was a seminal impulse in the Revolution. And those who were most in sympathy with it were usually determined to spread the new order over the whole world, so far as they could. Nor did they shrink from force. Rousseau had drawn back from the Plan for Perpetual Peace with the warning that it could not, in all probability, be made a reality without a terrible upheaval: "what is to the public interest," he wrote, "can only be introduced by force simply because particular interests are almost always opposed to it." But a warning like that is an incitement to revolutionaries.

Thus, when we try to sum up the effect of the Revolution and Napoleon together on the international outlook, we are faced with more

than usually large items of benefit and harm. Together they did spread new ideas of independence and co-operation, and Napoleon's achievement of inspiring Italy, Poland, and the Rhineland States with better ideals of government was almost wholly to the good. Yet he did this work to the accompaniment of force, he had no use for any doctrine of non-interference, and all through his career no more scruple than Machiavelli about Machiavellian methods. Moreover, he was the first European ruler to make a practice of conscription. Alike the dazzling success and the permanent value of his exploits made what was vicious in his example the more alluring. And along with this went, inevitably, an increase in that mutual distrust between European States which has been the curse of Europe. When Dubois was writing in the fourteenth century he could say, as we saw, that it would be impossible for any man in his senses to aim at the universal mastery of Christendom, and, even after the Hapsburgs and Louis XIV, Rousseau could disregard that particular danger as negligible. But Napoleon showed the Continent that for a time at least the thing could be done, and to end it had cost the nations more than enough. Inoffensiveness,

they were taught, was no barrier against ambition on this scale. Germany, in particular, had learnt to fight Napoleon with his own weapons, and some of her leaders never forgot the lesson. Nothing, they thought, but a nation's own military power, self-reliant and trusting only to itself, could save it from the aggressiveness of its neighbours. Thus new barriers were erected against anything like a real union in Europe.

But Napoleon never saw this himself. On the contrary: he looked forward at the end of his life, if we may trust Montholon who in this matter seems quite worthy of the trust, to a time when his son and heir would "reunite Europe in federal links that could never be broken" (*réunir l'Europe dans des liens fédératifs indissolubles*). Nor was this to be done by force of arms. Elsewhere Napoleon is reported to have said that nothing in his life had impressed him more than the inability of the sword to settle anything, and here, in his "Testament" to his son, he warned him expressly against attempting any repetition of his own military triumphs. Characteristically, vanity and self-excuse are mixed up with his statesmanship, but the statesmanship is there. "To do my work over again would be to imply that I had

done nothing. But to complete it would prove the solidity of the foundations, and make plain the plan of the building that had only been indicated. One can't do the same thing twice over in the same century. I was obliged to master Europe by the sword: to-day she must be convinced." Again, "There are national aspirations, which, sooner or later, must be satisfied, and it is towards this goal that we should advance. My son's position will be full of difficulty. I want him to do by universal consent what circumstances compelled me to do by force of arms. . . . I cut the Gordian knot of the nations: to-day it must be untied."

In the dreams of his exile Napoleon actually went back to the "might-have-beens" and the plans of St. Pierre and Rousseau. If only England and France had co-operated! "It is wonderful to think," he said, "what might have been the fortune of France and of Europe, if England had listened to the voice of a generous statesmanship and taken the French Revolution for her friend! The scaffold would never have dominated France: the kings would not have been shaken on their thrones; all of them, to a greater or less degree, would have forestalled revolt and revolution. Europe as a whole would have

become, without any upheaval, constitutional and free, without jealousy and without ambition. The plan of St. Pierre might have been realized."

Saul also is among the prophets. Nor is there any reason, given the circumstances of the time, to doubt that ideas of the sort were actually in Napoleon's mind. Whether he would ever have made any serious attempt to carry them out is another question. That, it may be admitted, is at least doubtful. Certainly he seems never to have had an inkling of the fact that his own methods had been more calculated to impede than advance them. Even after letting his imagination play round the plan of St. Pierre he goes on dreaming of one more conquest for France, "only one," just to give her "the beautiful frontier of the Alps and the Rhine." And with that the spectres rise before the reader of all the battles still to be fought for the same beautiful frontier, on either side. This sort of inconsistency makes part of the tragedy in Napoleon's life. He had both power and opportunity, as Shelley saw; he could, had he chosen, have reorganized Europe on a basis of peace and liberty and union. But for that he would have had to be greater than himself:

"He sought to win

"The world, and lost all that it did contain
Of greatness, in its hope destroyed; and more
Of fame and peace than virtue's self can gain

"Without the opportunity which bore
Him on its eagle pinions to the peak
From which a thousand climbers have before

"Fallen, as Napoleon fell."

Yet all this does not imply that Montholon is inventing out of his head when he purports to record Napoleon. The ideas were in the air, and Napoleon, for all his contempt of "idéologues," was too able a man not to understand that ideas were forces and respond to their force. In France, moreover, those particular ideas were not only imbedded in a long succession of works by isolated thinkers: they had been given new life, as the example of Turgot indicates, through the hopes of the Revolution. For the belief in "Humanity" as an advancing Whole was "the creed of Republicanism," as Mr. Lowes Dickinson points out in his *Revolution and Reaction*, a creed to be developed later by Auguste Comte, who, if he had the priggishness of a pontiff had also the fervour of an apostle and a width of mind worthy the science he

revered. The Revolutionary term of opprobrium for Pitt was "ennemi du genre humain," "enemy of the human race," not "of the French race."

It is true that no man of action in France nor any professed politician since Sully ever made a serious attempt to give concrete form to these ideas, but from the days of the Revolution to our own, through men like Comte, Saint-Simon, Victor Hugo and Anatole France, the hope of something like a United States for Europe has been constantly expressed. Nor was the idea limited to France. We find it shared by Jeremy Bentham in England, a true cosmopolitan in feeling and recognized as such abroad. And from the other end of Europe, from the Russia that Sully had found unfit for his Christian Commonwealth, there came, at the opening of the nineteenth century, the first proposals for a Christian Alliance. The "Holy Alliance" has become a byword, and indeed much connected with it was deplorable, but the thoughtful students of internationalism are beginning to recognize that also there was much in the proposals that deserved a better reception, even if we do not go so far as to say, as Goethe did to Eckermann in 1827, that nothing greater nor more beneficial had

ever been devised and that the opposition to it, like the opposition to Napoleon, sprang from a factious desire to belittle greatness. Its merits have recently been emphasized by Professor Grant and Mr. Temperley in their book, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*. They speak of the draft drawn up and circulated by the Czar Alexander in the September of 1815 as a "really moving document." They take Alexander to have been neither fool nor charlatan, though he had his drawbacks and his limitations. "To him it seemed," they write, "that the one thing necessary was to proclaim the adhesion of all governments and all public men to the principles of Christianity. A clear standard of right and duty thus would be set up. The Governments of Europe, faithful to these ideas, and freed from the threat of revolution, would lead their peoples along the path of friendship and peace."

But the document embodying these principles and that all Christian sovereigns were asked to sign seemed to Castlereagh only "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense," and he and Prince Metternich "examined every practical expedient to stop it." "When the Czar presented it to Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington, 'it was not without diffi-

culty that they went through it with becoming gravity.' But the Czar was too important a person to be openly flouted and they were content to pour cold water on the project, and to limit its influence as far as possible." The final judgment reached by Grant and Temperley is admirably fair. "The project of a world union of Christian States," they write, "never left the mind of the Czar, though it soon became overlaid by other motives—fear of revolution and ambition for power. It had not the slightest influence on the public policy of Europe, and is usually treated as unworthy of serious consideration. It can clearly be riddled with practical criticisms. Its motives were too narrow and indefinite; it took no account of the non-Christian world; it lacked entirely organization and machinery. But as we look back at it across the great wars of the nineteenth century and the greatest war of all which came early in the twentieth, we cannot help wishing that Castlereagh and Wellington had tried to give it practical efficiency instead of merely treating it with ridicule." "If British political experience had come into alliance with Russian idealism they might have given Europe an experiment in organic life which would have been of priceless advantage."

It is important to realize that the plan as Alexander conceived it was never even attempted. Its place was taken by the Quadruple Alliance, signed at Paris in November, 1815, between Russia, Prussia, Austria and England, and the Quintuple Alliance formed at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, between the same countries with the addition of France. All that was left of Alexander's original idea was that the Heads of the States in question should meet regularly to confer and take measures for the peace of Europe, or, in the cumbrous words of the Paris Treaty, "to renew, at fixed periods, whether under the immediate auspices of the Sovereigns, or by their respective Ministers, reunions devoted to the great common interests and to the examination of the measures which, at any of these periods, shall be judged most salutary for the repose and prosperity of the peoples, and for the maintenance of the peace of the State."

It is obvious that this clause, like so many of its kind, could mean much or little according to the spirit in which it was carried out. To the Czar it came to mean the right of interference in other countries against revolutionary movements. This was really the rock on which, in the end, the whole scheme broke. And if England is to be blamed, as she may

well be, for not having responded more generously to the finer elements in Alexander's proposals, she is also to be praised for not having yielded to the despotic. The Russian idea of interference in Spain where a democratic movement was on foot, and where Shelley saw liberty, "the lightning of the nations," flashing again through the darkness, was bound to be anathema to all English friends of freedom. In such matters Castlereagh and Shelley, Canning and Byron were at one. Canning's cry of relief when the Congress system came to an end, "Each nation for itself, and God for us all!" is no more contemptuous of the Alliance than Byron's fury:

"Shut up the bald-coot bully Alexander,
Ship off the Holy Three to Senegal,
Tell them that sauce for goose is sauce for gander
And ask them how they'd like to be in thrall!"

And yet, at the same time, the Congress system can claim the merit of having been the first attempt actually to recognize that the affairs of Europe could only be settled in common. If its failure has been used as an argument against a League of Nations, what success it did have was reflected during the years until the Great War in the value

ascribed by many statesmen, and those far from sentimental, to what they called "the Concert of Europe." The main lesson from the attempt is, in short, two-fold, and exactly corresponds with the warning of Kant, to wit, that a League in Europe was essential, but required a free constitution in every one of its members if it were to function properly. When one remembers that serfdom was not extinguished in Russia till past the middle of the nineteenth century, while it had been practically banished from England since the fourteenth, we can measure something of the gulf that still subsisted between Eastern and Western Europe. But in some ways this fact reflects the more credit on Russians, who, like Alexander, gave, however inadequately, a signal of advance to nations who considered themselves to be leading the van.

There was much indeed to be done in Europe at large before any of the nations could be regarded as promising units in an alliance for liberty and peace. Nor was much done till after the first quarter of the century. But before passing on to this something should be said about the international arrangements for Switzerland. Her independence was guaranteed after Waterloo and her neutrality promised. Both pledges were of

value and both have been well observed. This is the first and one of the outstanding successes in the attempt to restrict war by agreement. That corner of Europe has never been touched through all the fighting that has gone on since, though it has lain in the path of combatants and though it is a tiny State without any access to the sea. Switzerland has another interest for the student of internationalism. Her case is constantly quoted by nationalists, and quite rightly, as an instance of the mysterious force which binds men in unity though they may be of different races, speak different languages, and profess different forms of religion, but who live together, work together and make common cause in peace and war. But here the internationalist will ask, if this achievement is possible on a small scale, may not a larger instalment of it be possible on a larger? And the question becomes the more insistent the more the world is drawn together by the speed of transit and communication which has increased at so astonishing a rate since the end of the eighteenth century. In this connection the example of the United States has been of a significance that is seldom appreciated. A country as large as Europe, inhabited by the most diverse of the white races

and with the problem of a great negro population to boot, it has been welded together for more than a hundred and fifty years with only one internal convulsion and it shows every sign of persisting in a firmer and firmer unity. America ought to be a source of inspiration to Europe, not an object for detraction. Nor should we fail to notice that the American achievement, like the Swiss, has been accomplished in and through representative and federal government.

CHAPTER XI

EUROPE SINCE NAPOLEON

At the close of the Napoleonic Wars none of the great States in Europe had institutions that were in any full sense representative at all. But the forces that made for these were present and active, and from 1830 onwards the movement began to triumph in France and in England and to influence all other countries profoundly. The idea of international organization, save for the exceptions we have noticed, sank into the background, but the nations themselves began to attack their own problems in a manner to revive hope. Napoleon had spoken of national ambitions that would have to be satisfied before any real harmony in Europe was possible. The middle of the century saw satisfaction given to some of them, the frustrated attempts of others, and in all instances a mixture of nobility and meanness, of idealism and Machiavellianism, of gene-

rosity and greed, of war and peace that recall the contrasts of the Renaissance in their mixture of good auguries and bad.

The leading cases are the Unification of Germany and the Liberation of Italy. It has been customary, especially during and immediately after the Great War, to contrast the methods by which either was achieved. But the likeness is in some ways as important for our purpose as the contrast. In each case there was a strong liberal and republican element, although Germany in the mid-nineteenth century had no man of action and no prophet to compare with Garibaldi and Mazzini. In each case there was, on the other hand, an able, high-minded, but unscrupulous patriot, the Minister of a small compact State, who saw his way to make his own particular country the head of a larger whole and to exact that headship as the price for his work in giving unity and power to the rest. There is a real likeness between Bismarck and Cavour, between Piedmont and Prussia. Cavour had, doubtless, far more belief in liberty than Bismarck, but he was hardly less Machiavellian. "If you and I had done for ourselves what we have done for Italy," so he is reported to have said to a colleague, "we should have been a precious pair of rogues."

It has been customary also, and indeed almost universal, to talk of Mazzini as though he were a vague idealist, with a hazy system dependent on amiable sentiments for whatever force it possessed. This may have been true of Alexander: it is not true of Mazzini. It would be truer to say that his doctrine was almost too precise and the details almost too carefully thought-out. Mazzini failed, but if he had succeeded he might have inspired a new Europe. The noble bitterness that his failure brought to him comes out in his saying that nothing can be worse than to find the thing you had loved unworthy of its mission. Italy was the thing he loved and he wanted her "to give the new word to Europe."

In Mazzini's view every great epoch in history had a "Word," a leading idea to contribute towards the growth of Man, and often this word was given by some leading nation. Rome had given it twice to Europe, once as Rome of the Cæsars, once as Rome of the Papacy, and each time it was a word of unity: the time had come for her to give it again as Rome of the Republicans, and it would be a finer unity than ever, for it would be the Word of free co-operation between equal nations. He believed in nationality intensely, but only as an element in the larger

whole. Nationality was the completion of individuality, but not itself complete without this. The French Revolution, he was accustomed to say, closed one epoch, the epoch of the struggle towards individual freedom. Now a new epoch was opening, and it was because many of the Revolutionists failed to see this or to realize how the completion of one stage, if it was to be really fruitful, must mean the beginning of another, that the Revolution itself hung fire, halted, and might have perished.

The pressing task before Europe was now to build a framework for co-operation, "associazione" as he called it, in every possible way. With all this, Mazzini was neither Socialist nor Communist, and for the following reason: he thought that any form of the Socialism advocated in his time was bound to end in dictatorship by a minority. He wanted no dictatorship, least of all in his own country. What all men needed and what his Italians needed imperatively was, he believed, training for free political action in common, and this training was impossible under a dictatorship. A unified Italy he desired most earnestly, but almost all his political writings show that he was equally in earnest about decentralization. He wanted a fully developed system of local government,

the country organized in Communes where the people could learn through experience and through tradition—he attached great importance to a good tradition—the way to manage their own small affairs, and so be the better fitted to elect and to watch the representatives of the nation as a whole. Of course he loathed Cavour's policy: it was impossible that he should not. He saw that the assistance of Piedmont was necessary if Italy was to be united and independent, but he wanted Piedmont to give this generously and without bargaining beforehand. "Let us all help first to make Italy free," that was Mazzini's attitude, "and then let the nation meet in a Constituent Assembly and decide whether she wants a Monarchy or a Republic."

He would never have liked a Monarchy: he had seen too much of kings. But if his plan had been followed, if Italy had chosen freely, even though she had chosen the King, it is probable that instead of dying in exile he would have worked in an Italian Parliament. And it is impossible to read his writings now, carefully and dispassionately, without being struck by their insight and their foresight. He believed, it is true (and this is generally known by those who know anything about him at all), that the Nation was the

necessary middle term between the Individual and Mankind, and he believed that nations, properly organized and trained, would not make war in the way that dynasties had done. He has been criticized for this last belief. Nations, democratic nations, have shown themselves, it is said, quite as aggressive and warlike as kings. There is some truth in this and the warning is of value, but the criticism goes too far both against democracy and against Mazzini. On a full review, the wars of potentates, hereditary or self-made, must be judged as considerably worse and more wanton. And for Mazzini two things should be said. A prophet, and he was essentially a prophet, who points out the line of advance, almost always sees the goal as nearer than it actually is. But also, and more important for us to remember, democracies that set out to conquer have not been trained as Mazzini would have trained them. He hated the idea of a "people-king" as much as the idea of a "man-king": he fulminated against the self-flattery of "a chosen people, a Napoleon-people," who arrogated to themselves the sole right of initiative, a moral usurpation equally bad for the despiser and the despised. The cure lay in the education of an imaginative sympathy that could respect the ideals of

another nation as it would wish its own to be respected. But education for this has been, and still is, woefully deficient. There has not been the response demanded and hoped for by Mazzini as by Comte. The intellectuals have been, on the whole, quite as narrow as the untrained, and in no country do they recognize adequately that to foster dislike of any nation as a nation is to block the one way of escape for us all. A nation will not hold together without sympathy between its members, whatever its constitution: no more will a League of Nations. To say that such sympathy is impossible is to despair, and if the intellectuals would only watch their tongues and their pens and their tempers they might discover that it was not nearly so difficult as they had supposed.

In another respect also the example of Mazzini is a permanent source of inspiration. When he got the opportunity to use his powers as a man of action he, like Garibaldi, used them without a touch of cruelty or treachery. Garibaldi and Mazzini were fighting for a nation's existence if ever men did so fight, but no reproach of inhumanity can be brought against them. They take their places with Jeanne d'Arc, with Lincoln and Lee of Virginia, as outstanding instances of

the superficiality in the statement that all laws are always broken in war if the fighters have much at stake. Nor did these men, and here Cavour, to the honour of his statesmanship, was with them, ever claim for Italy territory that would have left another nation aggrieved. On the contrary, Cavour, when he surrendered Nice and the country round it to France, gave up lands to which Italy had a clear right, greatly, by the way, to Garibaldi's exasperation. But the student of Europe's destiny can only wish devoutly that Bismarck had exasperated the German soldiers in the same manner. Against his better judgment, Bismarck allowed Metz to be taken from France after 1870, but he must bear his share of the blame, for no one doubts that he always intended to annex the greater portion of Alsace and Lorraine. It was his move in the old wretched game of tit-for-tat, a game where the player who has won the last round always believes that it ought to be the last of all. "Who is it you think you are fighting now?" a sympathizer with France is said to have asked him. "Louis XIV," he answered. But it was Europe's future that took the wound. And one sign of her pathological state was the increasing practice of conscription and the fevered race for armaments.

In matters of this kind, moreover, nothing succeeds so dangerously as success. Bismarck, it is true, like Pericles, was prepared to stop after the three wars that he had thought essential. But few of his admirers were willing to copy his moderation, either at home or abroad. The increase in power that came to Germany as a result of successful warfare and enlarged territory was too alluring not to attract imitators. Her example was now added to that of France and of England, and in the second half of the nineteenth century the note of "expansion" is dominant in the policy of all the great European States. "Too much power," wrote an historian so well-balanced as Gardiner, and with reference to his own England, "is never good for man or nation." But what nation has yet recognized this as it should? The Concert of Europe had still a spasmodic existence, but in every quarter of the world except North America friction was incessant and ominous between the leading musicians. One has only to mention the names of Russia and Afghanistan, of France and Egypt, of the Transvaal and Germany, of Turkey, Austria and the Balkans to realize this.

Two other factors complicated a situation already too complex for any safety under

the old system. First, the just aspirations of the smaller States in the east and south-east of Europe were still thwarted: Poland and Hungary could not get free from rulers whom they detested, and what success Greece and the Balkans did achieve against tyranny was won largely in defiance of the interested lethargy, sometimes the veiled hostility, of nations to whom any growth in the influence of a powerful neighbour was a matter of more concern than the freeing of little peoples from intolerable oppression. Next, there was the commercial factor, the race for markets and for the control of raw materials. This has always been a factor in wars, and there is a modern school that, as we have had occasion to note, considers it the dominant factor. Without going so far as that, we must acknowledge its immense power for war-making when, though only when, it intertwines with nationalism. This is what many Free-Traders failed to see in their hopes that Free-Trade alone would ensure peace. Commercialism alone might make for peace, certainly, because war is destructive and commerce thrives on production. But men do not merely want to make money: they want to make it in their own country, beneath their own flag, and under conditions laid down

by their own compatriots. Once allow these two impulses unlimited play and there is no limit to the territory they will covet and the forces they will demand for its "protection." But along these paths collision with rivals of the same temper becomes, sooner or later, inevitable. The only way of defence is by timely conference and compromise, the compromise which surrenders not principle but power, the conference where the interests of all are honestly considered. But to most statesmen in the nineteenth century, "defence" meant armaments and "conference" meant bargaining, as they mean to far too many still.

This, however, is a long way from the whole truth, and it would be mistaken to end this book on a note of pessimism. The Victorians had some reason for their complacency. In the first place there were isolated achievements that indicated a substantial advance. Slavery was prohibited in all British dominions and by that prohibition one of the oldest institutions in the world, and one of the worst, was shaken to its roots. This was in 1833 after a deliberate campaign of half a century: "it was an obstinate hill to climb," but the liberators won to the top. A generation later, across the Atlantic, after

the only desperate war in the United States, it was decided that "the Union could not continue half-slave and half-free," and "Father Abraham" brought into safety, not only the Union, but the slave and with him the slave-owner. As a young man he had said in the slave-market, "If ever I get a chance to hit that thing, I'll hit it hard," and of all his pithy sayings none go nearer the heart of human dignity than his quiet remark later, "As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a slave-owner."

In two other respects the American Civil War is notable for an internationalist, first, because it saw the maintenance of peace between America and England through the good sense and good feeling of Lincoln and Victoria over the *Trent* affair, in spite of ill-advised clamour on either side. Victoria and Prince Albert together stopped the sending of a bellicose despatch and Lincoln decided to comply with the reasonable demand for the surrender of the two Southerners seized upon the English ship:

> "We give the critters back, John,
> 'Cos Abraham thought it right:
> It warn't your bloomin' clack, John,
> Provokin' us to fight."

In the next place England consented to

arbitrate over the *Alabama* case, the privateer that had been fitted out in Liverpool Docks to help the Southern States against the North. We English do well to applaud ourselves for this consent, though it may be thought we do it a little too often and even talk sometimes as though it implied that we had arbitrated enough. But taken as a beginning, it was a good beginning.

And in this connection a word should be said about the Declaration of Paris some years before. The last war ever fought between the United States and ourselves had been fought over the question of our Navy's right to interfere with neutral commerce and neutral ships. Almost every historian agrees now that we claimed too much at that time, but the war ended, in 1814, without any decision on the points at issue. Speaking broadly, the continental nations took the same view as America, but we, as the dominant Naval Power, were loth to accept anything that would limit the power of our Navy. After the Crimean War, however, in 1856, England at last modified her attitude. "The Declaration of Paris," to quote Trevelyan's summary, "laid it down that privateering should be abolished, that a neutral flag should cover enemy goods if not contraband of war,

and that blockades, to be valid in theory, must be effective in practice." It was an honest attempt to make a fair compromise between the rights of belligerents and the rights of neutrals, and it made a good solution, given the circumstances of the time. But it did not solve the problem finally. The meaning of the word "effective," for example, has been incessantly disputed, some taking it to imply that there must be a cordon of ships round a limited area close enough to prevent any ordinary vessel from passing at all, others that it is sufficient if the blockader is able to check the main supplies of munitions being carried by sea to the enemy country. In any case the United States never accepted the compromise, and in our own days the matter has taken on new aspects owing to the prevalence of conscription, the growth of scientific armaments, the intricacy of modern commerce and the speed of transit everywhere. It is, for example, no longer possible to lay down years beforehand distinctions between "contraband" and "non-contraband." Copper and cotton, for example, became, suddenly, essential elements in munitions. Nor is there any port on the Continent now so remote in practice from any other that it could be considered, without controversy,

as lying outside the sphere of an "effective" blockade. If a navy, therefore, is to use its powers as effectively in fact as before, a case can easily be made out for great latitude of interpretation. On the other hand, and for the same reasons, the interference of a navy may now involve much greater inconvenience to neutrals and much more widespread suffering to non-combatants. Whole populations are involved in modern warfare.

Yet the very complexities of the situation may indicate avenues towards solution. In the first place, as we have already pointed out, it is becoming increasingly clear that neutrals will only approve the free use of any navy when it is used "in defence of international contracts internationally interpreted." And in the next, the making of armaments is now so prodigious a part of any campaign that, if once the rest of the world would consent to disarm to the level of Germany, as the Allies appeared to promise in the Treaty of Versailles, and if once the United States joined the League, as President Wilson expected them to do, it would be a comparatively easy matter for any efficient navy to bring a recalcitrant State to reason by stopping the sea-borne supplies, not of food, but of materials for munitions. In short, the princi-

ples of the Paris Declaration, if interpreted to suit modern needs and coupled with the limitation of armaments and the regular practice of arbitration, would be in a fair way to settle the thorny question for good.

But, before leaving the topic of America, mention must be made of a step taken by ourselves and the United States in 1817, three years after the close of the miserable little war just referred to. It was a step the significance of which was hardly felt at the time, but the memory of it, a hundred years later, was like a lamp in the darkness of the Great War, and it ought to throw light on the paths of the future. Both of us agreed to disarm all along the Canadian frontier. The actual details of that frontier were not settled for more than a generation, but they were discussed and decided without any threat of war, and the line, the longest and safest frontier-line in the world, stands to this day without a fortress or an armament of any kind.

Three other events ought to be noticed of good augury for internationalism, two connected with little States and the third with Russia. The Red Cross Society was founded towards the middle of the century by a Swiss, an institution which survived and proved its value when so much else was engulfed in the

catastrophe of 1914. Sweden, towards the close of the century, allowed Norway to separate from her in peace and in so doing gave an example of courage and magnanimity much needed by much more powerful States. And in 1899 and 1907 the last Czar of all the Russias gave a lead to the rest of Europe by making the first official proposals for the all-round limitation of armaments and the setting-up of a permanent Court for impartial arbitration. Nothing came at the time of the proposals for disarmament, but something was done for a permanent arbitral Court at The Hague "which could be called into action, whenever two Powers wished to use it for the settlement of any disputes."

Here at last was the beginning of a law-court that could give substance to "international law," and the most thoughtful of internationalists foresee in its development an indispensable requisite for "the establishment of public right in Europe." Law-courts have always been necessary for individuals within the nations: here for the first time something like one was set up between the nations. But until all nations bind themselves to use it in all "legal" cases, the parallel is not complete and its powers are grievously hampered. To sign "the optional clause" which arranges for

this may be counted the greatest single step forward any one Power could now take in the cause of international confidence, and to Germany belongs the honour of having been the first great Power to do so.

That the initiative should have come in the first instance from Russia gives further cause for hope. All countries, perhaps, are countries of paradox, and national character can only be described in contraries. But Russia appears among the most paradoxical of all. There has been more cruelty and tyranny there than anywhere else in Europe, and yet, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, there has also come from Russia the most moving of all voices for peace and pity and goodwill. The influence of Tolstoy has been incalculable, going far beyond the circle of those who adhere to his uncompromising doctrines of non-resistance and passive endurance. He spoke to the conscience of Europe, and many were roused at least to recognize that there was something profoundly wrong in our present system even if they could not accept the remedies he proposed. And along with Tolstoy came the great outburst of Russian literature after which it ought to be impossible ever again to think of Russia as a barbarous country. The turmoil through

which she is going now is only what was to be expected in a revolution after centuries of misgovernment.

Nor was it Russia only that came into the circle of cultured thought during the nineteenth century. Scholarship and philology and æsthetics began to teach us what treasures lay in the religious thought of India, in the poetry and art of China and in the allied civilization of Japan. Japan, for her part, deliberately ranged herself side by side with the nations of the West. The transformation she willingly underwent is one of the most remarkable ever known in history. From some points of view it is sinister, for Japan felt herself obliged to join the race in modern armaments. "For centuries," so a Japanese is reported to have said, "we maintained a dignified religion, a lofty code of honour, a beautiful and delicate art, an exquisite tradition of manners, and Europe called us barbarians. Now we have shown that we can murder on the great scale, and Europe exclaims, 'Why, they are civilized!'" But, all deductions made, it is a gain to have a Yellow race meeting the White on terms of equality, moving among similar ideas and dealing with the same problems. And, whatever deductions must be made in other

matters, there are none needed for the co-operation in science, where Japan has taken an honourable part. In science, at any rate, co-operation has made strides during the hundred and odd years since Napoleon recognized the renown of Jenner as transcending country and passing the barriers of war. The mutual recognition between Pasteur and Lister, the devotion of American doctors, officers and privates, when they cleared Cuba of yellow fever at the risk of their own lives, these things are quite as thrilling as any tale of heroism and comradeship on the battle-field, and infinitely more promising for the common sense of mankind.

Further, as regards co-operation in the technical sense of team-work between capitalists and labourers, new chapters, and many chapters, have been opened since the French Revolution. The writing on their pages is still hard to read, and they lie at present on the fringe of our subject, but they are too important to be passed over without notice. The cry connected with the Socialism of Karl Marx, "Workers of the World, unite!" may prove in the end to be a cry announcing a new and wiser order. At present it is used too often as a bugle-call to announce a change from national war to class-war, a change that

would only leave things "more the same" than ever. None the less it is of extraordinary value as forcing on the attention of the work-man in the street how clearly connected his main interests are with those of workmen across the frontier. And, from another angle, we can notice that the development of "big business" may cut across frontiers to the lasting benefit of us all. It is becoming plainer and plainer that the valuable economies of production on a large scale can only be effective when the scale really is large. The tiny sections into which Europe is now divided are like allotment-gardens where steam-ploughs are needed.

The problems ahead are difficult enough, and no attempt has been made in this brief essay to disguise their difficulties. Man is faced, as Kant prophesied, with the last and hardest ascent. And he is being driven, as Kant also prophesied, to realize the fact through the crushing disasters into which his want of foresight has led him. Before the Great War the mass of people in all civilized countries, apart from an active minority of militarists, did not really believe that it would come. They thought that the swollen armaments were, on the whole, a guarantee of peace. Some of us thought them a needless

and burdensome guarantee, and some of us thought them dangerous. But the ordinary man and woman had no idea how little they guaranteed and how dangerous they were. We know now. In consequence there is a movement for international organization, arbitration, and limitation of armaments that is wider and deeper and more firmly based on common reason and common experience than has ever been known before. And through all the tragedy of the Great War, the war showed one thing plainly, and that was that the stores of endurance and self-sacrifice in the plain man are well-nigh illimitable. We have a sufficient reserve of spiritual strength to draw on, if we send it along the right channels. As we looked along the perspective of history we saw a succession of isolated thinkers, and heard voices crying in the wilderness, pointing out the right way, but the plain man seemed blind and deaf. Now, at last, there is really an army opening their eyes and listening and asking to be led. Let our statesmen be the leaders.

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